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ABSTRACT 
 
Recently, important changes have taken place in the firm’s institutional and 
information environment (e.g. Sarbanes Oxley Act, Regulation Fair Disclosure, 
IFRS) aiming at increasing the level of transparency and disclosure. Consistently, the 
empirical literature has provided new evidence on the relationship among internal 
corporate governance system, institutional features and several dimensions of 
disclosure policies. Review studies of disclosure and corporate governance literature 
have also been developed in order to have a systematic classification of the recent 
advances made in these fields (Beyer et al., 2010; Dechow et al., 2010; Brown et al., 
2011; Armstrong et al., 2010). 
The objective of this thesis is to contribute to the large mosaic of theory and evidence 
concerning the role of corporate governance for disclosure policies, focusing on the 
relationship among different sources of corporate information.  
A large body of literature claims that the role of disclosure is pivotal for the capital 
market efficiency (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Research shows that financial reporting 
quality and voluntary disclosure improve stock market liquidity (Healy et al., 1999), 
reduce information asymmetries and cost of capital (Botosan & Plumlee, 2002; 
Easley & O’Hara, 2004). Although it is widely acknowledged that firms’ governance 
structure affects disclosure choices (Dechow et al., 1996; Vafeas, 2000; Klein, 2002), 
there is still an open debate on whether disclosure acts as a complement or a 
substitute for other corporate governance mechanisms (LaPorta et al., 1998; Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997; Beekes & Brown, 2006).  
To date, existing empirical studies on the relation between governance and disclosure 
and their capital market effects selectively focus on a single aspect of a firm’s 
information environment such as financial accounting information (e.g. accounting 
quality), or alternatively, different features of voluntary disclosure, mainly ignoring 
interdependencies and complementarities among various sources of corporate 
information (i.e. financial accounting, mandatory non-accounting information and 
voluntary disclosures). Nevertheless, financial reporting environment is complex and 
develops endogenously in order to solve information asymmetries between insiders 
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and outsiders as well as agency problems between principals and agents (Beyer et al., 
2010). Therefore, the economic role of financial reporting cannot be evaluated 
separately from other sources of corporate information, since mandatory and 
voluntary disclosures can either complement or substitute each other (Ball et al., 
2011). 
Moving from this line of research this thesis investigates (i) the nature of the 
relationship between mandatory and voluntary disclosure (ii) the role of internal and 
external corporate governance characteristics for the managers’ decision to disclose 
information not mandated by the law (iii) the influence of the governance system on 
the informativeness of discretionary strategies in corporate narratives across 
alternative disclosure media. 
The thesis is structured in two sections. The first section reviews contributions to 
these topics from accounting, finance, and corporate governance literature in order to 
build a framework for the analysis of the relationship between corporate governance, 
accounting and other disclosure policies in the capital market. 
The review starts with the main theories explaining the firms’ supply and market’s 
demand for voluntary disclosure and the reasons why we need a regulation for 
disclosure. Then, the capital market effect of financial reporting transparency and 
voluntary disclosure are discussed. Moving from the increasing importance of 
narrative and descriptive disclosures inside the reporting package of the firm, the 
second paragraph examines reporting challenges related to the measurement, the 
informativeness and the credibility of such disclosures. The third paragraph points 
out the heterogeneity among disclosure practices and discusses the country-level and 
firm-level factors behind such variability, then focusing on the role of corporate 
governance system. The paragraph continues with a review of the studies on the 
relationship between governance structure and firm transparency and concludes with 
the debate on the complementarity vs. substitution between corporate governance 
and disclosure. Finally, the fourth paragraph illustrates the proposed research 
framework, discussing the research gaps and research questions addressed in 
empirical analyses, then highlighting their contribution to the research field. 
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The second section presents two empirical analyses based on archival and hand-
collected data that, using a deductive approach, investigate interrelated research 
questions. 
The first empirical study aims at understanding to what extent the firm’s internal and 
external governance characteristics affect voluntary disclosure strategies and their 
interaction with mandatory disclosure. To clearly distinguish between mandatory and 
voluntary information, the analysis is focused on the risk disclosure provided by 
Oil&Gas companies. In such a setting this study examines if firm’s voluntary 
disclosure choices are affected by their own mandatory disclosure strategies 
(substitute vs. complement). As related question, it analyses the influence of the 
board-based monitoring (firm-level incentives) and the strength of the institutions 
(country-level incentives) on the decision to disclose voluntary information. 
This study aims at providing empirical evidence on the direct relationship between 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure, thus complementing the theoretical studies 
exploring their interaction (Einhorn, 2005; Bagnoli & Watts, 2007). It also 
contributes to an emerging literature on the interplay between internal and external 
governance mechanisms and their influence on corporate transparency (Durnev & 
Kim, 2005; Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Doidge et al., 2007; Berretta et al., 2010). 
Finally, this research’s evidence could provide regulators and policy makers with 
useful knowledge in order to design new mandatory disclosure regulation in light of 
their impact on voluntary disclosure decisions. 
The second empirical research examines whether the firm’s governance 
characteristics and its accounting policies affect the informational value of 
discretionary strategies in corporate narratives. The focus is on environmental 
information provided by Oil&Gas companies, that are at the centre of a debate on 
their potential for increasing firms’ accountability towards stakeholders, versus being 
just another tool for corporate public relations (Cho et al., 2012). 
This study investigates if managers use environmental disclosure to opportunistically 
affect the users’ perception of corporate achievement (i.e. impression management), 
or rather provide useful information for predicting future environmental 
performance. In addition, it explores whether and to what extent the informativeness 
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of discretionary disclosure strategies varies according to reporting incentives coming 
from the board of directors’ characteristics. 
This research is meant at answering the recent call in the impression management 
studies for incorporating both possibilities (impression management vs. incremental 
information) into research design aiming at investigating discretionary disclosure 
strategies in corporate narratives (Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007). Moreover, it adds 
to the literature on the influence of the board of directors’ characteristics on 
environmental disclosure by examining two dimensions of the board activity (board 
monitoring and stakeholder orientation) both separately and simultaneously (Mallin 
et al., 2012). Finally, its findings could help investors and policy makers to interpret 
managers’ discretionary disclosure choices in corporate narratives, shedding light on 
some conditions that could compensate the managers’ legal accountability for 
qualitative disclosures. 
The thesis concludes with a discussion of the main findings, their contribution to the 
proposed framework, limitations and directions for future research. 
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PREFAZIONE 
 
Il tema dell’influenza delle caratteristiche del governo sulla qualità comunicazione 
economico-finanziaria delle imprese ha da sempre occupato un ruolo di rilievo nella 
letteratura economico-aziendale nazionale ed internazionale. 
Negli anni più recenti si è assistito ad un susseguirsi di significativi cambiamenti nel 
contesto istituzionale (Sarbanes Oxley Act, Regulation Fair Disclosure, IFRS) 
finalizzati ad aumentare il livello di trasparenza nella comunicazione esterna. Studi 
empirici nella letteratura di governance e accounting hanno messo in luce nuove 
evidenze sulla relazione tra caratteristiche interne al sistema di governance, ambiente 
istituzionale e svariate dimensioni delle politiche di comunicazione aziendale. Al 
contempo, numerose rassegne della letteratura hanno proposto una sistematizzazione 
dei più recenti sviluppi di questo filone di studi (Beyer et al., 2010; Dechow et al., 
2010; Brown et al., 2011; Armstrong et al., 2010). 
L’obiettivo del presente lavoro è offrire un contributo al mosaico di teoria ed 
evidenze empiriche concernenti il ruolo del sistema di governo societario per la 
trasparenza aziendale, attraverso un esame della relazione tra struttura di governance 
e politiche di comunicazione adottate dalle imprese nei diversi veicoli 
d’informazione al mercato. 
Un filone ben consolidato di studi mostra come le politiche di disclosure rivestano 
un ruolo centrale nel mercato dei capitali (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Analisi empiriche 
documentano che livelli più elevati di trasparenza aziendale contribuiscono alla 
riduzione delle asimmetrie informative tra impresa e interlocutori esterni, 
accrescendo la liquidità del mercato (Healy et al., 1999), e riducendo il costo delle 
operazioni di finanziamento (Botosan & Plumlee, 2002; Easley & O’Hara, 2004). 
Sebbene sia ampiamente riconosciuta l’importanza della struttura di governo per le 
politiche di disclosure (Dechow et al., 1996; Vafeas, 2000; Klein, 2002), esiste un 
dibattito ancora aperto in letteratura circa il ruolo di sostituzione o complementarietà 
tra disclosure e altri meccanismi di governo interni ed esterni (LaPorta et al., 1998; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Beekes & Brown, 2006).     
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Gli studi empirici sulla relazione tra governance e disclosure si sono finora 
focalizzati su un singolo aspetto del sistema informativo aziendale, quale ad esempio 
la comunicazione economico-finanziaria obbligatoria, o, alternativamente, le 
informazioni che le imprese volontariamente trasmettono al mercato, trascurando le 
interdipendenze e le complementarietà tra diversi veicoli d’informazione. La 
letteratura più recente evidenzia, invece, come le imprese si avvalgano di diversi 
strumenti d’informazione, che comprendono oltre le informazioni di bilancio 
obbligatorie, anche informazioni volontarie divulgate sia tramite il bilancio sia 
tramite altri veicoli d’informazione. Ne consegue un sistema informativo complesso 
ed endogeno rispetto alle caratteristiche dell’impresa, che si sviluppa e 
costantemente si modifica al fine di risolvere le asimmetrie informative e i problemi 
di agenzia tra manager e interlocutori esterni (Beyer et al., 2010). Pertanto, indagini 
finalizzate a valutare il ruolo economico dell’informativa di bilancio, non possono 
trascurare le altre forme di comunicazione sia obbligatorie sia volontarie, volte a 
sostituire o integrare le informazioni di bilancio (Ball et al., 2011).  
Prendendo spunto dalle precedenti considerazioni, la presente tesi vuole offrire un 
contributo originale alla pur copiosa letteratura che esamina la relazione esistente tra 
struttura di governance, informativa obbligatoria e disclosure volontaria, 
considerando la potenziale interazione esistente tra diversi elementi del sistema 
informativo (Beyer et al., 2010). 
A tal fine si indaga (i) la natura della relazione tra comunicazione obbligatoria e 
volontaria (ii) il ruolo che le caratteristiche del sistema di governance interne ed 
esterne all’impresa rivestono nella decisione di divulgare informazioni volontarie 
(iii) l’influenza del sistema di governo sul valore informativo delle strategie 
discrezionali adottate per comunicare informazioni non verificabili sia tramite il 
bilancio, che attraverso altri documenti di natura strettamente volontaria. 
La tesi è articolata in due sezioni. La prima sezione presenta una rassegna dei 
contributi teorici ed empirici rivenienti in letteratura, al fine di sviluppare un quadro 
concettuale per l’analisi della relazione tra corporate governance, informativa 
obbligatoria e politiche di comunicazione volontarie.  
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Dopo aver discusso le principali teorie alla base della decisione di comunicare 
informazioni volontarie, si analizzano i fattori che giustificano la regolamentazione 
dell’informativa d’impresa, passando in rassegna gli effetti sul mercato dei capitali 
della comunicazione volontaria e obbligatoria. Prendendo spunto dalla crescente 
importanza della disclosure narrativa, nel secondo paragrafo si illustrano talune 
questioni relative all’apprezzamento della qualità e del contenuto informativo di 
informazioni volontarie non verificabili e si discute il problema della loro credibilità 
agli occhi degli investitori esterni. Riconoscendo l’eterogeneità delle politiche di 
disclosure, il terzo paragrafo prende in esame le caratteristiche dell’impresa e del 
contesto istituzionale che spiegano parte di tale variabilità, focalizzandosi sul ruolo 
del sistema di governance. Il paragrafo prosegue con una rassegna degli studi 
empirici che esaminano la relazione tra sistema di governo e trasparenza della 
comunicazione esterna d’impresa, e si conclude con il dibattito sul ruolo di 
complementarietà o di sostituzione esistente tra governance e disclosure. Infine, il 
quarto paragrafo illustra il quadro teorico di riferimento, mettendo in evidenza le 
lacune della letteratura introduce le domande di ricerca alla base delle analisi 
empiriche e mostra il relativo contributo al filone di studi oggetto dell’analisi. 
La seconda sezione presenta due analisi empiriche che affrontano domande di ricerca 
tra loro strettamente collegate. 
Il primo contributo vuole indagare il ruolo delle caratteristiche del sistema di 
governance e delle peculiarità del contesto istituzionale per le politiche di disclosure 
volontaria e la relazione esistente con l’informativa di tipo obbligatorio.  A tal fine, si 
prende in esame la disclosure sui rischi, come particolare tipologia d’informativa 
che, date le caratteristiche della regolamentazione a oggi esistente, consente di 
discernere tra informazioni obbligatorie e volontarie. In particolare si analizza se e in 
che misura l’informativa volontaria è influenzata dalla qualità delle informazioni di 
tipo obbligatorio (sostituti vs. complementi). In aggiunta, si indaga l’influenza degli 
incentivi provenienti dal monitoraggio del Consiglio di Amministrazione e dalle 
peculiarità del contesto istituzionale per le politiche di disclosure volontaria. 
Tale studio vuole fornire un triplice contributo. In prima istanza, si propone di 
fornire evidenze empiriche sulla relazione diretta tra disclosure obbligatoria e 
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volontaria, a complemento degli studi teorici che analizzano tale tematica (Einhorn, 
2005; Bagnoli & Watts, 2007). In secondo luogo, attraverso un esame del ruolo di 
monitoraggio esterno, proveniente dalle istituzioni e quello interno, che promana dal 
Consiglio di Amministrazione, esso contribuisce ad un emergente filone di studi che 
indaga l’interazione tra meccanismi di governo interni ed esterni e la loro influenza 
sulla trasparenza aziendale (Durnev & Kim, 2005; Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; 
Doidge et al., 2007; Berretta et al., 2010). Infine, le evidenze empiriche vogliono 
essere di supporto agli investitori, nell’interpretare le politiche di comunicazione 
delle informazioni su base volontaria, ed agli organismi regolamentari, per la 
disciplina dell’informativa obbligatoria tenuto conto del suo impatto sulle politiche 
di disclosure volontaria. 
Il secondo contributo empirico affronta il tema dell’utilizzo del tono nell’informativa 
ambientale fornita da un campione di imprese del settore Oil&Gas. Questo tipo di 
disclosure risulta di particolare interesse alla luce del recente dibattito circa il 
potenziale incremento della responsabilità verso gli stakeholder rispetto al rischio di 
divenire un ulteriore strumento di pubbliche relazioni (Cho et al., 2012). In questo 
contesto, si analizza se i manager utilizzano opportunisticamente il tono 
dell’informativa ambientale per modificare la percezione esterna dell’immagine 
aziendale (i.e. impression management), ovvero per fornire informazioni utili a 
predire il livello di performance ambientale futura. Inoltre esso indaga se ed in che 
misura il contenuto informativo delle strategie di comunicazione si modifica in 
funzione delle caratteristiche del Consiglio di Amministrazione. 
Da un punto di vista teorico, lo studio si propone di contribuire a quella parte della 
letteratura sull’impression management che evidenzia la necessità di incorporare 
entrambe le prospettive (incremental information vs. impression management) nelle 
analisi sulla valenza informativa delle strategie discrezionali (Merkl-Davies & 
Brennan, 2007). Combinando diverse teorie per spiegare l’influenza del Consiglio di 
Amministrazione sull’utilizzo di strategie discrezionali nella disclosure ambientale, 
esso indaga due dimensioni dell’attività del CdA (monitoraggio e orientamento verso 
gli stakeholder) sia contemporaneamente che separatamente (Mallin et al., 2012). Da 
un punto di vista pratico, esso vuole fornire agli investitori informazioni utili per 
valutare l’utilizzo di particolari tecniche comunicative e contribuire al dibattito circa 
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la necessità di instituire una responsabilità legale anche per le informazioni 
qualitative che i manager comunicano al mercato. 
Il lavoro di tesi si conclude con un esame del contributo congiunto delle due analisi 
empiriche al framework di ricerca proposto, una discussione dei limiti dell’approccio 
adottato e dei possibili sviluppi futuri. 
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 1. The role of disclosure in the capital market: an overview1  
Corporate disclosure plays two important roles in the capital market: the valuation 
and the stewardship role (Beyer et al., 2010)2. According to the valuation role, it 
allows investors to evaluate the return potential of investment opportunities. Under 
the stewardship role, disclosure allows investors to monitor the use of capital, once 
provided. In the first case, disclosure plays an ex-ante informational role, by 
facilitating investors’ inferences about element of firm value that are independent of 
managerial action, while in the second investors do use the information disclosed ex-
post, in order to evaluate the level of managerial effort. Although there is a clear 
relationship between the two roles, the nature of such a relation is still not well 
understood3. 
The valuation role originates from information asymmetries between investors and 
entrepreneurs (Akerlof, 1970). The information or “lemons problem” arises when, in 
a market of goods of different quality, there is uncertainty among market 
participants, since sellers have more information on the quality of those goods than 
buyers. As buyers cannot distinguish between high quality goods and low quality 
goods, sellers of low quality goods tend to claim that their goods are as valuable as 
high quality ones. Buyers, who are rational, will anticipate this possibility and value 
both goods at the average quality. In such a setting, Akerlof (1970) shows that high 
quality goods are progressively driven out of the market because of the impossibility 
of separating them out from low quality goods. As a result, there is a progressive 
                                                
1 The purpose of a review of all studies on governance and accounting literature might be too broad to 
result in a careful examination of all the research in this area. Therefore, this chapter aims at providing 
a systematization of the relevant theoretical and empirical studies in order to build a general 
framework for the analysis of the relationship between corporate governance, accounting and other 
disclosure policies, in the capital market. 
2 Although corporate disclosure can be directed to stakeholder other than investors, the focus of this 
work is mainly on communication towards investors. 
3 From one hand, BUSHMAN et al. (2006) investigating the link between the weight placed on earnings 
in compensation contracts and the weight placed on earnings in stock price formation find a strong 
positive relation between contracting and valuation role of earnings. From the other hand, GASSEN 
(2008) claim that the valuation and the stewardship role of financial accounting information should be 
considered as alternative objectives of financial reporting. BANKER et al. (2009) find results similar to 
the BUSHMAN at al. (2006). Focusing on soft information, HEINLE & HOFMANN (2009) find that if 
disclosure of soft information is beneficial for valuation perspectives, it can be detrimental for the 
stewardship perspective when it increases the noise in the stock prices, thus diminishing managerial 
incentives. See ARMSTRONG, C. S., GUAY, W. R., & WEBER, J. P. (2010). The Role of Information and 
Financial Reporting in Corporate Governance and Debt Contracting, Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 50(2–3), 179-234. 
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reduction in the size of the market that eventually collapses4. Therefore, the existence 
of a reliable communication channel between informed and uninformed parties 
reduces information asymmetries, thus preventing the market failure (Trombetta & 
Bozzolan, 2012). 
On the contrary, the stewardship role of disclosure arises once savers have invested 
their capital in a business venture. As capital providers do not have the ability to play 
an active role in the management of firm’s resources, they delegate it to experienced 
managers. This gives rise to a separation between ownership and control and to 
consequent agency problems between principal (owners) and agent (mangers) 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Managers, who are self-interested, have incentives to 
take action to expropriate investors’ resources, such as consumption perquisites or 
paying excessive remuneration5. Here again, the role of financial reporting and 
corporate disclosure in general may be pivotal in providing external shareholders 
with useful information to evaluate whether entrepreneurs have managed the firm’s 
resources in the interests of the owners. 
Having this distinction clear in mind, the following of the paragraph introduces 
theories that explain voluntary disclosure, the rationales for regulation, and the main 
effects of disclosure activity for the capital market. 
 
1.1 Theories for voluntary disclosure  
Moving from the valuation role of disclosure, a first strand of literature tracing back 
to the Akerlof’s (1970) paper, assumes that in equilibrium truthful disclosure is 
                                                
4 HEALY  &  PALEPU (2001) identify several solutions to lemons problem. The first one is the optimal 
contracting that provides incentive for full disclosure of private information; the second is the 
regulation that requires managers to fully disclose their private information; the last one is financial 
analysts and rating agencies that engage in private information production to uncover manager’s 
superior information. See HEALY, P. M.,  &  PALEPU, K. J. (2001). Information Asymmetry, Corporate 
Disclosure, and the Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 31(1–3), 405–440. 
5 As in the case of the “lemons problems”, the literature proposes different solutions to the agency 
problem. A part from the existence of optimal contracting and information intermediaries, a central 
role is played by corporate governance mechanisms in general and the board of directors in particular 
that monitor and discipline the management behaviour on behalf of external shareholders. See 
JENSEN, M. C.,  &  MECKLING, W. H. (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360. The third and fourth 
paragraphs will discuss the role of corporate governance mechanisms in reducing the agency conflicts 
between insiders and outsiders and the relationship with the corporate disclosure. 
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available, and shows how the “lemons problem” can be solved through a full 
disclosure policy. It is this literature that sets the basis for all the subsequent 
voluntary disclosure studies. 
Grossman (1981) Grossman & Hart (1980) and Milgrom (1981) identify six 
conditions under which there is full disclosure equilibrium, with firms voluntarily 
disclosing all their private information. Their result goes under the notion of 
“unravelling result” or “revelation principle”. The six conditions are (i) firms incur 
no cost in making disclosure (ii) investors know that firms have private information; 
(iii) all investors interpret the firm’s disclosure (or non-disclosure) in the same way 
and firms know how investors will interpret it (iv) managers want to maximize 
firms’ share prices (v) firms can credibly disclose their private information (vi) firms 
cannot commit ex-ante to a specific disclosure policy. The rationale of the 
“unravelling result” is the following: if firms withhold their private information, 
investors would interpret this as information that is unfavourable about the asset’s 
quality and would revise downward their perceptions of the asset’s value (Dye, 
2001). This process continues until the firms are better off revealing their 
information, however unfavourable it may be (Verrecchia, 2001). As a consequence, 
it is in the firms’ interest to disclose all their private information to distinguish 
themselves from the one having less favourable information to disclose, in order to 
prevent a price collapse.  
In the light of the “unravelling result” argument, the following voluntary disclosure 
literature has long focused on reasons why the full disclosure equilibrium may not 
occur in the real context. They are (a) disclosure costs (b) uncertainty (c) managerial 
incentives (d) commitment to disclosure (e) disclosure credibility. 
(a) Disclosure costs. A large number of researches examine what happens when 
disclosure is costly. Disclosure can be costly because it entails costs of preparing and 
divulging information, which are fixed costs that do not vary with the manager’s 
private information (Verrecchia, 1983). Furthermore, the information may be costly 
because it is informative about the product or the market to competitors, labour 
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unions or regulators (Wagenhofer, 1990)6. When information is not costless (e.g. the 
source of competitive advantage), its disclosure imposes a proprietary cost on the 
firm (i.e. a reduction in future cash flows attributable to the disclosure) (Dye, 1990). 
The proprietary nature of that information increases the range of investors’ 
interpretations from the manager’s decision not to disclose (Verrecchia, 1983), 
leading managers to withhold information to achieve a higher payoff. A large part of 
disclosure literature suggests that proprietary costs create incentives for managers not 
to fully disclose information. Among others, Verrecchia (1990) and Dye (1986) 
show that in presence of disclosure costs managers will disclose information only if 
it is sufficiently favourable (i.e. it reveals that the asset value is expected to be 
high/low risk). On the contrary, they will withhold the information when it is 
sufficiently unfavourable. As uninformed investors cannot infer from silence that 
managers are withholding bad news, firms can hide information without 
experiencing negative effects on share prices7.  
(b) Uncertainty. Other studies analyse the role of uncertainty on both the existence of 
private information and investor response. Dye (1985) proposes that when investors 
are uncertain about the existence of manager’s private information, they cannot infer 
“bad news” from non-disclosure. Therefore, managers will disclose only relatively 
good news. In addition, the presence of an audience with differential characteristics 
(informed vs. uninformed investors; sophisticated vs. unsophisticated investors) may 
create a condition of uncertainty on the investors reaction to the firms’ disclosure, 
                                                
6 Information might be costly because it reveals to competitors or other parties some weakness and 
opportunities of the business that can be exploited to their own advantage (competitive costs). For 
instance, DARROUGH  &  STOUGHTON (1990) argue that managers lower voluntary disclosure activity 
in presence of competitive costs related to the size and the number of rivals. WAGENHOFER (1990) 
show that firms move from full to partial disclosure when proprietary costs are higher and there is a 
low ex-ante risk of adverse action by competitors. Other example of proprietary information is 
segment reporting, which is highly proprietary since it provides relevant information to the market 
and financial analysts. See BAKER, M.  &  MCFARLAND, W. B. (1968). External Reporting for 
Segments of a Business (New York: NAA); MAUTZ, R. K. (1968). Financial Reporting by Diversified 
Companies (New York: FERF); BOERSEMA, J. M. & VAN WEELDEN, S. J. (1992). Financial Reporting 
for Segments (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants). 
7 For a further discussion on disclosure costs see FELTHAM, G. & XIE, J. (1992). Voluntary Financial 
Disclosure in an Entry Game with Continua of Type. Contemporary Accounting Research, 9, 46–80; 
NEWMAN, P. & SANSING, R. (1993). Disclosure Policies with Multiple Users. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 31, 92–113; DARROUGH, M. (1993). Disclosure Policy and Competition: Cournot vs. 
Bertrand. The Accounting Review, 68, 534–562; GIGLER, F. (1994). Self-enforcing Voluntary 
Disclosures. Journal of Accounting Research, 32, 224–241; HAYES, R. & LUNDHOLM, R. (1996). 
Segment Reporting to the Capital Market in the Presence of a Competitor. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 34, 261–280. 
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that, in turn, leads managers to disclose only information that are sufficiently high or 
low (Dutta & Trueman, 2002) 
(c) Managerial incentives. Another important assumption of the “unravelling result” 
is that managers have superior information to outside investors and strategically 
disclose them in order to maximize share price. However, this is not always the case. 
For instance, in presence of stock-based compensation contracts, managers may have 
incentives to maximise share price when they are going to sell shares. But when 
stock options are awarded and they intend to exercise it, they may attempt to 
minimize prices (Yermack, 1997). There is also a related literature on voluntary 
disclosure that empirically analyses how different managerial incentives affect their 
disclosure decision8. Among the most important there are corporate transactions9, the 
stock based compensation10 and the corporate control contests hypotheses11 (Healy & 
                                                
8 This literature relies on a very traditional view that assumes that disclosure policy, corporate 
governance, and management incentives are exogenous at the time a manager makes a disclosure 
choice. See CORE, J. E. (2001). A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature: Discussion. Journal 
of Accounting and Economics, 31(1-3), 441–456.  
9 This factor is related to corporate transactions such as the decision to issue additional equity or debt 
capital or to acquire another company. In presence of severe information asymmetry between 
managers and outside investors, the latter will demand a higher premium for bearing information risk, 
thus increasing the costs of raising external capital for the firm. Consequently, managers may have 
incentive to reduce the level of information asymmetries by voluntary disclosing their private 
information. See MYERS, S. & MAJLUF, N. (1984). Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions 
When Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have. Journal of Financial Economics, 13, 187–
222; BARRY, C. B. & BROWN, S. J. (1986). Limited Information as a Source of Risk. The Journal of 
Portfolio Management, 12, 66–72; MERTON, R. C. (1987). A Simple Model of Capital Market 
Equilibrium Within Complete Information. The Journal of Finance, 42, 483–510; LANG, M. & 
LUNDHOLM, R. (1993). Cross-sectional Determinants of Analysts Ratings of Corporate Disclosures. 
Journal of Accounting Research, 31, 246–271; HEALY, P., HUTTON, A. & PALEPU, K. (1999). Stock 
Performance and Intermediation Changes Surrounding Sustained Increases in Disclosure. 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 16, 485– 520; HEALY, P. & PALEPU, K. (1993). The Effect of 
Firms’ Financial Disclosure Strategies on Stock Prices. Accounting Horizons, 7, 1–11; HEALY & P., 
PALEPU, K. (1995). The Challenges of Investor Communications: the case of CUC International, Inc. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 38, 111–141. 
10 The presence of stock based compensation creates strong incentive for “strategic” voluntary 
disclosure. When managers contemplate buying or selling their companies’ securities or when they 
are being awarded stock options, they might want to provide additional voluntary disclosure to (i) 
meet the restrictions imposed by insider trading rules and to increase the stock liquidity (ii) to reduce 
the risk of misevaluation that limit the efficiency of stock compensation. See NOE, C. (1999). 
Voluntary Disclosures and Insider Transactions. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 27, 305–327; 
ABOODY, D. & KASZNIK, R. (2000). CEO Stock Options Awards and the Timing of Corporate 
Voluntary Disclosures. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 29, 73–100; MILLER, G. & PIOTROSKI, 
J., (2000). The Role of Disclosure for High Book-to-Market Firms. Working Paper, Harvard 
University.  
11 Managers may use voluntary disclosure to reduce the undervaluation of firms stock and to explain 
away poor earnings performance, thus limiting the risk of job loss. This reason is known as “corporate 
control contest” hypothesis and is related to the managers accountability toward the board of directors 
and investors for poor stock and earnings performance. See WARNER, J., WATTS, R. & WRUCK, K. 
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Palepu, 2001)12.  
(d) Commitment to disclosure. Analytical model (Verrecchia, 2001; Dye, 2001) point 
out that for disclosure to have some welfare-enhancing effects (e.g risk-sharing) 
firms should not be able to credibly commit to a disclosure policy before receiving 
information (Beyer et al., 2010)13. Therefore, under some conditions disclosure could 
reduce the social welfare because it would destroy risk-sharing opportunities. 
(e) Disclosure credibility. Finally, even though the unravelling result is based on that 
the messages sent by managers to investors can be fully truth, disclosure studies 
point out that voluntary disclosure is not always verifiable or credible. Despite the 
regulated disclosure, several information is disclosed through informal 
communication channels where firms do not necessarily have to tell the truth. The 
extent and the informativeness of this so-called “informal talk” may vary according 
to whether misrepresentation is costly (Beyer & Guttman, 2012) or costless 
(Crawford & Sobel, 1982)14.  
In the light of the failure of the “revelation principle”, another strand of literature, 
departing from the Akerlof’s (1970) paper, analyses how voluntary disclosure may 
solve the “lemons problem” but, contrary to Grossmann (1981) and Milgrom (1981) 
assumes that the messages sent by informed to the un-informed party can be full lies. 
This literature is known as “cheap talk” models and represents the starting point for 
the recent disclosure literature on the credibility of voluntary disclosures.  
                                                                                                                                     
(1988). Stock Prices and Top Management Changes. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 461–493; 
WEISBACH, M. (1988). Outside Directors and CEO Turnover. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 
431– 461; PALEPU, K. (1986). Predicting Takeover Targets: a Methodological and Empirical 
Analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 8, 3–36; MORCK, R., SHLEIFER, A. & VISHNY, R., 
(1990). Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions? Journal of Finance, 45, 31–50. 
12 Additional factors that influence managerial disclosure decisions are related to the institutional 
setting. High level of shareholder litigation increases the managerial incentives for voluntary 
disclosure to avoid the threat of legal actions. However, if managers believe that investors cannot 
distinguish management bias, litigation may also reduce incentives to provide some types disclosures 
(e.g. forward looking disclosure). Not surprisingly, here the empirical evidence is mixed. See 
SKINNER, D. (1994). Why Firms Voluntarily Disclose Bad News. Journal of Accounting Research, 32, 
38–61; MILLER, G. & PIOTROSKI, J. (2000). The Role of Disclosure for High Book-to-Market Firms. 
Working Paper, Harvard University.  
13 BEYER et al. (2010) provides a clear example to illustrate the impact of violating that assumption. 
For a deeper discussion of the topic see BEYER, A., COHEN, D. A., LYS, T. Z., & WALTHER, B. R. 
(2010). The Financial Reporting Environment: Review of the Recent Literature. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 50(2–3), 296–343. 
14 While there is a large literature focusing on the case in which misrepresentation is costless (cheap-
talk models), the case of costly misreporting is still largely unexplored (BEYER et al., 2010). 
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In a classic “cheap talk” model no control can be exercised over the truthfulness of 
communication, thus managers might want to disclose whatever information can lead 
investors to value the firm closest to the managers’ objectives, regardless of their 
private information. Therefore, this disclosure is not informative at all and the 
“lemons problem” still remains unresolved.  However, Crawford & Sobel (1982) 
show that this extreme pay-off occurs only under the assumption that informed and 
uninformed parties have completely opposite incentives. Indeed, if the sender is 
perfectly informed and both parties have a common interest in avoiding the full 
collapse of the market, in equilibrium the senders (managers) may not necessarily 
want to lie. As a consequence, either non-verifiable disclosure may be informative. 
(Farrell & Rabin, 1996)15. 
Moving from a single communication game to repeated communication, the 
informativeness of non-verifiable disclosure increases, as the role of the reputation 
comes into play. Sobel (1985) examines a game in which the sender is perfectly 
informed and the incentives between the sender and the receivers are misaligned. 
They find that when the communication of messages is repeated, the need to build a 
reputation makes non verifiable messages at least partially informative (credible). 
Benabou & Laroque (1992) generalize the Sobel’s (1985) model to a sender with 
noisy information. When private information is not perfect, there is the chance the 
sender’s message is not intentionally biased, but reports truthfully, even though it 
contains an honest mistake. Therefore, non-verifiable message is always partially 
informative, as over time receivers will use the sender’s track record to reassess the 
credibility of his/her messages, and will eventually uncover an opportunistic 
manipulator.  
Other two major theories have been used to explain voluntary disclosure: agency and 
                                                
15 There is also some theory suggesting that managers do not necessarily lie even when talk is cheap 
and their private information is not fully reliable. FISHER & STOCKEN (2001) examine the case of 
imperfect information showing that non verifiable messages can be more informative starting from a 
larger information set. They analyse a model of single communication game in which the sender 
privately observes some imperfect unverifiable disclosure and his/her incentives are misaligned with 
those of the receivers. In such a setting, as the sender’s information quality improves the quality of 
information that he/she may communicate increases, but the credibility of that communication 
decreases. They conclude that a finer information set is not always deliverable as the sender’s 
information that maximizes the receiver’s information may be coarse or imperfect. See FISCHER, P. E. 
& STOCKEN, P. C. (2001). Imperfect Information and Credible Communication. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 39, 119–134. 
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signalling theory. Signalling theory predicts that firms voluntarily disclose 
information to “signal their type” and, contrary to other field of studies (e.g. agency 
theory), it focuses on the behaviour of managers in well-performing firms. Although 
signalling theory has been developed to explain problems of information 
asymmetries in the labour market16, its arguments are, indeed, applicable in any 
market with information asymmetry. This theory assumes that sellers of a product in 
the market have an informational advantage, (i.e. positive or negative information on 
the quality of the product sold which is useful for outsiders). Outsiders (buyers) have 
conflicting interests with the signallers and, in absence of any information, will value 
all goods at the same price (the average). Therefore, sellers of goods with a value 
above that price will incur in an opportunity loss, while sellers of goods with a value 
below that price will incur in an opportunity gain. In this setting, sellers of high 
quality goods have incentive to disclose a message that acts as a signal predicting the 
superior quality. However, to be effective the signal should be costly and not 
replicable by low quality goods sellers. Moreover, it should be observable and 
confirmed after the purchase17. When applied to accounting, signalling theory argues 
that high quality firms use disclosure as costly mechanism to signal their superiority, 
in order to reduce information asymmetries and avoid the opportunity loss (Hughes 
& Schwartz, 1988). 
From a different but overlapping perspective, agency theory has been regarded as 
theoretical foundation of voluntary disclosure. It is concerned with the principal-
agent problem created by the separation of ownership and control of the firm (Berle 
& Means, 1932). Under the assumptions of opportunism, information asymmetry and 
bounded rationality, this separation creates agency problems (i.e. the possibility that 
                                                
16 The first study about the signalling theory is the one of SPENCE (1973). In his seminal paper he 
analyses the case of a job applicant who wants to signal her high quality by disclosing his/her past 
experience. See SPENCE, M. (1973). Job Market Signaling. The quarterly journal of Economics, 87(3), 
355–374.  
17 In the finance literature, it is well established that when direct revelation is not possible, firms may 
use corporate financial decisions such as dividend and capital structure policy to signal their type. See 
LELAND, H. E., & PYLE, D. H. (1977). Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial 
Intermediation. Journal of Finance, 32(2), 371–387. BHATTACHARYA, S. (1979). Imperfect 
Information, Dividend Policy, and “The Bird in the Hand” Fallacy. The Bell Journal of Economics, 
10(1), 259–270; MYERS, S. C., & MAJLUF, N. S. (1984). Corporate Financing and Investment 
Decisions When Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 13(2), 187–221.  
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the agent will take opportunistic actions that work against the welfare of the 
principal). As a consequence, three types of agency costs incur: (i) monitoring costs 
borne by the principal to create incentives against the agent misbehaviour (ii) 
bonding costs induced by the agent to ensure he/she behaves in the principal’s 
interest, and she/he will be compensated in case of misbehaviour (iii) residual loss 
(i.e. a decline in firms value due to sub-optimal choices). Corporate disclosure is, 
therefore, a mechanism to protect principal’s interests and to reduce agency costs 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980)18. 
Finally, disclosure can also be explained in the light of non-shareholders-centred 
theories, that require the firms to be accountable towards a broader community of 
stakeholders (i.e. stakeholder and legitimacy theory). According to stakeholder 
theory the success of organizations depends on their ability to meet the demand of a 
wide group of stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995; Ullman, 1985). Therefore, firms may 
want to voluntary disclose information on multidimensional aspects of their 
performance, so that the stakeholders are informed about the effect of the company’s 
operations, thus responding to their diverse and various expectations. Legitimacy 
theory (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Patten, 1992) assumes that companies operations 
are regulated by a “social contract” where they agree to perform socially desired 
outcomes in order to survive. As a consequence, disclosure is a tool to ensure 
stakeholders that they behave within the bounds of that contract, to attain legitimacy 
for their actions and ultimately pursue long-term prosperity19.  
 
1.2 Rationales for disclosure regulation  
So far theories explaining voluntary disclosure have been discussed. Thus, if firms 
may communicate on a voluntary basis, why do we observe a regulation for 
                                                
18 The role of corporate disclosure as a control mechanisms and its relationship with other monitoring 
devices will be deeply discussed in paragraph 3. 
19 These theories share many similarities and are recently mostly used to explain corporate disclosures 
with regard to environmental and societal issues. Nevertheless, the main difference between them is 
that under stakeholder theory firms disclose information as a response to the demand of various 
stakeholders groups, while legitimacy theory assumes that managers disclose information to give a 
more favourable view of the corporate achievements, rather than providing information useful for 
outsiders. See FREEDMAN, M., & JAGGI, B. (2010). Sustainability, Environmental Performance and 
Disclosures. Emerald: UK.  
CHAPTER ONE 
 23 
disclosure in the capital market? In the unravelling result setting managers disclose 
all their private information, but when one (or more than one) condition of the 
unravelling result does not hold, less than full disclosure is likely to occur. However, 
this does not necessarily imply that disclosure regulation is desirable (Beyer et al., 
2010). Indeed voluntary disclosure is always associated with some firm-specific 
benefits in terms of liquidity, cost of capital, and firm valuation other than the costs. 
As a result, firms are expected to voluntarily provide information as long as the 
benefits of disclosure overcome its costs, because they ultimately bear the costs of 
withholding information. According to Leuz & Wysocki (2008) a complete 
justification of mandatory disclosure has to show that the “market equilibrium” is 
unlikely to produce a level of disclosure that is desirable for the society as a whole, 
while a “regulatory solution” would achieve a better outcome (Leuz & Wysocki, 
2008:15). This literature has, therefore, identified four main rationales to explain 
disclosure regulations, other than the failure of the “unravelling result” argument. 
The most investigated are (a) externalities (b) economies of scale (c) agency costs20. 
(a) Externalities. The first condition is related to the existence of several disclosure 
(positive or negative) externalities that lead to private under- (over-) production of 
information. There exist financial externalities when a firm’s disclosure is 
informative not only about its own financial position but also about other firms. 
Moreover, a firm’s disclosure may also create some real externalities by affecting 
other firms’ real decision (Kanodia et al., 2000). Disclosure regulation might 
mitigate such externalities and improve the social welfare (Dye, 1990; Adamati & 
Pfleiderer, 2000).  
(b) Market-wide costs savings. The second motive relies on the market-wide costs 
savings from regulation. In absence of any regulation, the private acquisition of 
                                                
20 Often debates about disclosure and financial reporting regulation incorrectly focus on firm-specific 
benefits and costs of voluntary disclosures, not considering their market wide effects. However, 
disclosure effects often goes beyond a single firm. For instance, it may benefit non-competing firms, 
providing information about investment risks (FOSTER, 1981). Moreover, it may help investors assess 
other firms’ relative managerial efficiency or potential agency conflicts. Knowledge of these market-
wide effects and externalities provides a basis for identifying the costs and benefits of regulating and 
enforcing corporate financial reports and disclosures. In the following will be discussed these 
rationales for disclosure regulation, mainly referring to LEUZ, C. & WYSOCKI, P. (2008). Economic 
Consequences of Financial Reporting and Disclosure Regulation: A Review and Suggestions for 
Future Research, Working Papers. For a complete discussion of the topic please refer to this review. 
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information may be very expensive or even impossible for some investors. 
Moreover, it can lead to investors’ duplication of information. Mandating certain 
level of disclosure might save costs of negotiating disclosures individually 
(Mahoney, 1995). This facilitates the information production, increases the 
comparability of information across firms, generates economies of scale and 
eventually efficiency gains (Rock, 2002). In addition, regulation for disclosure 
provides a costless commitment device to transparency (Rock, 2002) which is 
rewarded by the capital market (Verrecchia, 2001; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000). 
(c) Agency costs. The third justification for disclosure regulation is the existence of 
agency costs. In presence of agency problem, investors will anticipate that insiders 
will attempt to expropriate firms’ resources withholding corporate information to the 
market. For instance, investors might price protect themselves and increase the rate 
of return at which they are willing to provide capital to the firm. In such a setting, the 
firm will ultimately bear the costs coming from the agency problems (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Therefore, regulation forces firms towards an increased 
transparency that helps limiting diversion activities and reducing the related agency 
costs (Shleifer & Wolfenzon, 2002). Moreover, given the use of accounting numbers 
in firm’s contracts, a regulation for disclosure will increase the efficiency of 
contracting between firms and outsiders (managers, shareholders, debt holders, 
suppliers, customers etc.) (Holmstrom, 1979). Lastly, mandatory regime can be 
beneficial if it offers access to criminal penalties or other remedies that are not 
available (or very expensive) to private contract. 
Despite its benefits, mandated disclosure has also several costs. First, it implies costs 
for designing, implementing and enforcing standards. Moreover, regulated disclosure 
has detrimental effects by reducing risk-sharing (Diamond, 1985; Dye, 1990) or 
information production by other market participants (Fisher & Stocken, 2010). For 
instance, Fishman & Hagerty (1989) show that more disclosure by one firm can 
attract investors away from others. The same argument can be applied when 
examining the level of disclosure across markets and/or countries. Additional costs 
related to the regulatory process come from the increased level of dictatorship and 
corruption (Djankov et al., 2003; Wysocki, 2011), which in turn allows some 
incumbent firms to capture the regulatory process. Thus, the resulting regulatory 
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system may inhibit, rather than promote socially-optimal outcomes (Stigler, 1971). 
Furthermore, the diversity among firms and over time makes it difficult for 
regulators to design a “one-size fits-all” disclosure regulation. Finally, even in 
presence of a regulation theoretically able to increase the social welfare, its efficacy 
depends on the characteristics of the enforcement mechanisms and the institutional 
environment that affect the way the regulation is implemented in practice (Leuz & 
Wysocki, 2008).  
There are several empirical studies that provide insights into the economic 
consequences of financial reporting and disclosure regulation. Empirical literature on 
Securities Act (1933) and Securities and Exchange Act (1934) is skeptical about the 
benefit of regulation (Benston, 1969). These studies have, however, been highly 
criticized (Romano, 1998) due to the lack of control group that helps controlling for 
changes in market conditions. More recently studies point out costs and benefits of 
changes in US disclosure regulation related to the introduction of “Eligibility 
Rule”21, “Regulation FD” and “Sarbanes Oxeley Act”22 (Bushee & Leuz, 2005; Iliev, 
2009)23. Other than the US setting, few studies examine the effects of regulation 
(Christensen et al., 2010)24. These evidence suggests that capital market outcomes of 
                                                
21 The “Eligibility Rule” (1999) forced firms with shares traded in the OTCBB market to comply with 
reporting rules under the Security Act (1934). Exploiting features of this new setting, BUSHEE & LEUZ 
(2005) find that the imposition of SEC disclosure had significant negative economic consequences, 
pushing a significant number of smaller firms into a less regulated market (so-called “crowding 
effects”). However, they also provide evidence of positive externalities for firms already compliant 
with SEC Rules (i.e. positive returns and improved liquidity). See BUSHEE, B., & LEUZ, C. (2005). 
Economic Consequences of SEC Disclosure Regulation: Evidence from the OTC Bulletin Board. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39(2), 233–264. 
22 Regulation Fair Disclosure (2000) limits the managers selective release of material non-public 
information to professionals and institutional investors, in order to increase the confidence in the 
market and reduce the degree of information asymmetries between different types of shareholders. 
Sarbanes Oxeley Act (SOX) was passed in 2002 as a response to some public scandals and introduces 
major changes to the regulation of financial practice and corporate governance.  
23 Literature on Sarbanes Oxeley Act’s effects provides different cross-sectional results. Focusing on 
domestic firms some studies document positive abnormal returns to the passage of SOX (LI et al., 
2004; CHHAOCHARIA & GRINSTEIN, 2007), while others negative effects (ZHANG, 2007). The same 
arguments applies for foreign firms (LITVAK, 2005; BERGER et al., 2005). Other studies examine the 
effects of specific behaviour (e.g. earnings management). For instance, ILIEV (2009) uses regression 
discontinuity design to exploits the effects of SOX implementation of Section 404 on audit fees and 
earnings management. He finds that even though SOX had reporting benefits, on net it imposed more 
costs than benefits to the small firms. See ILIEV, P. (2010). The Effect of SOX Section 404: Costs, 
Earnings Quality, and Stock Prices. The Journal of Finance, LXV(3), 1163–1197.  
24 In the EU there was a series of directives to harmonize and improve capital market regulations. 
Christensen et al. (2011) examine the market benefits of two EU directives (“Market Abuse 
Directive”, “Transparency Directive”), focusing on market liquidity. They find significant capital-
market benefits from tighter regulation. Nevertheless, they also find a considerable heterogeneity in 
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regulation are not homogeneous and can be explained by several factors (e.g. 
effectiveness of prior regulation, heterogeneity in the way directives were 
implemented; different level of enforcement across countries)25.   
In sum, the evidence on the economic consequences of disclosure and reporting 
regulation is still confounding. As a result, whether or not mandating additional 
disclosure is beneficial and really desirable for the market as a whole still remains an 
empirical question.  
 
1.3 Capital market outcomes of disclosure activity 
In the light of its importance for firms, investors, regulators and standard setters, a 
large number of studies examine the economic consequences of firm’s disclosure 
activity. These studies mainly focus on the valuation perspective and analyse the 
capital market outcomes that are relevant at the firm level (i.e. that can be fully 
internalized by each firm when making their individual disclosure decision)26. The 
most discussed are: (a) market liquidity (b) cost of equity (c) cost of debt (Healy & 
Palepu, 2001). 
(a) Market liquidity. The first benefit of disclosure is the liquidity of the firm’s 
securities in the secondary market, i.e. the ability of investors to quickly buy or sell 
shares at low cost and with little price impact. The existence of information 
asymmetry affects the willingness of market participants to “jump” into the market 
because of transaction costs and opaqueness. This generates a price protection 
                                                                                                                                     
those effects, with countries having stronger prior regimes (or higher regulatory quality) showing 
larger effects. See CHRISTENSEN H. B., HAIL L., & LEUZ C. (2011). Capital-Market Effects of 
Securities Regulation: The Role of Prior Regulation, Implementation and Enforcement. Working 
Papers. 
25 Other than the aforementioned studies, a substantial part of the literature on disclosure regulation 
examines the effects of the IFRS adoption of reporting quality and its capital market consequences. As 
a deeper examination this literature goes beyond the scope of this thesis, see LEUZ & WYSOCKI 
(2008), for a review of the studies on this topic. 
26 From a valuation perspective (market based approach) investors appreciate whether accounting 
information and disclosures are useful in predicting the level and the variance of the firms’ cash flow. 
As discussed later, better information may improve the market liquidity, lower the required rate of 
return of individual securities and improve the risk sharing in the economy. A different perspective 
(contracting approach) assumes that outsiders evaluate the usefulness of accounting information to 
decide whether or not engage in contracts with the firm. Thus, high quality information can improve 
the contracting efficiency by leveling the playing field among potential contracting parties and reduce 
the costs of searching, processing and negotiating contracts.  
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mechanism meaning that uninformed investors tend to ask (offer) higher (lower) 
price for a given security compared to the ‘true price’ to protect against the losses 
from trading with a better informed party. This form of price protection not only 
introduces a bid-ask spread, but also reduces the number of shares that uninformed 
investors are willing to trade, thus making the market illiquid. 
Corporate disclosure reduces information asymmetries and mitigates the adverse 
selection problem (Kim & Verrecchia, 1994; Easley & O’Hara, 2004)27. It has a first 
moment effect, making it more difficult (and costly) to be privately informed, thus 
reducing the probability of trading with a better informed counterpart. In addition, it 
affects the ex-ante precision of the information and its distribution. Thus, it also has a 
second moment effect by limiting the uncertainty and the informational advantage of 
informed investors relative to the one that are uninformed. Accordingly, Welker 
(1995) and Healy et al. (1999) show that firms with higher disclosure have lower 
bid-ask spread. Leuz & Verrecchia (2000) find that firms committing to a listing 
exchange that requires more transparent disclosure have lower bid-ask spread and 
higher trading volume. Ng (2007) documents that the firm’s information quality 
lowers its liquidity risk. 
Adverse selection problem and trading costs in the secondary market manifest 
themselves also in the primary market. In primary capital markets, firms sell equity 
shares to raise cash proceeds for investment. When the trading occurs among agents 
with different degrees of information, investors may be required to pay or offer some 
“liquidity premium” when assets are exchanged, to protect against the adverse-
selection problem. If investors held their shares until the firm liquidates, they would 
be unconcerned about transaction costs that arise from the exchange of asset shares 
prior to liquidation. However, as investors generally tend to sell some shares prior to 
liquidation, or to buy additional shares, they anticipate the price protection 
mechanisms and translate the transaction costs into what they are willing to pay to 
hold shares initially. This cost is known as “information asymmetry component of 
                                                
27 KIM & VERRECCHIA (1994) model a setting where more expansive disclosures lead to greater 
incentives on the part of investors to acquire private information, resulting in greater information 
asymmetry and, by implication, a higher cost of capital. See FRANCIS, J., NANDA, D., & OLSSON, P. 
(2008). Voluntary Disclosure, Earnings Quality, and Cost of Capital. Journal of Accounting Research, 
46(1), 53–99.  
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the cost of capital” and represents the discount that firms provide as a means of 
mitigating the adverse-selection problem arising from the information asymmetry 
(Verrecchia, 2001). Therefore, the higher the anticipated transaction cost, the higher 
the “information asymmetry component of the cost of capital”, the lower the capital 
firm receives for investment and production when its shares are sold in a primary 
capital market28.  
It arises from the previous discussion that disclosure is a means to mitigate the 
information asymmetry which in turn translates into an improvement of the market 
liquidity, but also in a reduction of the rate of return that investors require for 
securities transaction. For instance, Amihud & Mendelson (1986) find that firms 
providing a higher level of public disclosure, reduce the adverse selection component 
of the bid-ask spread, thereby reducing their cost of equity capital. Diamond & 
Verrecchia (1991) claim that disclosure reduces the price impact29 of trades, thus 
increasing the investor’s willingness to take larger position in a trade. This increases 
the demand for firm’s securities and reduces its cost of capital. 
(b) Cost of equity. The aforementioned studies provide evidence of an indirect link 
between disclosure and cost of capital. However, there are also studies that examine 
the direct effect of firm’s disclosure on cost of capital. This second stream of 
literature suggests that greater disclosure reduces the estimation risk i.e. the risk that 
investors bear when they estimate the parameters of firm’s value such as the firm’s 
beta (Barry & Brown, 1984). Theoretically, whether or not disclosure activity affects 
the firm’s cost of capital through reduced information risk depends on whether 
information risk is diversifiable, which is a non-trivial issue (Clarkson et al., 1996). 
If it is non-diversifiable (priced-risk factor), investors will demand an incremental 
rate of return for investing in firms with low disclosure levels and high information 
risk. Easley & O’Hara (2004) and Lambert et al. (2007) have sought to assess this 
issue. 
                                                
28 The information asymmetries and the adverse selection problem manifest themselves in the primary 
market also through the problem of the underpricing. See Ljungqvist, A. (2004). IPO Underpricing. 
Handbook in Corporate Finance: Empirical Corporate Finance edited by B. Espen Eckbo.  
29 The price impact is a measure of illiquidity suggested by AMIHUD (2002). This measure captures the 
ability of investors to trade in a stock without moving its price, thus reflecting the price impact of 
trades. See AMIHUD, Y. (2002). Illiquidity and Stock Returns: Cross-Section and Time-Series Effects, 
Journal of Financial Markets, 5(1), 31–56.  
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Assuming that information is a priced risk factor, Easley & O’Hara (2004) develop a 
model where disclosure can improve the risk sharing between informed and 
uniformed investors and lowers the cost of capital. Huges et al. (2007) re-examine 
the Easley & O’Hara’s (2004) model and conclude that information risk is not priced 
as it is fully diversifiable or associated with other diversifiable risk factors. Lambert 
et al. (2007) show that the quality of firm-specific disclosures can influence the cost 
of capital either indirectly or directly, by decreasing the covariance between a firm’s 
cash flow and the cash flow of other firms. However, contrary to Easley & O’Hara 
(2004) they claim that the information risk becomes diversifiable only when 
investors can form a portfolio of many stocks.  
Empirical research documents mixed results concerning the relation between 
disclosure and cost of capital. One of the first studies that attempt to directly quantify 
the cost of capital benefit of disclosure is the Botosan’s (1997) cross-sectional 
analysis. Even though she does not find a significative relationship between 
voluntary disclosure and cost of capital for the entire sample, she does find a 
negative and significant relationship for the subsample of firms with low analysts 
following. Botosan & Plumlee (2002) extend the Botosan’s (1997) study to assess if 
the negative association between cost of equity and disclosure can be generalized and 
hold either for different disclosure vehicles. However, they find contrasting results, 
with the annual report disclosure significantly negatively related with cost of capital 
while the voluntary disclosure being positively related30. A different, but related, 
literature tries to disentangle the cost of capital effect of specific accounting 
attributes. The most investigated is the quality of accruals component of earnings but 
the results of empirical analyses are quite confounding. Some studies suggest that 
accruals quality is an additional priced risk factor (Francis et al., 2004; 2005), while 
other research questions this result calling for more robust evidence (Bhattacharya et 
al., 2011; Aboody et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2008). In addition, the presence of 
smoothed earnings is associated with lower cost of capital (Francis et al., 2004). 
However, when controlling for other variables affecting the cost of capital estimates, 
                                                
30 Other studies examine the impact of disclosure on cost of capital in specific corporate event such as 
IPO, cross-listing, SEO. For instance, HEALY et al. (1999), LANG & LUNDHOLM (2000), SHRAND & 
VERRECCHIA (2005), LEONE et al. (2007) document a positive relationship between external capital 
raising activities and corporate disclosure.  
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this association disappears (McInnis, 2007)31. 
(c) Cost of debt. Despite the large analytical and empirical literature that examines 
the relationship between disclosure and cost of equity capital there is limited 
evidence on its impact on the cost of debt. For instance, Sengupta (1998) finds a 
negative relationship between voluntary disclosure and the cost of raising debt. 
Francis et al. (2005) document that firms with low financial reporting quality have 
higher ratio of interest expense to interest-bearing outstanding debt. Zhang (2008) 
reports that lenders offer low interest rates to firms that report conservative earnings. 
However, this recent stream of literature faces several issues, such as the difficulty in 
evaluating the impact of specifics debt contract’s characteristics that have a 
substantial impact on the cost of debt (Leuz & Wysocky, 2008). 
Above all, we are not sure whether either the equity market or the debt market price 
the level of disclosure provided by each company. The empirical evidence on the 
relation between disclosure and cost of capital is still inconclusive and sensitive to 
alternative research design, firm-specific characteristics, empirical metrics used to 
measure either the cost of capital or the firm’s disclosure and omitted variables 
problem (Beyer et al., 2010). 
(d) Other outcomes. Disclosure literature has identified some indirect effects on the 
information intermediation, such as the analysts following and the institutional 
ownership (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Core, 2001)32. Concerning the former, public 
disclosure affects the cost of private information acquisition for analysts (Bushan, 
                                                
31 For further evidence on the cost of capital effects of corporate disclosure see also ECKER, F., 
FRANCIS, J., KIM, I., OLSSON, P. M., & SCHIPPER, K. (2006). A Return-Based Representation of 
Earnings Quality. The Accounting Review, 81(4), 749–780; MCINNIS, J. (2007). Are Smoother 
Earnings Associated with a Lower Cost of Equity Capital? University of Iowa Working Paper; LIU, 
M., WYSOCKI, P. (2007). Cross-Sectional Determinants of Information Quality Proxies and Cost of 
Capital. Working Paper. 
32 Other than capital market outcomes, disclosure has also several real effects. For instance it may 
have impact on the firms investment efficiency (BIDDLE & HILARY, 2006; BIDDLE et al., 2009; 
MCNICHOLS & STUBBEN, 2008; JACKSON et al., 2009) and/or for the executive labour market (DESAI 
ET AL., 2006; KARPOFF et al., 2008; SRINIVASAN, 2005; MENON & WILLIAMS, 2008, ENGEL et al., 
2003). Moreover disclosure has been found to influence the litigation propensity (PALMROSE & 
SCHOLZ, 2004; LEV et al., 2008; GONG et al., 2008; DUCHARME et al., 2004), the audit opinion 
(FRANCIS & KRISHNAN, 1999; BRADSHAW et al., 2001; BUTLER et al., 2004), the firm valuation 
(BARTH ET AL., 1999; KASZNIK & MCNICHOLS, 2002; MYERS et al., 2007; PETRONI et al., 2000; 
BEAVER & MCNICHOLS, 1998; BEAVER & ENGEL, 1996, SKINNER & SLOAN, 2002; MYERS et al., 
2007) and the executive compensation (BALSAM, 1998; BABER et al., 1998; NWAEZE et al., 2006; 
DECHOW et al., 2009, BUSHMAN et al., 2004; CHENG & FARBER, 2008). As they are out of the scope 
of this review, refer to the aforementioned studies for a further discussion. 
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1989), that, in turn, increases the level of analysts following and improves the 
precision and the accuracy of the analysts’ forecast (Lang & Lundholm, 1993). From 
an opposite perspective, the availability of more public disclosure may decrease the 
demand for third party information leading to lower analyst coverage (Healy et al., 
1999). Fisher & Stocken (2010) show that analysts stop following a firm when the 
precision of public information is sufficiently high, thus negatively affecting the total 
amount of information available. Li et al. (2009) document that analysts’ coverage is 
positively associated with the frequency, the precision and the accuracy of 
management forecasts. 
Furthermore, expanded disclosure and stock liquidity can be associated with 
increased institutional ownership (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Kim & Verrecchia, 
1994). However, this literature reports mixed results. For instance, Healy et al. 
(1999) and Bushee & Noe (2000) show that higher level of disclosure is associated 
with higher institutional ownership. Conversely, Tasker (1998) and Bushee et al. 
(2001) document that firms with higher institutional ownership and analysts 
following are less likely to voluntarily disclose additional information. Ajinkya et al. 
(2005) find that firms with more concentrated institutional ownership provide less 
voluntary disclosure. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that analysts 
and other intermediaries produce additional information that reduces the information 
asymmetry and the need for additional corporate disclosure. However, what is the 
nature of the relationship between these information intermediaries and firms’ 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure is still not well understood. 
Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that firms benefit from disclosure activity 
through the increased liquidity, the reduction in its cost of capital, or an increase in 
analysts following. As a consequence, what would preclude a firm from choosing the 
corner solution of full disclosure? One potential explanation is that managers and/or 
firms do not choose the corner solution (full disclosure) because there are costs that 
constrain such behaviour (Verrecchia, 2001). Therefore, these costs should be 
considered when examining the capital market benefit of disclosure (Beyer et al., 
2010). A second explanatory factor is that the optimal disclosure strategy depends 
not only on the trade-off between benefits and costs of disclosure, but also on the 
incentives managers facing in their disclosure decision (Core, 2001). 
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2. From hard to soft information: earnings quality, disclosure quality and 
credibility  
Theory predicts that corporate disclosure reduces information asymmetries (Botosan 
& Plumlee, 2002; Easley & O’Hara, 2004), increases stock market liquidity (Healy 
et al., 1999) and improves capital market efficiency. A fundamental question of 
empirical accounting and capital market research is, however, how to assess the 
“quality” of information disclosed. Firms may communicate with outside investors 
by providing information through multiple venues. First of all, there are some 
disclosures that are mandatory such as financial statements, footnotes, management 
discussion and analysis and other regulatory filings (10-K, 10-Q). Firms may also 
provide information on a voluntary basis through management forecasts, analysts’ 
presentations and conference calls, press releases, internet sites and other corporate 
reports (Healy & Palepu, 2001). 
Given the availability of these multiple disclosure channels, it is not surprising that a 
clear definition of “disclosure quality” and a direct derivation of measures from that 
definition are still missing from the literature (Beyer et al., 2010). In the following it 
will be discussed the evolution of the concept of “reporting quality” according to the 
historical change observed in the role of financial reporting and voluntary disclosure 
and the key challenges it poses to both scholars and practitioners.  
 
2.1 The quality of accounting earnings 
Market-based accounting research has long focused on the information content of 
accounting numbers since the pioneering studies of Ball & Brown (1968) and Beaver 
(1968)33. Recognizing that accounting numbers convey useful information affecting 
                                                
33 In their seminal study BALL & BROWN (1968) empirically document the association between stock 
returns and reported accounting earnings. Using 261 firms over the years 1957-1965, they estimate the 
expected earnings (proxied by last year’s earnings) for each firm-year observation. Then they classify 
each observation as “Good News” (if actual earnings are greater than the expected earnings) and “Bad 
news” (if actual earnings are lower than the expected earnings). They estimate the Abnormal Stock 
Return for month of earnings announcement and find that stock market reacts to accounting 
information, but begins to anticipate the Good/Bad news 12-months prior the earnings announcement. 
Their approach is consistent with securities market efficiency and rational decision theory and still 
form the basis for studies using market-based approach to analyse disclosures. See BALL, R., & 
BROWN, P. (1968). An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 6(2), 159–178. 
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security prices, although not on a timely basis, this strand of literature assumes those 
numbers are of better quality if they provide useful information about firms’ 
financial performance. Therefore, this literature has referred to a narrow concept of 
“disclosure quality”, which makes direct reference to the summary measure of firm 
performance as derived from the financial statement (i.e. “earnings quality”). Under 
that approach higher quality earnings should provide information relevant to a 
specific decision made by specific decision makers. As financial statement has 
multiple users, each one with different decision model34, the concept of “earnings 
quality” is necessarily multidimensional. It relies upon some qualitative attributes 
that proxy for characteristics of accounting earnings that market participants take 
into account in their allocation of resources (Dechow et al., 2010). As a consequence, 
the measurement of earnings quality is necessarily context-specific, since there is not 
a measure that is superior for all decision models. 
Earnings attributes are generally divided into two broad categories according to the 
underlying assumption on the role of reported earnings (Francis et al., 2004): 
accounting-based and market-based attributes. Accounting-based attributes derive 
from the assumption that the function of earnings is the efficient allocation of cash 
flows to reporting periods via the accruals process35. They are: (a) accrual quality (b) 
persistence (c) predictability and (d) smoothness.  
(a) Accrual quality. This approach assumes that accounting earnings are composed of 
two sub-components: realized cash flows and estimated accruals. The function of the 
accrual components of earnings is to mitigate the timing and matching problem of 
the cash flow components, leading to a measure of earnings which is more 
informative about future firm performance. However, this informational advantage is 
not without limitations. As accruals result from a subjective estimation, they may 
                                                
34 For instance, long-term debt holders are more interested in the liquidation value, while 
compensation committee is more interested in the performance under managerial control. 
35 All proxies for earnings quality have at their core that reported earnings are a function of 
fundamental unobservable earnings, and the ability of accounting system to measure the firm’s 
fundamental earnings process. However, the existing literature has not yet separated the unobservable 
dimension of quality (i.e. the dimension related to fundamental performance) from the contribution of 
accounting system to the quality of reported earnings. See DECHOW, P., GE, W., & SCHRAND, C. 
(2010). Understanding Earnings Quality: A Review of the Proxies, their Determinants and their 
Consequences. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50(2–3), 344–401. 
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contain intentional and unintentional errors that, in turn, lower the quality of reported 
earnings. Therefore, the quality of accounting earnings mainly depends on the 
quality of accruals. The most common approach to estimate accrual quality 
distinguishes “normal” from “abnormal” accruals. If the “normal” component of 
accruals is modelled properly, it should capture adjustments that are related with the 
firms’ fundamental performance. Then, the “abnormal” component captures the 
distortions induced by the application of accounting standards or earnings 
management and is of a lower quality (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Kothari et 
al., 2005). Other models view the matching function of accruals to cash flows as 
being of primary importance and consider short-term accruals (as proxied by 
working capital accrual) as a function of last-period, current-period, and next-period 
operating cash flows (Dechow & Dichev, 2002; Francis et al., 2005). This approach 
takes the view that earnings that map more closely into cash are more desirable 
(Penman, 2001)36.  
(b) Persistence. This attribute is meant at measuring earnings sustainability. Indeed, 
persistent earnings are desirable because they are useful to equity investors for 
valuation. The underlying assumption is that more persistent earnings will yield 
better inputs to equity valuation models, since current earnings are a better summary 
measure of future firm performance than non-persistent earnings. Studies on the 
persistence of earnings and its sub-components show that the cash flow component 
of earnings is more persistent than accrual components and “abnormal” accrual 
components are less persistent than “normal” accruals (Richardson et al., 2005)37. 
                                                
36 DECHOW & DICHEV (2002) show that firms with lower accrual quality have less persistent earnings, 
longer operating cycles, larger accruals and more volatile cash flows, accruals and earnings. They are 
also smaller and are more likely to report a loss. One of the main limits of the DECHOW & DICHEV’s 
(2002) model is, however, the inability to distinguish between the “normal” and the “abnormal” 
component of accruals. To overcome this limitation FRANCIS et al. (2005) decompose the standard 
deviation of the residuals (their inverse measure of accrual quality) into firm-level measures of innate 
estimation errors (“innate factors”) and discretionary estimation errors (“discretionary factors”). The 
innate factors should, then, capture the firm’s fundamental performance, while the discretionary 
factors should represent the effect of managerial opportunistic choice. See FRANCIS, J., LAFOND, R., 
OLSSON, P., & SCHIPPER, K. (2005). The Market Pricing of Accruals Quality. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics, 39(2), 295–327. 
37 SLOAN (1996) finds that accrual component of earnings is less persistent than cash flow component 
due to the discretion allowed in the accounting system. Moreover, he points out that investors fail to 
fully price the differing implication of this difference in persistence for the future profitability of the 
firm (“accrual anomaly”). FAIRFIELD et al. (2003) argue that the lower persistence of accruals is an 
effect of growth.  Nevertheless, the lower persistence of accruals does not mean that they are useless, 
since they make earnings a better predictor of future profitability than cash flows. See FAIRFIELD, P. 
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Other approach is based on disaggregation of accruals to examine the persistence of 
specific component and the related market reaction. For instance, Dechow & Ge 
(2006) document an investor overreaction to special items accruals, suggesting that 
they mis-understand their transitory nature.  
(c) Predictability. Earnings are predictable when they are able to predict their future 
levels. Predictability is commonly a desired property by standard setters and analysts 
since it represents an essential component of corporate valuation. Research have 
found that earnings are better able than cash flow to make long term prediction for 
firms whose operating cycle is longer (Dechow et al., 1998). Moreover, aggregate 
earnings have lower predictive ability than cash flows. However, there are some 
accruals sub-components such as account receivables, account payables, inventory, 
depreciations, that are superior in predicting future cash flows (Barth et al., 2001). In 
addition, Lipe (1990) points out that higher earnings persistence and predictability 
translates into higher Earnings Response Coefficient38. 
(d) Smoothness. An underlying assumption of the accrual-based system is that 
earnings smooth random fluctuations in the timing of payments and receipts, making 
earnings more informative about fundamental performance than cash flows. 
Therefore, earnings smoothness is a natural outcome of the accrual process. Several 
studies conclude that smoothed earnings have higher information content for 
investors (Demski, 1998; Trueman & Titman, 1988). Arguments supporting the idea 
that smoothness is a desirable property of earnings derive from the view that 
corporate managers signal their private information about future income to smooth 
out transitory fluctuations and in so doing achieve a more informative earnings 
number39. Nevertheless, accruals that lead smoothness can hide or delay changes in 
                                                                                                                                     
M., WHISENANT, J. S., & YOHN, T. L. (2003). Accrued Earnings and Growth: Implications for Future 
Profitability and Market Mispricing. The Accounting Review, 78(1), 353–371.  
38 The Earnings Response Coefficient (ERC) is the estimated slope coefficient on the level or change 
in earnings. It expresses the ability of earnings changes to explain the variation in market return. The 
higher the ERC the higher the magnitude of the price response to an information release. Other than 
persistence other factors contributing to ERC are firm size and interest rates. See EASTON, P. D., & 
ZMIJEWSKI, M. E. (1989). Cross-Sectional Variation in the Stock Market Response to Accounting 
Earnings Announcements. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 11(2–3), 117–141; COLLINS, D. W., 
& KOTHARI, S.P. (1989). An Analysis of Intertemporal and Cross-Sectional Determinants of Earnings 
Response Coefficients. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 11(2–3), 143–181. 
39 TUCKER & ZAROWIN (2006) conclude that smoothness improves earnings informativeness based on 
an analysis that splits firms into high smoothing group (having high negative correlation between 
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fundamental performance that would be useful to investors, if revealed. Moreover, 
earnings smoothness may be the result of opportunistically motivated accounting 
choices aiming at dampening the fluctuations of their firms’ earnings realizations 
(Beidleman, 1973; Ronen & Sadan, 1981; Healy & Whalen, 2000). Empirical studies 
examining the relation between smoothness and market outcomes provide 
contrasting results on the informativeness of earnings smoothness. Cross-country 
studies mainly argue that income smoothing is an opportunistic earnings 
management practice, since it is associated with less enforcement, lower shareholder 
rights and other determinants of low earnings quality (Leuz et al., 2003). Other US-
based studies conclude that smoothness lead to higher earnings informativeness 
(Tucker & Zarowin, 2006). However, these two strands of studies rely on different 
proxies and are unable to separate smoothing related to the fundamental process of 
the firm from opportunistic (artificial) smoothness. As a consequence, whether or not 
this attribute improves the decision usefulness of earnings is still an open question in 
the empirical accounting literature.    
Market-based earnings attributes derive from the different assumption that the 
objective of earnings is to reflect economic income as represented by stock returns. 
They are: (e) value relevance (f) timeliness and conditional conservatism.  
(e) Value relevance. Value relevance is the degree to which accounting earnings 
summarize information impounded in market prices (Brown et al., 2006). Typically, 
in accounting research value relevance is based on the explanatory power of the 
following regression of returns on the level and change in earnings (Francis & 
Schipper, 1999; Collins et al., 1997; Bushman et al., 2004). Therefore, earnings with 
greater explanatory power are viewed as more desirable because they explain greater 
variation in returns. This attribute commonly looks at two different properties of 
accounting earnings: relevance and reliability. The first captures the extent to which 
accounting earnings are useful for investment and disinvestment decisions, helping 
investors confirm or revise their expectation on future firm performance. The second 
                                                                                                                                     
discretionary accruals and unmanaged earnings) and low smoothing group. They find that the former 
group has greater earnings informativeness (as proxied by the extent to which current stock return are 
reflected in future earnings). See TUCKER, J. W., & ZAROWIN, P. A. (2006). Does Income Smoothing 
Improve Earnings Informativeness? The Accounting Review, 81(1), 251–270.  
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refers to the ability of accounting numbers to reflect truthful and verifiable 
information on fundamental firm performance. These two dimensions imply a trade-
off, and the prevalence of one on another depends upon the specific users’ decision 
model40. 
(f) Timeliness and Conditional Conservatism. These two features derive from the 
view that accounting earnings are intended to measure “economic income”, defined 
as changes in market value of equity41. Earnings timeliness captures the ability of 
accounting earnings to fully reflect relevant information for the market, both positive 
and negative. Therefore, this property satisfies the informational need of investors 
that are sensible to either the positive (gains) or the negative (losses) part of the 
earnings distribution. The accrual process plays a pivotal role for the timeliness of 
accounting earnings, by increasing the timely recognition of economic gains and 
losses even in the absence of their cash flow realizations (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; 
Kothari et al., 2005). However, when earnings convey information that has been 
already incorporated in the prior period stock returns there can be a “lack of 
timeliness”. This can be due to the presence of some noise in managerial estimations 
on the actual value of future cash flows, or to accounting rules which require 
managers to recognize gains on a cash basis, while losses on a timely basis (Collins 
et al., 1994). This creates an asymmetric timeliness which is known in the literature 
as conservatism.   
                                                
40 The debate on the relevance vs. reliability of earnings numbers has found renewal vigor after the 
introduction of the fair-value accounting, under the IFRS. The FASB/IASB has called for fair-value 
accounting to overcome the limitation of the historical-cost accounting, thus increasing the value-
relevance of earnings and book value. However, fair-value provides preparers with greater 
discretionality to exercise accounting judgment and estimation. This discretionality can be used to 
convey private information to financial statement users (increasing its relevance and faithful 
representation), or to misrepresent and bias financial statements (decreasing its perceived reliability). 
As a consequence, a substantial part of the empirical accounting literature has started analysing 
whether fair-value increases the relevance at the expense of the reliability of information. See 
DIETRICH, J. R., M. S. HARRIS, & K. A. MULLER, III. (2000). The Reliability of Investment Property 
Fair Value Estimates. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 30(2), 125–158. GOH, B. W., NG J., & 
YONG, K. O. (2009). Market Pricing of Banks’ Fair Value Assets Reported under SFAS 157 during 
the 2008 Economic Crisis, Working Paper. LAUX, C., & LEUZ, C. (2010). Did Fair-Value Accounting 
Contribute to the Financial Crisis? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24(1), 93–118. 
41 An important assumption is the market efficiency that allows stock return to reflect new information 
in earnings (earnings surprise). However, the extent to which prices reflect information does not hold 
equally across firms or countries leading to confounding results (i.e. variation in earnings timeliness 
and asymmetric timeliness could empirically reflect variation in the quality of the return generating 
process).  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 38 
The accounting literature distinguishes between unconditional and conditional 
conservatism. The former refers to the systematic under-valuation of assets and/or 
over-valuation of liabilities and is also known as balance sheet or news independent 
conservatism, being independent from the presence of new information to be 
incorporated in accounting earnings (Beaver & Ryan, 2005). The latter traces back to 
the seminal paper of Basu (1997) and is interpreted as “accountants’ tendency to 
require a higher degree of verification for recognizing good news than bad news in 
financial statements” (Basu, 1997:4)42. Although it is still subject to several 
measurement issues, the conditional conservatism has been largely examined by the 
literature in a wide variety of context, including countries’ market, political, taxation 
regime (Ball et al., 2000; Pope & Walker, 1999; Bushman & Piotroski, 2006); over 
time (Holthausen & Watts, 2001); different demands on financial reporting of public 
and private companies (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Wang, 2006); management 
compensation, independent directors and other corporate governance issues (Callen 
et al., 2009)43. In the context of earnings quality conservatism is a desirable property 
since it not only reduces the information asymmetries in the market, but also 
increases the efficiency of contracting (LaFond & Watts, 2008), by protecting debt 
holders against excessive dividend distribution, and/or managerial compensations. 
Finally, it provides board of directors with timely information on the negative 
consequences of managers’ non-optimal choices, and lower political and taxation 
costs, thus increasing the firm value (Watts, 2003). 
                                                
42 Despite the difference, there is a clear relationship between conditional and unconditional 
conservatism. According to GASSEN et al. (2006) there can be a negative relationship between them, 
with conditional conservatism being higher when unconditional conservatism is low. The evidence 
shows that goods news are recognized earlier for low market-to-book firms. However, this 
relationship is difficult to effectively test empirically, as proxies such as the market-to-book ratio may 
capture both properties of earnings. See BEAVER, W. H., & RYAN, S. G. (2005). Conditional and 
Unconditional Conservatism: Concepts and Modeling. Review of Accounting Studies, 10(2-3), 269–
309; POPE, P. & WALKER, M. (2003). Ex-ante and Ex-post Accounting Conservatism, Asset 
Recognition, and Asymmetric Earnings Timeliness. Working paper; ROYCHOWDHURY, S. & WATTS, 
R. L. (2007). Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings, Market-to-book and Conservatism in Financial 
Reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 44(1–2). 
43 There is a recent controversy over the validity of the BASU (1997) model to properly capture the 
asymmetric timeliness of earnings. For a discussion of these criticisms and the proposed potential 
solutions refer to DIETRICH, J. R., MULLER, K. A., &  RIEDL, E. J. (2007). Asymmetric Timeliness 
Tests of Accounting Conservatism. Review of Accounting Studies, 12(1), 95–124; BALL, R., KOTHARI, 
S.P. & NIKOLAEV, V. V. (2011). On Estimating Conditional Conservatism, Forthcoming, The 
Accounting Review; PATATOUKAS, P. N., & THOMAS, J. K. (2011). More Evidence of Bias in the 
Differential Timeliness Measure of Conditional Conservatism. The Accounting Review, 86(5), 1765–
1793. 
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2.2 Beyond the numbers: informativeness of narrative disclosures 
Until the mid-nineties, the financial reporting model was the most widespread means 
for communicating company performance, due to the close relationship between 
market value and accounting value of the firm. Thus, measures of earnings quality 
were considered as good proxies for the overall corporate reporting quality. 
Nevertheless, from that point on its adequacy in satisfying users’ information needs 
has been questioned. Francis & Schipper (1999) and Lev & Zarowin (1999) have 
criticized the role of financial information documenting a decreasing relevance of 
accounting numbers for decision making. This phenomenon is (at least partially) 
attributable to the increased complexity of the business environment and the inability 
of traditional accounting system to recognize the value of assets of primary 
importance to the firms (e.g. intangibles). Thus, users such as institutional investors 
and financial analysts have been increasingly demanding additional information to 
identify drivers of long term value creation (Robb et al., 2001). Similarly, 
practitioners and standard setters bodies started to call for enrichment of the 
timeliness (when) and content (what) of corporate disclosure (CICA 2001; FASB 
2001)44. Among the elements that have been identified as suitable to achieve the 
improvement in the quality of corporate reporting, there are voluntary narrative and 
descriptive disclosures. Therefore, in last fifteen years, there has been an increasing 
importance of these supplementary disclosures inside the reporting package of a 
firm. 
According to regulators’ belief, this supplementary disclosure should be useful to 
describe the company business “through the eyes of management” (AICPA, 1994; 
CICA, 2002; ICAEW, 2003). Such a reporting identifies the business’ aspects that 
are especially important to the company success (critical success factors), the 
management strategies and plans for managing those factors, as well as metrics used 
to manage the implementation of strategies and plans (performance indicators). 
Furthermore, it supports external users in interpreting and assessing the related 
financial statements in the context of the environment in which the entity operates 
                                                
44 Several initiatives have been taken by professional (e.g. AICPA 1994; CICA, 2001, 2004; SKE 
2005) and standard setters bodies (e.g. FASB, 2001; IASB, 2006) to extend what is reported such as 
issuing guidelines for voluntary disclosure in MD&A, OFR, MC and issuing guidelines for voluntary 
disclosure in regards to value drivers not captured by financial statements (e.g. Intellectual Capital). 
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(e.g. explaining inventory increases), by providing supplementary narrative 
information on trends and factors underlying an entity development, performance 
and position (e.g. R&D processes)45.  
The relevance of supplementary disclosure for users of corporate information is 
almost unquestioned. For instance, several studies in the capital market research have 
analysed the value-relevance of narrative disclosure (Amir & Lev, 1996), its 
predictive ability (Ittner & Larker, 1998; Banker, 2000) or the link with information 
intermediaries such as financial analysts (Simpson, 2010). 
However, in contrast with quantitative financial disclosures, this supplementary 
disclosure often entails “non accounting” narrative information, that is context-
specific and not regulated in detail. Moreover, it is not mandatory, nor audited (or it 
is only partially audited), thus being not immediately verifiable by external users. As 
a consequence, it gives rise to a number of reporting issues related to the 
measurement, the informativeness and the credibility of such disclosures.  
Traditionally, a large number of studies in the disclosure literature have used the 
Association for Investment Management Research (AIMR) score as a measure for 
voluntary disclosure (Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Welker, 1995; Helay et al., 1999). It 
is an externally generated score based on a ranking of US firms that reflects the 
usefulness of firms’ disclosure as it is perceived by a specific user of this information 
(financial analysts). However, it is available for US firms only and covers a limited 
number of years. Moreover, this ranking captures a very broad range of disclosure 
activities other than voluntary disclosure itself and it can be potentially biased by the 
analysts that follow a particular firm (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Beyer et al., 2010). For 
this reason subsequent research has attempted to capture the quality of voluntary 
disclosure through self-constructed disclosure indices46. Initially, those indices were 
                                                
45 This information can be either quantitative (numerical information, financial or not) or qualitative 
(including also graphs, tables and images). 
46 Disclosure indices are based on content analysis that is a well-established method in social sciences 
to investigate the characteristics of narratives (voluntary) disclosure and allows to make valid 
inferences from the analysis of a text. See WELKER, M. (1995). Disclosure Policy, Information 
Asymmetry, and Liquidity in Equity Markets. Contemporary Accounting Research, 11(2), 801–827; 
KRIPPENDORFF, K. (1980). Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology. Beverly Hills, 
Calif.: Sage Publications.  
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one-dimensional, aiming at capturing the quantity (i.e. the amount of) disclosure47. 
However, in the context of non mandatory and unregulated supplementary 
disclosure, disclosure quantity cannot be really assumed as proxying for disclosure 
quality. In line with the assumption of the “cheap-talk” models, there is not 
“assurance” about the truthfulness of information disclosed. Thus, something 
different from proxies of “transparency” is needed in order to capture the “quality” 
of that information48. As a consequence, scholars have moved to disclosure indices 
measuring not only how much is disclosed but also what is disclosed. These 
multidimensional indices would capture additional semantic properties of narrative 
disclosure that can proxy for dimensions such as time orientation (historical, forward 
looking) or economic sign (good news vs. bad news)49. Other than disclosure index 
studies, research has also adopted several techniques of textual analysis aiming at 
performing detailed content analysis of the entire narrative content of corporate 
annual report (e.g. thematic content analysis, readability studies and linguistic 
analysis) (Beatty et al., 2004)50. The following figure reports a synthesis of the most 
widespread approaches to the analysis of narratives in corporate annual report. 
                                                
47 One-dimensional index relies on a strong assumption: all the condition of the unravelling results 
hold. Indeed, when manager must tell the truth, it can be assumed that disclosure quality depends only 
on the amount of disclosure (level of disclosure). In such a setting, in order to measure the quality of 
disclosure what is needed is a proxy of “transparency” capturing how much information is disclosed 
(e.g. the coverage of information). Nevertheless, in the disclosure literature, the amount of voluntary 
disclosure has been long used to infer the determinants of voluntary disclosure, the characteristics of 
disclosure and related media, the consequences of such disclosure. See BOTOSAN, C. A. (1997). 
Disclosure Level and the Cost of Equity Capital. The Accounting Review, 72(3), 323–349; HOPE, O. 
K. (2003). Accounting Policy Disclosures and Analysts’ Forecasts. Contemporary Accounting 
Research, 20(2), 295–321; GARCÍA-MECA, E., PARRA, I., LARRÁN, M., & MARTÍNEZ, I. (2005). The 
Explanatory Factors of Intellectual Capital Disclosure to Financial Analysts. European Accounting 
Review, 14(1), 63–94. 
48 Standard setters (FASB, 2001; IASB, 2006) established some qualitative characteristics for the 
disclosure to be useful for decision making. They are the understandability (structure, language and 
writing style); the relevance in evaluating past, present or future events (material information, 
quantity); the reliability (information to assess uncertainty regarding measurement issues and 
assumption that underline forward looking information and faithfully represents factually-based 
strategies, plans and risk analysis); the comparability over time (SEC comparability between entities); 
the neutrality (balance between good and bad news). The concept of quality is, however, complex and 
still difficult to operationalize. In addition, some qualitative attributes are often un-measurable in 
objective and universally accepted way.  
49 Other potentially relevant attributes to define the quality of disclosure include: (i) qualitative vs. 
quantitative information (ii) financial vs. non-financial information (iii) actual vs. 
perceptual/judgement (iv) objectives vs. activities vs. results (v) location (vi) repetitions. 
50 Thematic content analysis is a type of content analysis using “themes” as recording units while 
readability studies are meant at capturing the cognitive difficulty of text. See JONES, M. J., & 
SHOEMAKER, P. A. (1994). Accounting Narratives: A Review of Empirical Studies of Content and 
Readability. Journal of Accounting Literature, 13, 142–184.  
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Figure 1. Approaches to the analysis of narratives in annual report 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Beattie et al. (2004) 
Within this framework, linguistic analyses have recently gained increasing 
importance due to the longer and even more sophisticated supplementary disclosure. 
The idea is to look at how the information is disclosed, beyond the content itself, by 
analysing the language that managers use in the communication with investors 
(Healy & Palepu, 2001; Core, 2001). Language is considered an additional element 
of the information package of firms since it provides a unifying framework that 
affects how market participants process, perceive and understand the information 
(Davis et al., 2012). Therefore, taking advantage of natural language processing 
programs, accounting scholars are now measuring several features of managers’ 
language to proxy for disclosure quality (Beyer et al., 2010). One important 
dimension of the language communication is the “tone” (i.e. the sentiment) of 
disclosure. It is a characteristic of the narrative disclosure that is captured through the 
use of nouns, adjectives, or verbs that generally express different sentiments such as 
optimism, certainty, activity that a sender would transmit to a receiver (Trombetta & 
Bozzolan, 2012). Recent studies document that the sentiment of disclosure plays a 
pivotal role in the communication between managers and outside investors. These 
studies document that language is incrementally informative beyond quantitative 
disclosures, thus allowing to achieve a further reduction in the information 
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asymmetries between firms and external users51. However, as it is costless, not 
regulated and unaudited, it can provide managers with the opportunity to engage in 
self-serving disclosure strategies at the expense of disclosure informativeness.  
This sheds light on another strand of literature that investigates the informativeness 
of corporate narratives in order to assess whether managers use discretionary 
disclosure strategy (e.g. tone bias) to convey additional value-relevant information 
rather than manipulating the impression of accounting information’s users. This 
literature goes under the notion of impression management literature (Clatworthy & 
Jones, 2001). 
In general terms impression management is a field of study within social psychology 
studying how individuals present themselves to be perceived favourable by others 
(Hooghiemstra, 2000). In the context of corporate reporting it examines whether 
managerial discretionary disclosure choices are opportunistic or constitute value-
relevant information aimed at improving investor decision making. In other words, 
this literature evaluates whether discretionary disclosure strategies are informative 
(incremental information school) or they just confuse market participants, being 
provided to mislead investor decisions (impression management school)52. For 
instance, according to Merkl-Davies & Brennan (2007) the bias in disclosure tone 
can be considered part of the impression management strategies that allows 
managers to obfuscate failures and emphasize success (“concealment” behaviour). 
                                                
51 For instance, DEMERS & VEGA (2010) find that language in the management’s quarterly earnings 
press releases is incrementally informative over the contemporaneously available “hard” information. 
DAVIS & TAMA-SWEET (2012) find that higher level of pessimistic language is associated with lower 
future firm performance. DAVIS et al. (2012) find a significant association between the bias towards 
the positive language (i.e. optimism) in earnings press releases and future firm performance, and 
conclude that language has information content beyond quantitative disclosures. They also document 
that investors respond to this incremental information. See DAVIS, A., PIGER, J., & SEDOR, L. (2012). 
Beyond the Numbers: Measuring the Information Content of Earnings Press Release Language. 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 20(10), 1–24.  
52 Impression management studies focus on whether and under which conditions companies engage in 
impression management practices. The attention is on preparers and association between their 
characteristics and different impression management practices. In contrast, incremental information 
studies look primarily at whether and to what extent investors (users) perceive discretionary narrative 
disclosure as value relevant. The main difference between the two schools of thought regards the 
underlying assumption on the investors ability to assess reporting bias, that in turn depends on the 
level of efficiency of the market (weak vs. semi strong form of market efficiency). Thus, it is not 
surprising that US researchers tend to adopt the incremental information assumption, while non-US 
researchers are more likely to take an impression management perspective. See MERKL-DAVIES, D. 
M., & BRENNAN, N. M. (2007). Discretionary Disclosure Strategies in Corporate Narratives: 
Incremental Information or Impression Management? Journal of Accounting Literature, 26, 116–194. 
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Nevertheless, the use of more positive than negative words is only one of the tactics 
that managers can rely on to manipulate the outsiders’ perception of firm 
performance (thematic manipulation). 
In their review paper, Merkl-Davies & Brennan (2007) indentify seven impression 
management practices, classified according to two types of impression management 
behaviour: concealment and attribution. The former refers to the activity of (i) 
obfuscating negative outcomes (positive representation of bad news) and/or (ii) 
empathising positive outcomes (more positive bias in representing good news).53 The 
attribution behaviour refers to self serving bias in claiming more responsibility for 
success than for failure. It involves attribution of positive organisational outcomes to 
internal factors (entitlements), and negative organisational outcomes to external 
factors (excuses). Figure 2 illustrates the seven impression management tactics. 
Figure 2. Managerial impression management strategies in corporate narratives 
 
 
  
Source: Merkl-Davies & Brennan (2007) 
                                                
53 They also point out that concealment of bad/good news might be achieved through six different 
strategies. Obfuscation of bad news might occur by (i) making the text more difficult to read (reading 
ease manipulation) (ii) using persuasive language (rhetorical manipulation). Emphasis of good news 
involves (i) thematic manipulation (i.e. emphasis on positive words and themes), (ii) visual and 
structural manipulation (i.e. ordering of verbal/numerical information) (iii) biased performance 
comparisons (iv) choice of earnings numbers as benchmarks that portray current financial 
performance in the best possible light (MERKL-DAVIES & BRENNAN, 2007). 
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Studies that investigate whether managers manipulate outsiders’ perception of firm 
performance by rendering corporate narratives more difficult to read find an 
association between reading difficulty and several firm characteristics, in particular 
firm performance, but with contrasting results (Alderberg, 1979). Research on 
rhetorical manipulation also finds mixed evidence. Some scholars find little evidence 
of impression management, while others conclude that firms with very positive and 
very negative performance use narratives not as impression management technique 
but to increase the communication with outsiders (Yuthas et al., 2002). Studies 
focusing on thematic manipulation are inconclusive, too. Abramson & Amir (1996) 
and Davis et al. (2007) consider the use of thematic manipulation as a means to 
overcome information asymmetries, while Matsumoto et al. (2006) and Lang & 
Lundholm (2000) suggest that managers engage in impression management 
strategies trough more “optimistic disclosures”. Findings from research on visual and 
structural manipulation as well as performance comparison and choice of earnings 
numbers are more homogeneous. They suggest that discretionary narrative disclosure 
strategies mainly constitute self-serving behaviour rather than providing investors 
with additional information (Bowen et al. 2005). 
Detecting whether or not bias introduced into corporate narratives is an informative 
rather than an impression management strategy is not straightforward. Firstly, prior 
work tends to consider discretionary disclosure practices individually, while 
impression management may occur through the contemporaneous use of different 
tactics and methods54. Secondly, previous studies in that area mainly consider 
impression management and the incremental information school as mutually 
exclusive, and only few of them attempt to differentiate between those two 
hypotheses (Bowen et al., 2005; Barton & Mercer, 2005). Finally, how firms use 
discretion in corporate narratives largely depends on the reporting incentives. These 
incentives are shaped by many factors including capital market forces, countries 
institutional factors and firm-specific corporate governance characteristics (Ball et 
                                                
54 Recently, BRENNAN et al. (2009) develop a holistic measure for analysing impression management, 
through the mean of a composite score based on both quantitative and qualitative data in corporate 
narratives. See BRENNAN, N. M., GUILLAMON-SAORIN, E., & PIERCE, A. (2009). Methodological 
Insights: Impression management: Developing and Illustrating a Scheme of Analysis for Narrative 
Disclosures – a Methodological Note. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 22(5), 789 – 
832. 
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al., 2003; Burgstahler et al., 2006). Given the lack of studies that incorporate all 
these factors whether or not managers use discretionality in corporate narratives in an 
opportunistic rather than in an efficient way is still an unanswered question in the 
extant literature. 
 
2.3 The credibility of soft information and the role of financial reporting quality  
Another issue arising from the growing importance of supplementary disclosure in 
the reporting package of the firm is the credibility of these disclosures. The debate on 
disclosure credibility traces back to the study of Crawford & Sobel (1982) which sets 
the basis for the literature on cheap-talk models. According to this literature, in 
presence of unverifiable disclosure, managers may have incentives to lie in order to 
create a perception of the firm that may be favourable for their self-serving 
objectives. Therefore, it takes importance the degree of verifiability (crediblity) of 
the message disclosed (Trombetta & Bozzolan, 2012). 
When looking at the credibility of information, the traditional disclosure literature 
distinguishes between verifiable and unverifiable information, where verifiable is 
typically financial and/or quantitative information, while unverifiable information is 
non financial and/or qualitative information. However, this dichotomy has been 
considered inappropriate and often incomplete. By introducing the dimension of the 
time, Trombetta & Bozzolan (2012) further distinguish between ex-ante and ex-post 
verifiability, thus creating a new taxonomy of information: Hard, Vanishing, 
Directed and Soft55 (Figure 3).  In this new taxonomy the credibility issue only 
relates to Soft information that external investors cannot verify neither ex-ante nor 
ex-post56. Some supplementary disclosures such as Corporate Social Responsibility, 
                                                
55 They define a statement as ex-ante verifiable when “there exists a mechanism by which the 
uninformed party can check the truthfulness of the disclosure or a third party can certify it to be the 
“true” or “false” before or at the same time that it is made”. While there exists a verifiability ex-post 
when “sometime after the statement is made, this becomes directly observable by the un-informed 
party or by a third party that can certify it to be true or false”. See TROMBETTA M. & BOZZOLAN, S. 
(2012). From Hard to Soft Information: a New Look at the Literature on Voluntary Disclosure. 
Working Paper. 
56 Other categories are: (i) Hard information that refers not necessarily to quantitative financial 
information but also to narrative non financial information in the annual report that is audited by third 
party, thus it is verifiable ex-ante (ii) Vanishing information when it is verifiable ex-ante because it 
relates to a public event that external investors may gather by “common talks”, but it becomes 
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Intellectual Capital, Internal Operating Activities disclosures are all examples of 
unverifiable soft information. These disclosures refer to internal factors and contain 
price sensitive information. However, as it is neither verifiable or auditable, it allows 
managers to take advantage of information asymmetry through self-serving 
disclosures. Therefore, to disentangle misleading disclosures investors look for 
credibility signals (Athanassokou & Hussainey, 2009). 
Figure 3. Verifiability and information 
 
 
  
 
Source: Trombetta & Bozzolan (2012) 
Mercer (2004) defines disclosure credibility as “investors’ perceptions of the 
believability of a particular disclosure” (pg. 186) and proposes four different factors 
that might influence firm’s credibility: (a) situational incentives (b) external/internal 
assurance (c) disclosure’s characteristics and (d) management’s credibility (Figure 
4). 
In the following there is a brief discussion of these factors, and, then, a focus on 
managerial credibility and the role of financial reporting quality for the credibility of 
supplementary (soft) disclosure.  
(a) Situational incentives. According to this distinction the credibility of disclosure 
depends, in part, on situational incentives that managers have at the time of 
disclosure. Several studies find that bad news disclosures result more credible than 
disclosures containing good news (Hutton et al., 2003). Other situational incentives 
relate to financially distressed firms, managerial stock options, the risk of hostile 
takeovers (Aboody & Kasnick, 2000) or insider trading activities (Gu & Li, 2007). 
                                                                                                                                     
unverifiable ex-post if the firm stops giving information about the event (iii) Directed information 
which is a kind of disclosure that is not verifiable at the moment in which it is disclosed but it will 
become verifiable by external investors with the passing of time, such as in the case of managerial 
earnings forecast (TROMBETTA & BOZZOLAN, 2012). 
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For instance, market participants rely less on disclosures of financially distressed 
firms, as they have greater incentives to provide misleading disclosures (Koch, 
1999). In addition, the presence of stock option plans reduces the disclosure 
credibility giving managers incentives to increase their personal profit (Rogers & 
Stocken, 2005).  
(b) External/internal assurance. Internal assurance may come from a high-quality 
board of directors that effectively monitors the firm’s activities (Beasley, 1996; 
Klein, 2002), while the presence of audited disclosure provides an external assurance 
for the credibility of managers’ disclosure (Bushman et al., 2004). However, in the 
light of the distinction between ex-ante and ex-post verifiability, the internal/external 
assurance is not a factor that affects the credibility as it makes the information 
verifiable ex-ante (Trombetta & Bozzolan, 2012). 
(c) Disclosure’s characteristics. There are also some characteristics that affect the 
credibility of disclosure. Several studies suggest that managers can boost disclosure 
credibility by increasing its precision (Hirst et al., 1999; Baginski et al., 1993), or 
disclosing short-horizon disclosures (Pownall et al., 1993). In addition, Hutton et al. 
(2003), Baginski et al. (2004) and Ng et al. (2008) show that the credibility of 
earnings forecasts increases with the amount of supporting information. There are 
also studies documenting that investors perceive the disclosure to be credible the 
closest it is with the previous management disclosures.  
(d) Managerial credibility. Although previous studies tend to consider management 
credibility as a synonymous of disclosure credibility, the former is a characteristic of 
a firm’s managers that comes from their competence and reputation of truthfulness 
and does not vary across different disclosures. Williams (1996) argues that the ability 
of managers to make good disclosure with the passing of time builds a reputation that 
increases the believability of future disclosures. Hirst et al. (1999) and Hodge et al. 
(2000) find similar results.  
Assessing managerial credibility is straightforward for directed information when 
investors can check the accuracy of managers’ forecasts through ex-post realizations 
in the firm’s audited financial statements. Nevertheless, when coming to the soft 
information, investors cannot evaluate the precision of the signal emanating from the 
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firm’s disclosures with similar accuracy, as this often contains internal qualitative 
information from which it is difficult or even impossible to look for ex-post 
realizations. Therefore, investors would reasonably seek for alternative signals of 
management’s credibility such as the informativeness of contemporaneous available 
hard information or managerial incentives57. As the quality of reported earnings 
reflects the firm’s information environment and managerial incentives, it offers an 
important signal of management’s credibility. According to this view, Athanasakou 
& Hussainey (2009) find that the credibility of forward-looking performance 
disclosure increases with the firm’s earnings quality.  
Figure 4. Factor that influence disclosure credibility  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Mercer (2004)  
The role of earnings quality for the credibility of unverifiable disclosure creates a 
                                                
57 By analysing managers’ language in earnings announcements Demers & Vega (2010) suggest that 
investors’ reliance on soft non-verifiable information depends on factors related to the firm’s 
information environment (e.g. the informativeness of contemporaneous available hard information) as 
well as managerial incentives. See DEMERS E. & VEGA C. (2010). Soft Information in Earnings 
Announcements: News or Noise, Working Paper. 
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relationship between mandatory and voluntary disclosures that is known in literature 
as “confirmatory role” of disclosure58. The origins of this perspective can be found in 
the theoretical studies of Dye (1985), Jung & Kwon (1988) and Verrecchia (1990). 
They argue that high information quality boosts the credibility of voluntary 
disclosure. Therefore, as information quality increases, the likelihood of disclosure 
also increases (Francis et al., 2008), leading to a positive association between 
voluntary disclosure and information quality (Mouselli & Hussainey, 2012). If a 
measure of earnings quality proxies for information quality (i.e. the management 
credibility), voluntary disclosure decision will be endogenously determined by the 
higher (lower) quality of the reported earnings that in turn will affect the credibility 
of that information (Dechow et al. 2010). 
Most empirical studies support a complementary relationship between financial 
accounting information and voluntary disclosure. These studies document a positive 
relationship between earnings (or accruals) quality and voluntary disclosure (Lobo & 
Zhou, 2001; Francis et al., 2008). For instance, high quality accounting information 
is complementary to managers’ voluntary disclosure as it disciplines managers’ 
voluntary forecasts (Ball, 2001). The issuance of management forecast is positively 
associated with earnings informativeness (Lennox & Park, 2006)59. Recently Ball et 
al. (2011) document that audited accounting reports increase the credibility of 
voluntary information60. Finally, Mouselli & Hussainey (2012) find a positive 
association between accrual and disclosure quality61. 
                                                
58 Several studies suggest that one important role of mandatory disclosure is to create an environment 
in which managers can credibly communicate private information. See LUNDHOLM, R. J. (2003). 
Historical Accounting and the Endogenous Credibility of Current Disclosures. Journal of Accounting, 
Auditing and Finance, 18, 207–229; STOCKEN, P.C. (2000). Credibility of Voluntary Disclosure. 
RAND Journal of Economics 31, 359–374. 
59 WAYMIRE (1985), COX (1985), IMHOFF (1978) find that forecast frequency is inversely related to 
earnings volatility (information asymmetries) which they interpret as a complementary relationship 
between the quality of reported numbers and the level of voluntary disclosure.  
60 An important assumption of the studies that claim the complementarity between financial reporting 
and disclosure is that the primary economic role of reported earnings is not to provide timely new 
information to the share market, but settling debt and compensation contracts, disciplining prior 
information, including more timely managerial disclosures of information originating in the firm’s 
accounting system. Therefore, it has a primary contracting rather than an informational role. See 
BALL, R., & SHIVAKUMAR, L. (2008). Earnings Quality at Initial Public Offerings. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 45(2–3), 324–349.  
61 Although they are complementary sources of information for investors, in their asset pricing test 
they find that accruals quality factor and disclosure quality factor contain similar information and 
confirm the substitutive nature of accruals quality and disclosure quality factor in explaining the time-
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Nevertheless, another strand of literature, assuming that the quality of mandatory 
accounting information is exogenous, argues that information asymmetries create a 
demand for disclosure and provides incentive to disclose more because the value of 
new information will be higher in such a setting (Grossman & Hart, 1980; Milgrom, 
1981; Verrecchia, 1983). If the quality of reported earnings mirrors for the managers 
private information62, thus firms with low earnings quality (and high information 
asymmetries) would increase voluntary disclosure in order to mitigate the 
information asymmetries between managers and shareholders (Francis et al., 2008). 
It follows that the relationship between voluntary disclosure and earnings quality is a 
substitutive one, since the former compensate for the latter. 
Measuring the quality of voluntary disclosure with the Association for Investment 
Management Research (AIMR) ratings, Lang & Lundholm (1993) find an inverse 
relationship between the level of voluntary disclosure and the quality of financial 
reporting, proxied by the returns-earnings correlations. Tasker (1998) also finds a 
negative relationship between the likelihood that a firm uses conference calls (proxy 
for disclosure quality) and earnings informativeness. Chen et al. (2002) find that 
managers voluntarily include balance sheet information along with quarterly 
earnings announcement when current earnings are less informative as response to 
investor demand for value-relevant information to supplement earnings. Lougee & 
Marquardt (2004) find that firms with less informative GAAP earnings are more 
likely to disclose pro forma earnings than other firms and pro-forma earnings are 
more useful to investors when GAAP informativeness is low. Athanasakou & 
Hussainey (2009) go one step further. Using accrual quality as a proxy for earnings 
quality and distinguishing between innate and discretionary component of earnings 
quality, they find that disclosure quality substitutes for poor innate earnings quality 
and complements high discretionary earnings quality63.  
                                                                                                                                     
series variation in portfolio returns. See MOUSELLI, S., JAAFAR, A., & HUSSAINEY, K. (2012). Accruals 
Quality Vis-à-Vis Disclosure Quality: Substitutes or Complements? The British Accounting Review, 
44(1), 36–46. 
62 The literature acknowledges that the level of earnings quality is positively correlated with the 
quality of manager’s private information (FRANCIS et al., 2008).  
63 Focusing on a less verifiable type of voluntary disclosure, DEMERS & VEGA (2010) find that net 
optimism detected in soft information is priced more for firms when the quality of accounting data is 
lower, consistent with net optimism substituting for poor earnings quality. In a different setting (i.e. 
signalling theory), GIETZMAN & TROMBETTA (2003) show that the interaction between accounting and 
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The conflicting results of previous analytical and empirical research about the nature 
of the interaction between mandatory and voluntary disclosure mainly depend on 
different samples as well as different proxies used for both voluntary and mandatory 
disclosures. A substantial role is, however, played by assumptions underlying the 
analytical and empirical model.64 
To summarize, the growing importance of soft information in the reporting package 
of the firm has shift the focus from the content of such disclosure on its believability 
(i.e. credibility). Mandatory disclosure may play an important role in increasing the 
credibility of soft unverifiable disclosure. However, its credibility also relies on the 
incentives managers face when issue such disclosure (Demers & Vega, 2010). In the 
following, the role of the political and institutional incentives will be deeply 
discussed, then the focus will be on the incentives coming from the firm’s corporate 
governance system and its interaction with the corporate disclosure practices. 
                                                                                                                                     
voluntary disclosure choices can lead to a situation where firms with high accounting quality (i.e. 
conservative accounting policy) make no voluntary disclosure, leading to a substitution between them. 
See GIETZMANN, M. B., & TROMBETTA, M. (2003). Disclosure Interactions: Accounting Policy 
Choice and Voluntary Disclosure Effects on the Cost of Raising Outside Capital. Accounting and 
Business Research, 33(3), 187–205. 
64 Most of the analytical and empirical studies assume that mandatory and voluntary signals have a 
common underlying value. For instance, in her model EINHORN (2005) refers to two signals, both 
correlated with firm value, one that must be disclosed, and the other that can be disclosed according to 
the manager’s decision. In such a setting she shows that the manager’s voluntary disclosure decision 
depends on the correlation between those two signals and the firm value as well as on the change in 
the information environment associated with mandatory disclosure. She finds that there is a non-
monotonic relationship between the likelihood of voluntary disclosure and the quality of mandatory 
disclosure. But, most importantly, she show that the voluntary disclosure decision does not depend on 
the content of the mandatory disclosure itself (e.g., whether it contains good or bad news). On the 
contrary, BAGNOLI & WATTS (2007) assume that managers have some private information and may 
explicitly determine whether to voluntarily provide information that complements, rather than 
substitutes for, the information in financial reports. Changing the assumption underlying its analytical 
model they find that the content of the financial reports affects what the manager voluntarily 
discloses, and this effect varies according to the nature of the managers private information (whether 
it complements or substitutes for mandatory financial report information). This calls into play the role 
of the content of voluntary disclosure. ATHANASAKOU & HUSSAINEY (2009) argue that when 
disclosures are related to voluntary information, voluntary and mandatory disclosures are likely to 
substitute each other. However, to the extent voluntary disclosures are unrelated to the information in 
contemporaneously reported earnings, then they are more likely to complement reported earnings 
quality. By examining the case of forward-looking performance information, where the content of 
supplementary disclosure is not necessarily related to the information in mandatory disclosure they 
find that these disclosures complement the quality of the financial reporting outcome and that 
investors use earnings quality to infer the credibility of these disclosures. See ATHANASAKOU, V. & 
HUSSAINEY, K. (2009). Forward-Looking Performance Disclosure and Earnings Quality. Working 
paper. 
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3. The heterogeneity of firms disclosure policies65 
Firms do not operate in a vacuum, but rather in socio-economic and political 
environments that differ across countries as well as organizational structures. 
Therefore, a central issue of the disclosure literature has been to identify the extent to 
which firm’s disclosure practices vary according to the cross-sectional variation of 
country-level and firm-level characteristics.  
Traditionally, researchers have focused on differences in accounting standards to 
explain cross-sectional variability in reporting practices. Nevertheless, Ball et al. 
(2000a), point out that the heterogeneity among disclosure practices is not 
determined by differences in accounting standards alone. Analysing a sample of 
firms from seven countries that differ in the way they solve information asymmetries 
(via “public” disclosure or “private channels”) they show that international 
differences in reporting practices are a function of reporting demand under different 
institutional arrangements. Ball (2001) and Bushman et al. (2004) suggest that 
accounting and disclosure characteristics in a country evolve according to the 
economic, legal and political infrastructures. In a related study, Ball et al. (2003) 
analyzing the firms’ accounting properties in four Asian countries having similar 
accounting standards, but different institutional structures, show that reporting 
quality is ultimately determined by the preparers’ incentives and not by accounting 
standards per se. This perspective is known as “reporting incentive view” and 
sustains the prevalence of reporting incentives over accounting standards in 
determining the quality of corporate reporting. There can be two different (and 
interrelated) set of incentives (a) country-level (b) firm-level incentives. 
(a) Country-level incentives. The characteristics of the institutional environment are 
multidimensional, including the strength of countries’ securities regulation, 
enforcement, capital market development, investor protection, disclosure and 
transparency of reporting practices (Guenther & Young, 2000; Jaggi & Low, 2000; 
Francis et al., 2003)66. A variety of studies document that reporting quality varies 
                                                
65 The focus of this paragraph is to examine studies on the determinants of corporate disclosure, with a 
particular focus on the role of corporate governance for firm transparency. For a review of the 
literature on corporate governance in general refer to ARMSTRONG et al. (2010). 
66 However, it has been noticed that these aspects are highly correlated because they all reflect to 
some degree the underlying quality of investor protection in a country (ROSSI & VOLPIN, 2004). LEUZ 
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according to the origins of legal system. An almost unquestioned result is that 
common law countries are more transparent than civil law countries due to the 
prevalence of “market forces” (i.e. the amount of publicly traded equity, the size of 
the market, the extent of the private versus public contracting) relative to the 
“political forces” (i.e. the government involvement in codifying and enforcing 
accounting standards). The underlying assumption is that in market-oriented 
common law countries the information asymmetries between insiders and outsiders 
are solved more by public disclosure than private communication channel, thus 
increasing the demand for a high transparent financial reporting system (Ball, et al., 
2003).  
There is also a cross-country variation in different earnings quality proxies such as 
earnings responsiveness, smoothness or earnings management according to 
characteristics of the institutional environment (Francis & Wong, 2008)67. For 
instance, Ali & Hwang (2000) examine the investors’ responsiveness to earnings 
according to six country-level institutional factors and find that it is lower in markets 
that are more bank- rather than investor- oriented, and where the accounting rules are 
the results of a standard setting process. Hung (2000) finds that the use of accrual 
accounting is associated with low investor responsiveness only in countries with 
weak legal protection. Leuz et al. (2003) find that the level of earnings management 
is positively associated with the degree of development of stock market, the level of 
ownership concentration, the strength of investor rights and legal enforcement.  
The aforementioned evidence suggests that country’s legal and judicial regime as 
well as the extent of market forces are important determinants of corporate financial 
transparency. Beyond institutional features, there are, however, other factors that 
explain the cross-sectional variation of corporate policies within individual countries, 
related to both the characteristics of the business model and the governance system 
                                                                                                                                     
(2010) has recently performed a cluster analysis of 31 countries suggesting that there exist three 
institutional clusters with similar institutional features related to the level of securities regulation, 
investor protection and legal enforcement systems. See LEUZ, C. (2010). Different Approaches to 
Corporate Reporting Regulation: How Jurisdictions Differ and Why. Accounting and Business 
Research, 40(3), 229–256.  
67 Studies on cross country variation in accounting policies mainly focus on the following earnings 
attributes: (i) value relevance (ALFORD et al., 1993; ALI & HWANG, 2000; FRANCIS et al., 2003; 
GEUNTHER & YOUNG, 2000; LAND & LANG, 2002) (ii) earnings management (LEUZ et al., 2003, 
BHATTACHARYA et al., 2003) (iii) earnings timeliness (BALL et al., 2000, BALL et al., 2002). 
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of the firm.  
(b) Firm-level incentives. A substantial part of that reporting incentives are related to 
the characteristics of the firm’s business model such as size, leverage and firm 
profitability (Marston & Shrives, 1991; Ahmed & Courtis, 1999). The positive 
association between measures of firm size (such as market value of the firm, total 
revenue, book value of asset) and disclosure level (McNally et al., 1982), suggests 
that larger corporation are more likely to disclose more information to users of 
annual report. The evidence of the impact of firm size on the quality of reported 
earnings is more inconclusive (Dechow et al., 2010). Some studies find a negative 
association between firms’ size and disclosure, because of their higher political and 
regulatory costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). However 
other studies find that larger firms tend to be more transparent68.  
A high leveraged capital structure should lead to an increase in the disclosure level of 
the firm due to the higher monitoring costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Schipper, 
1981; Hossain et al., 1994). From a different stand-point, highly leveraged firms 
should exhibit a lower quality of financial reporting, as managers may take action to 
avoid violating covenants (i.e. income increasing accounting choice) (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1986). Several empirical studies find support to this hypothesis that is 
known in the literature as debt-covenant hypothesis (Bowen et al., 1981; Sweeney, 
1994; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Dichev & Skinner, 2002)69. 
The firm’s profitability is also associated to its disclosure level, since highly 
profitable firms have more incentive to signal their superior performance to the 
market (Cooke, 1989). However there are also studies that find a negative 
relationship (Belkaoui & Kahl, 1978). In the context of earnings quality studies have 
found that firms with weaker performance engage more in accounting practices to 
                                                
68 According to this latter view, larger firms bear more fixed costs to maintain an adequate internal 
control system, thus are better able to monitor the quality of financial report. See BALL, R., & FOSTER, 
G. (1982). Corporate Financial Reporting: A Methodological Review of Empirical Research. Journal 
of Accounting Research, 20, 161–234; GE, W., & MCVAY, S. (2005). The Disclosure of Material 
Weaknesses in Internal Control After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Accounting Horizons, 19(3), 137–158; 
ASHBAUGH-SKAIFE, H., COLLINS, D. W. & KINNEY JR., W. R. (2007). The Discovery and Reporting of 
Internal Control Deficiencies Prior to SOX-Mandated Audits. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
44(1–2), 166–192. 
69 There can also be other incentives that lead higher leveraged firms to have a lower quality of 
reported earnings such as bankruptcy concerns, need for financing, financial distress (DECHOW et al., 
2010). 
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hide their negative performance (i.e. earnings management) that eventually reduce 
the quality of reported earnings (Petroni, 1992; DeFond & Park, 1997; Balsam et al., 
1995). However, DeAngelo et al. (1994) argue that firms with a persistent negative 
performance have lower possibilities to engage in earnings management.  
Other than the previous, listing status (Singhvi & Desai, 1971), liquidity (Belkaoui & 
Kahl, 1978), industry type (McNally et al., 1982), and the level of growth (Nissim & 
Penman, 2001), are other factors shaping the corporate disclosure policies and 
transparency but the nature of their association with corporate disclosure is far from 
being univocal. 
The inadequacy of these studies to fully explain the cross-sectional variation among 
firms’ disclosure policies has been largely attributed to differences across samples 
and measures of firm transparency (Ahmed & Courtis, 1999). However, Gul & 
Leung (2004) point out that one of the main reasons that account for such 
inconclusiveness is the failure to include the incentives related to the corporate 
governance systems (pp. 355).  
 
3.1 The role of corporate governance for disclosure 
In the last 15 years the growing of corporate governance literature in accounting 
suggests that dimensions related to the firm’s corporate governance structure, such as 
board of directors characteristics, managerial incentives, capital structure or external 
auditor influence preparers’ reporting incentives, thus (at least partially) explaining 
the observed heterogeneity across firms disclosure practices. Understanding the role 
of corporate governance characteristics for firm transparency needs going to the 
roots of the corporate governance literature and analyzing the role of disclosure in 
the governance process. 
The definition of corporate governance differs depending on the perspective of 
researchers70. The view commonly held in the accounting and finance literature relies 
                                                
70 SHLEIFER & VISHNY (1997) define corporate governance as the ways in which suppliers of finance 
to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. ZINGALES (1998) views 
governance systems as the complex set of constraints that shape the ex post bargaining over the quasi-
rents generated by the firm. GILLAN & STARKS (1998) define corporate governance as the system of 
laws, rules, and factors that control operation at a company. For a discussion on the definition of 
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upon the agency theory. Here the firm is viewed as a “nexus of contracts” among the 
various factors of production and corporate governance is considered the subset of 
contracts that help align the actions and choices of managers with the interest of 
shareholders, thus reducing the level of agency costs (Armstrong et al., 2010). 
Agency problems in organizations result from the separation of ownership and 
control and the subsequent conflict of interests between shareholder and corporate 
managers. Thus, in presence of information asymmetries, self-interested managers 
will choose a set of decisions to maximize their own utility at the expense of 
corporate shareholder (Berle & Means, 1932). Theory also suggests that contracts 
alone are not always enough to solve these conflicts (Hart, 1995). Therefore, owners 
(and sometimes managers) have interest in setting corporate governance mechanisms 
that help alleviate agency problems created by the separation of ownership and 
management of the business entities, by limiting undesirable managerial behaviour 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Corporate disclosure is one of these governance 
mechanisms whose role is to mitigate the information asymmetries between insiders 
and outsiders, and reduce the potential for opportunistic behaviours. 
Disclosure might play both an explicit and implicit role in the governance of 
corporations71. Firstly, outputs of the reporting system can be used as parameters in 
the explicit contracting activity, thus constraining managers from engaging in actions 
that generate agency costs. Secondly, a commitment toward transparency acts as an 
implicit contract between managers and external parties, thus reducing their ability to 
expropriate wealth (Armstrong et al., 2010). Thirdly, financial reporting helps 
facilitate the operation of specific corporate governance mechanisms, such as the 
enforcement of investors legal rights against management or the monitoring of the 
                                                                                                                                     
corporate governance see also BRICKLEY, J. A. & ZIMMERMAN, J. L. (2010). Corporate Governance 
Myths: Comments on Armstrong, Guay, and Weber. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50(2–3), 
235–245.  
71 The link between corporate governance and disclosure becomes much more clear if we recall that in 
the light of its stewardship role, disclosure should provide investors with information useful to 
Evaluate the Performance of manager. See JENSEN, M. C. (1993). Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Finance, 48(3), 831; MEHRAN, H. 
(1995). Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership, and Firm Performance. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 38(2),163–184; SHLEIFER, A., & VISHNY, R. W. (1997). A Survey of Corporate 
Governance. The Journal of Finance, 52(2), 737–783; CORE, J., & GUAY, W. (1999). The Use of 
Equity Grants to Manage Optimal Equity Incentive Levels. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
28(2), 151–184; HOLDERNESS, C. G. (2003). A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate Control. 
Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Apr, 51–64. 
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board of directors over the top management team (Sloan, 2001). 
Bushman & Smith (2001) define the use of information in control mechanisms as the 
“governance role” of financial accounting and recognize it as one of the channels 
through which financial accounting information may affect economic performance72. 
However, financial accounting information constitutes not only the input for the 
governance process, but is itself a product of that process. In particular, it is the 
outcome of corporate accounting and external reporting process that is under the 
direct control of the management. As management knows the kind of information 
that will be used, it may have incentives to manage that information according to 
their own interests (Bushman & Smith, 2001). Thus, a series of corporate governance 
mechanisms have evolved to ensure the quality of financial reporting process. 
Accordingly, a large strand of literature has investigated the effectiveness of these 
mechanisms in ensuring that information provided by management is timely and 
relevant, in other words not biased. The following of the paragraph reviews the 
major contributions from the governance and accounting literature with a particular 
focus on the role of board of directors, given its prominent position for corporate 
transparency. 
 
3.2 Governance mechanisms and corporate transparency 
According to the agency theory there are several mechanisms through which firms 
can mitigate agency conflicts between managers and investors. The classic 
dichotomy distinguishes between internal and external corporate governance 
mechanisms. Internal mechanisms, such as managerial incentive plans, board of 
directors and internal labour market, result from the decision and action of the 
                                                
72 The first channel involves the use of financial accounting information to identify good versus bad 
projects by managers and investors (project identification). The second is the use of financial 
accounting information to reduce information asymmetries among investors (adverse selection). The 
third is the use of financial accounting information in corporate control mechanisms that discipline 
managers to direct resources toward project identified as good and away from project identified as 
bad, thus preventing managers from expropriation of wealth of investors (governance channel). They 
suggest that financial accounting information, through its governance role, influences economic 
performance both directly by allowing managers a better selection of investments, and indirectly by 
lowering the risk premium demanded by investors to compensate for the risk of loss from 
expropriation by opportunistic managers. See BUSHMAN, R. M., & SMITH, A. J. (2001). Financial 
Accounting Information and Corporate Governance. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 32, 237–
333.  
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shareholders and the board, while external mechanisms include monitoring by 
outside shareholder or debt holder, the market for corporate control, the product 
market competition, the external managerial labour market, and securities laws that 
protect outside investors against expropriation by corporate insiders (Bushman & 
Smith, 2001). 
When examining the role of corporate governance for transparency, researchers have 
traditionally focused on internal control mechanisms such as board of directors, 
internal audit and ownership structure. However, this narrow view of the corporate 
governance may potentially undervalue the role that it can play in the overall 
corporate communication between insiders and outsiders (Cohen et al., 2004). 
Recognizing that a firm is more than just board, management, and shareholders 
recently scholars have called for an enlargement of the corporate governance 
framework in order to consider factors inside and outside the firm (Figure 5).  
Figure 5. Corporate governance and transparency: a broad framework  
Source: Adapted from Cohen et al. (2004) 
All these aspects may influence the governance process ultimately affecting the 
quality of financial reporting and disclosure (Gillan, 2006). In the following, the 
focus will be on the (a) board of directors and its committees (b) managerial 
incentives (c) ownership structure. Then the role of (d) external auditors (e) 
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institutional investors and financial analysts will be discussed. 
(a) The board of directors and its committees. The most investigated dimension of 
the internal corporate governance is the board of directors. Board of directors holds 
the responsibility for setting objectives and controlling the firm’s activities (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). Various attributes of the board of directors and its committees 
influence their effectiveness as corporate governance mechanisms. Board size and 
independence are among the most investigated.  
The trade-off between having a large rather than a small board has been subject of 
considerable research effort (Armstrong et al., 2010). From one hand, smaller boards 
are supposed to monitor more effectively because they are more cohesive and 
productive, while a board comprised of too many directors may experiment 
coordination costs and free-riding problems that prevent the effective monitoring on 
the financial reporting practices (Lipton & Lorsh, 1992; Jensen, 1993). From the 
other hand, larger boards may offer a better advice to the CEO due to the broader 
expertise of its member (Dalton et al., 1999)73. 
A related and debated dimension is board independence. Recent reforms act to 
strengthen the board monitoring and advising function calling for the increase in the 
proportion of non-executive directors, with no business and family relationship with 
the company74. Independent outside directors may bring a greater breadth of 
experience and are in a better position to monitor and control managers activities, 
including the financial reporting process (Eng & Mak, 2003; Chen & Jaggi, 2000). 
To this vein several studies document a positive association between board 
                                                
73 COLES et al. (2008) exploit this duality of views by examining whether one board size fits all. They 
conclude that the relationship between board size and firm value is U-shaped, because different firms 
have distinct optimal board size. In particular, complex firms (i.e. large, diversified and highly-
leveraged firms) have larger boards than simple ones. See COLES, J. L., DANIEL, N. D., NAVEEN, L. 
(2008). Boards: Does One Size Fit All? Journal of Financial Economics, 87(2), 329–356.  
74 The definition of the independent director varies throughout theoretical literature. The most 
common approach to measuring board independence are non-executive and independent directors on 
the basis of a legal definition (GUL & LEUNG, 2004). A non-executive director is one who is not in the 
direct employ of the corporation. However, this definition does not allow to properly identify 
independence of directors, as it includes also directors who maintain personal or professional 
relationships with the firm or firm management (grey or affiliated directors). According to SEC 
guidelines are affiliated and then not independent directors with “(..) family relationship by blood or 
marriage with a top manager or other director; affiliation with the firm as a supplier, banker or 
creditor within the past two years; association with a law firm engaged by corporation; stock 
ownership resulting in the SEC designation of control person”.  
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independence and voluntary disclosure (Adams & Hossain, 1998; Patelli & Principe, 
2007; Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007). For instance, 
companies with more outside directors make more accurate and less optimistically 
biased earnings forecasts (Ajinkya et al., 2005). There is also a considerable 
literature on the impact of the board independence on the quality of accounting 
numbers. These studies suggest that the proportion of outside directors is negatively 
related with the incidence of SEC accounting enforcement actions (Beasley, 1996), 
and the extent of earnings management practices (Peasnell et al., 2005; Klein, 2002). 
It is also positively related with the conservatism of accounting earnings (Beeks et 
al., 2004; Ahmed & Duellman, 2007) and level of earnings informativeness (Chang 
& Sun, 2009)75.  
While board size and independence play a pivotal role, board of directors’ features 
that lead to increased transparency extend over those two, including CEO 
leadership/power, directors’ knowledge and expertise and the degree of directors 
“busyness”. The idea that concentrating decision making power in the same person 
of the board Chair/CEO may constrain its independence and limit its oversight is 
well accepted in the agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Brickley et al., 1994). 
Furthermore, the issue is considered important by the code of best practices that 
recommends a separation of the role of CEO and Chairman in the large corporation. 
This is because CEO/Chair duality concentrates power in the CEO’s position, 
potentially allowing for more management discretion. However, the empirical 
evidence on the association between CEO duality and corporate disclosure is quite 
                                                
75 All of the previous studies emphasize the direction of causality from the monitoring activities of the 
board of directors to the outcome of the reporting process. However there can also be alternative 
interpretations. ARMSTRONG et al. (2010) discuss the case of the positive association between board of 
directors and corporate transparency. Management and shareholders invite more outside directors to 
sit on the board and its sub-committee only when their corporate financial reporting process is 
transparent, i.e. there are less information asymmetries between managers and outside directors. For 
firms with a noisy information environment (high growth, intangible asset, substantial R&D) it is 
more difficult and costly for outside directors to acquire the information to effectively monitors 
managers (DEMSETZ & LEHN, 1985; GILLAN, 2006; COLES et al., 2008). Thus we will observe an 
higher proportion of outside directors only in firms with lower information asymmetries. Even though 
these are information asymmetries between managers and outside directors and not between 
managers/directors and external investors, from a practical point of view it is difficult to disentagle 
them because proxies that capture manager-director info asymmetries (i.e. R&D, stock price 
volatility) also captures managers-investors info asymmetries. See ARMSTRONG, C. S., GUAY, W. R., 
& WEBER, J. P. (2009). The Role of Information and Financial Reporting In Corporate Governance 
and Contracting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, (2-3), 179–234. 
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inconclusive (Ho & Wong, 2001; Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Gul & Leung, 2004)76. 
Recently, researchers have examined the role of expertise of the board and its sub-
committees members (Gillan, 2006). Directors with a background in public 
accounting, auditing, or financial operation have higher expertise with respect to 
monitoring and advising financial reporting and disclosure issues. Research finds a 
positive relationship between financial expertise and disclosure quality. Financial 
expertise is associated with lower earnings management (Xie et al., 2003) and lower 
earnings restatement (Agrawal & Chadha, 2005)77. Moreover, firms with a higher 
proportion of outside directors on the audit committee with financial expertise have 
more frequent and accurate managements’ earnings forecasts (Karamanou & Vafeas, 
2005)78. 
Another important (but under investigated) dimension is the appointment of the same 
directors on the board of other organizations. This feature is known as “busyness” of 
directors or “interlocking behaviour”. A consistent portion of studies grounded in the 
agency literature argue that the incidence of external appointment weakens the level 
of monitoring by the board over financial reporting process leading to a lower degree 
of financial reporting quality79. However, from a different perspective directors who 
                                                
76 HO & WONG (2001) and CHENG & COURTENAY (2006) found no association between CEO duality 
and voluntary disclosure, while SHARMA (2004) finds that accounting fraud is more likely to occur 
when there is CEO duality and less board independence. By focusing on the voluntary disclosure, 
GUL & LEUNG (2004) find that the negative relationship between CEO duality and corporate 
disclosure is moderated by the presence of non executive directors. See GUL, F. A., & LEUNG, S. 
(2004). Board Leadership, Outside Directors’ Expertise and Voluntary Corporate Disclosures. Journal 
of Accounting and Public Policy, 23(5), 351–379. 
77 However, the definition of the board or audit committee expertise is not homogeneous across 
studies. While in the US context the SEC and SOX Section 407 illustrates criteria for identifying the 
financial expertise of the audit committee, in the continental Europe no similar rule can be found. This 
gives rise to significant differences across countries that may affect the result of the studies. 
Moreover, some studies find that the audit committee accounting expertise more than the financial 
expertise appear to be valued by investors. See CARCELLO, J. V., HERMANSON, D. R., & YE, Z. 
(SHELLY). (2011). Corporate Governance Research in Accounting and Auditing: Insights, Practice 
Implications, and Future Research Directions. AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 30(3), 1–
31.  
78 KRISHNAN & VISVANATHAN (2008) show that the presence of financial expert in the audit 
committee is positively associated with the conservatism, but only when the overall quality of 
corporate governance is strong. ABBOTT et al. (2004) and DONOHER et al. (2007) suggest that the 
financial expertise of the audit committee members increases its effectiveness in preventing earnings 
restatements, and other misleading disclosures. 
79 For instance, literature point out that the number of external appointments is positively related with 
the likelihood of financial accounting fraud and earnings management and negatively related with the 
degree of conservatism. See BEASLEY, M. S. (1996). An Empirical Analysis of the Relation Between 
the Board of Director Composition and The Accounting Review, 71(4), 443–465; AHMED, A. S., & 
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serve on multiple boards may develop reputational capital as experts and are 
therefore more experienced in their monitoring function (Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Kosnik, 1987; Kaplan & Reishus, 1990; Shivdasani, 1993). It is not surprising that 
empirical analyses on the association between director interlock and corporate 
transparency also report conflicting results (Brickley et al., 1999; Erickson et al. 
2006; Bowen et al., 2008; Devos et al., 2009). 
Finally, the role of audit committee on disclosure quality is pivotal as well, since the 
board of directors delegates the oversight over financial reporting process to the audit 
committee. Literature suggests that firms with CEO duality, less independent board 
and audit committee are more likely to engage in accounting earnings manipulation 
(Dechow et al., 1996; Abbott et al., 2000; Klein, 2002; Davidson et al., 2005). In 
addition, García Osma (2008) reports that more independent boards limit real 
earnings management (manipulation of R&D). Yang & Krishnan (2005) show that 
the audit committee size is negatively related with abnormal accruals whereas the 
provision of stock ownership is positively related. 
(b) Managerial incentives. A further dimension of internal corporate governance is 
the level of management incentives. Compensation policies play an important role in 
aligning the interests of managers and shareholders (Jensen, 1993). Higher stock 
option or ownership by directors and executive officers create incentives for value 
maximizing behaviour. As a consequence, the presence of managerial ownership 
increases the quality of accounting information (Warfield et al., 1995). Firms with 
equity incentives (ties between executive compensation and performance measures) 
issue more frequent earnings forecasts and have higher analysts’ rankings of firm’s 
disclosure practices (Nagar et al., 2003). However, stock option and/or directors 
share ownership also give rise to several concerns regarding their efficacy. They may 
create perverse incentive to engage in fraudulent activities to compromise financial 
information aiming at improving the performance of the firm in periods around stock 
sales or option exercises. In addition, they can foster the insiders’ entrenchment thus 
                                                                                                                                     
DUELLMAN, S. (2007). Accounting Conservatism and Board of Director Characteristics: An Empirical 
Analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 43(2–3), 411–437; SARKAR, J., & SARKAR, S. 
(2009). Multiple Board Appointments and Firm Performance in Emerging Economies: Evidence from 
India. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 17(2), 271–293. 
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increasing the potential for opportunistic behaviour. Under that perspective firms 
with low managerial ownership release more voluntary disclosure (Eng & Mak, 
2003). Conversely, CEO’ pay-for-performance is associated with greater earnings 
management (Cornett et al., 2008)80. The major concern of this literature is that its 
incentive vs. entrenchment effect depends upon the degree of managerial ownership 
concentration. Thus, recent studies suggest that the relationship between managerial 
ownership and disclosure quality is not linear: at low level of managerial ownership, 
the relation is positive while beyond a certain threshold increasing ownership 
concentration worsens the quality of reporting (Yeo et al., 2002; Sanchez-Ballesta & 
García-Meca, 2007). 
(c) Ownership structure. The degree of ownership concentration, as well as the 
nature of the firm’s blockholders and management are other dimensions of the 
corporate governance structure that may affect financial reporting and disclosure 
transparency81. 
However, the influence of ownership concentration over the level of corporate 
transparency is far from being univocal. The literature provides two competing 
views: the “alignment” and the “entrenchment” hypotheses. The “alignment” 
hypothesis predicts that in presence of concentrated ownership a firm faces less 
pressure from capital markets in order to meet or beat analyst forecasts or avoid 
reporting earnings decreases or losses. The owner is likely to be more involved in the 
management of the business entities, being able to better monitor the financial 
reporting process, and leading to a higher level of firms’ transparency82. 
On the contrary, the “entrenchment” hypothesis suggests that in presence of high 
                                                
80 In addition, BERGSTRESSER & PHILIPPON (2006) document that when CEO exercises stock option 
the level of accruals is higher. See BERGSTRESSER, D., & PHILIPPON, T. (2006). CEO Incentives and 
Earnings Management. Journal of Financial Economics, 80(3), 511–529.  
81 Here, the interesting agency conflict is not the one between managers and shareholders, because 
managers and directors can be selected and directly monitored by the controlling shareholder. The 
relevant conflict of interest arises between majority shareholders and minority shareholders where the 
former can extract private benefit of control at the expense of the latter. See SHLEIFER, A., & VISHNY, 
R. W. (1997). A Survey of Corporate Governance. The Journal of Finance, 52(2), 737–783.  
82 Firms with controlling shareholders may want to mitigate the perceived higher agency costs by 
using disclosure as a bonding mechanism to commit toward high transparency and reducing its ability 
to extract private rents. See CHAU, G. K., & GRAY, S. J. (2002). Ownership Structure and Corporate 
Voluntary Disclosure in Hong Kong and Singapore. The International Journal of Accounting, 37(2), 
247–265; HANIFFA, R. M., & COOKE, T. E. (2002). Culture, Corporate Governance and Disclosure in 
Malaysian Corporations. Abacus, 38(3), 317–349. 
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degree of ownership concentration the controlling owner may want to collude with 
managers in order to take action that reflects personal motives rather than value-
maximizing decisions. In such a setting, insiders have incentives to conceal their 
private control benefits from minorities through earnings management (Morck et al., 
1988; Hossain et al., 1994; Cormier et al., 2005; Bremmer & Pavelin, 2006; Patelli & 
Principe, 2007)83.  
The issue of  the entrenchment is particularly relevant in presence of mechanisms 
able to produce a “Disproportionate Ownership” by separating control rights from 
cash flow rights (Bigelli & Megoli, 2004; Enriques & Volpin, 2007)84. The 
employment of CEMs mechanisms from one hand reduces the agency conflicts 
between managers and dispersed shareholders, but from the other hand it fosters the 
conflict between controlling owners and minority shareholders ownership (Morck et 
al., 1988; Schulze et al., 2003). Empirical literature on this dimension mainly focuses 
on the quality of reported earnings and agrees on that firms with dual class-shares 
and/or other mechanisms that allow separating cash flow rights from voting rights 
tend to show lower earnings informativeness (Fan & Wong, 2002; Francis et al., 
2005).  
Finally, firms in which members of the founding family are blockholders and/or take 
position in the firms’ management either as top executives or as directors (i.e. family 
firms) also face incentives to be forthcoming with the information similarly to the 
case of concentrated ownership. The presence of the shares in the hands of the 
founder or its family, their active involvement in the management of the business, 
together with their long-term orientation and risk aversion (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; 
Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001) may increase their commitment 
toward value-maximizing action leading to better disclosure. A firm controlled by 
                                                
83 Similar to the case of concentrated ownership is the issuance of public debt traded on the market. 
GIVOLY et al. (2010) suggest that firms that issue public debt face higher demand for transparency 
from the market (Demand hypothesis) but at the same time have also higher market pressures that 
create incentives to manipulate financial reporting for opportunistic behaviour (Opportunistic 
hypothesis). See GIVOLY, D., HAYN, C. K., & KATZ, S. P. (2010). Does Public Ownership of Equity 
Improve Earnings Quality? The Accounting Review, 85(1), 195–225. 
84 Previous literature suggests at least four different mechanisms that controlling shareholders employ 
to produce a wedge between ownership rights and control rights: (i) non voting shares (ii)  pyramidal 
structures (iii) voting trusts (iv) cross shareholdings. See BURKART, M., & LEE, S. (2008). One Share - 
One Vote: the Theory. Review of Finance , 12 (1), 1–49. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 66 
founding family ownership has larger analysts following, more informative analysts’ 
forecasts and smaller bid-ask spreads (Wang, 2006). They also have more 
informative reported earnings compared to their nonfamily peers (Ali et al., 2007), in 
terms of either accounting-based or market-based attributes (Cascino et al., 2010).  
Nevertheless, the involvement of family members in the ownership and the 
management of the corporation may also have some drawbacks. For instance, when 
CEO is a founding family member there is a higher probability of restatement due to 
the lack of independence (Agrawl & Chadha, 2005).   
(d) External auditor. Jensen & Meckling (1976) argue that the audit of financial 
report by an independent party is one mechanism by which shareholders can mitigate 
agency conflicts and increase the reliability of information about the firms’ current 
and future cash flows. External auditor is, indeed, responsible for verifying that the 
financial statement is in conformity with GAAP and reflects the “true” economic 
condition and operating results of the entity. Even though the general accepted 
auditing standards set several guidelines for measuring the external auditor’s 
performance, the “quality” of the auditor is multidimensional and unobservable 
(Balsam et al., 2003). Therefore, researchers make reference to several various 
proxies such as the auditor brand name, independence and tenure, the provision of 
external services, the audit compensation (Lin & Hwang, 2010). 
High quality auditor is associated with higher earnings response coefficient (Teoh & 
Wong, 1993), lower incidence of accounting errors and irregularities (DeFond & 
Jimbalvo, 1991). Several studies document that the use of brand name auditors 
constraints the level of earnings management (Francis et al., 1999). Firms whose 
audit committee member is affiliated with the audit partner have large discretionary 
accruals (Naiker & Sharma, 2009). The same occurs when firms hire former audit 
partners as officers or directors (Menon & Williams, 2004), pay greater non-audit 
fees (Frankel, et al., 2002) or have lower auditor tenure (Chen et al. 2008). 
Moreover, clients of larger audit firms exhibit increased conservatism (Kim et al., 
2003). Finally, accounting restatements are positively related to the proportion of 
audit committee member compensation that is composed of short-term or long-term 
stock option (Archambeault et al., 2008). 
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(e) Institutional investors and analysts. Blockholders such as institutional investors 
also require timely and reliable information about the firm in order to make efficient 
investing decisions. Institutional investors put pressures to firms in order to disclose 
more information (Healy et al., 1999). The importance of these blockholders 
increases when managers have incentives to boost the firm’s reported earnings. The 
presence of institutional investors decreases the level of accrual earnings 
management (Chung et al., 2002) and results in more conservative accounting 
choice. In addition, in presence of institutional investors managers are less likely to 
“take a bath”. Researchers also document that the level of firm transparency depends 
on how long institutional investors intend to hold shares. Forker (1992) and Abraham 
& Cox (2007) find a lower level of risk disclosure in presence of long-term 
institutional investors. While other studies find that long-term institutional investors 
are associated with constraining accounting discretion (Koh, 2003; Hsu & Koh, 
2005). 
Finally, literature suggests that financial analysts play an important role for corporate 
transparency. They may reduce agency costs by monitoring management and 
providing information about the firms to the market (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Chung & Jo, 1996). Analysts and other information intermediaries (e.g. rating 
agencies) help to detect managers’ misbehaviour (Healy & Palepu, 2001). 
Consistently, when firms are followed by more analysts, they engage less in earnings 
management (Yu, 2008), or tend to use income smoothing as an informative rather 
than an opportunistic tool (Sun, 2011). However, their corporate governance role is 
not clear ex-ante as they may also put excessive pressures to managers to meet or 
beat forecasts 85.  
                                                
85 In a broader view of the corporate governance system there are other external actors potentially 
affecting disclosure quality (e.g. regulators, legislators and other aspects of the legal system). 
However, most of them have been already mentioned in the analysis of the cross-country differences 
in corporate reporting practices. For instance, CLARKSON et al. (2008) show that when firms are 
provided with more discretionality they tend to issue poor quality disclosure. BURGSTAHLER et al. 
(2006) find that a strong legal environment is associated with lower earnings management. Another 
important mechanism is the market for corporate control, which may constitute the ultimate corporate 
governance mechanisms, but it may also allow inefficient managers to indulge in empire building. 
ARMSTRONG et al. (2012) examine the changes in US state antitakeover laws as source of exogenous 
variation in the functioning of the market for corporate control and find that financial statement 
informativeness increased following the passage of antitakeover laws. Other external corporate 
governance mechanisms are labour and product markets competition, media and business press. See 
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3.3 The nature of the interaction between governance and disclosure: 
complements or substitutes?   
At this point of the discussion, the evidence suggests that “good” internal and/or 
external governance increases corporate transparency86.  
However, a still debated question in the literature is whether the existence of costs 
related to disclosure activities or other limits to the information environment lead 
some firms to a substitution towards costly monitoring mechanisms (Bushman & 
Smith, 2001). In other words most studies empirically examine whether corporate 
disclosures and corporate governance are complementary or substitutive. 
If they are complementary, agency theory will predict a positive association between 
corporate governance effectiveness and firms’ transparency. The adoption of “good” 
governance mechanisms will lead to improvement in disclosure comprehensiveness 
and quality of annual reports, because the stricter monitoring environment acts as a 
constraint for managers to withhold and/or compromise information for their own 
interests. The empirical evidence reviewed in the previous paragraph is all consistent 
with the hypothesis of complementarity. 
Nevertheless, other studies suggest that the effectiveness of corporate governance 
practices and the quality of firms’ disclosure may substitute each other. The starting 
point of this literature is that firms trade off benefits and costs of financial reporting 
versus other corporate governance mechanisms in solving information asymmetries 
and agency problems. Even though disclosure has several direct and indirect positive 
effects for the capital market efficiency it also has costs. They are fixed costs (costs 
that do not vary with the manager’s private information) of disclosure such as the 
costs of preparation, certification and dissemination of accounting reports. In 
addition, firms can also have indirect costs resulting from the proprietary nature of 
                                                                                                                                     
GILLAN, S. L. (2006). Recent Developments in Corporate Governance: An Overview. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 12(3), 381–402.  
86 The term “good” governance, here, refers to certain governance structures that exert pressure over 
corporate board and management towards increased level of transparency, thus mitigating the 
information asymmetries and the agency costs. However, this term should be used with caution since 
it is conditional to the characteristics of the firm, including its stage of development. Therefore, 
certain governance structure that are “good” for one firm, may be “bad” for others. Moreover, within 
the same firm, the governance structure that is desirable at one point in time, may became 
inappropriate with the passing of the time. Finally, governance structure that are ex-ante optimal may 
cause unanticipated consequences, and turn out to be sub-optimal ex-post (ARMSTRONG et al., 2010). 
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information that is informative about the product, the market or the competitive 
position (Wagenhofer, 1990). The fact that this proprietary information can be used 
by other parties such as competitors, labour unions, regulators at the expense of the 
firm, may dampen disclosure incentives, leading managers to withhold information 
(Verrecchia, 1983).  
Furthermore, in certain settings there are some limits to the information environment 
itself. It is the case of firms operating in noisy business environments such as high 
growth firms with substantial R&D and high volatility. Here it is more difficult or 
costly for internal corporate mechanisms (i.e. board of directors) to acquire the 
information necessary to effectively monitor managers (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; 
Coles et al., 2008) in order to mitigate the information asymmetries and the related 
agency costs. Because disclosure is selective and the cost associated with 
information asymmetries can be reduced by using other governance mechanisms as 
“warranty” for investors, firms characterized by high proprietary and/or monitoring 
costs will choose (or be forced) to switch toward other control mechanisms 
Several studies report results consistent with the hypothesis of substitution between 
corporate governance mechanisms and disclosure transparency.  
For instance, LaPorta et al. (1998) suggest that in countries where the accounting and 
legal system provides poor investor protection, there is a substitution towards costly 
monitoring by large shareholders. This substitution effect may also occur between 
corporate disclosure and internal control mechanisms. 
Bushman et al. (2000) find that the level of accounting transparency is negatively 
related with the board of directors. Eng & Mak (2003) show that firms release more 
voluntary disclosure in presence of lower proportion of outside directors. 
Researchers also find a negative association between board independence and 
voluntary disclosure (Hannifa & Cooke, 2005; Gul & Leung, 2004, Barako et al., 
2006). García Osma & Gill-de-Noguer (2007) find that the level of earnings 
management increases with the presence of independent directors.  
Other studies suggest that financial reporting transparency and equity incentives 
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substitute each other as monitoring mechanisms87. LaFond & Roychowdhury (2008) 
suggest that firms with less conservative earnings opt for an indirect monitoring 
provided by CEO equity incentives. In a related study, Bushman et al. (2004) find a 
negative relationship between equity incentives and earnings timeliness. In addition, 
they also document an inverse relationship between earnings timeliness and 
concentrated ownership, measured as institutional ownership and blockholders. This 
evidence is consistent with a substitution effect also between ownership 
concentration and corporate disclosure. Accordingly, Li et al. (2008) and Lim et al. 
(2007) find that the higher the ownership concentration the lower the extent of 
voluntary disclosure88. 
The same argument applies for monitoring by financial analysts. Bushman & Smith 
(2001) point out that financial analysts may either complement or substitute 
corporate disclosure. From one hand they facilitate interpreting and disseminating 
high quality information, but from the other hand they may help overcome 
information asymmetries for firms with poor financial accounting information. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, Bushee & Noe (2000) and Tasker (1998) show that 
firms with greater analysts following and greater institutional ownership are less 
likely to hold open calls.  
Reconciling the previous conflicting evidence is not a trivial task. As a consequence 
the debate on the substitution vs. complementarity between corporate governance 
mechanisms and disclosure practices still remains open in the recent literature. 
Furthermore, governance literature also points out the existence of a potential 
                                                
87 Also the family business literature points out that family owned firms may provide fewer disclosure 
since they have increasing ability to monitor being more actively involved with management. See 
CHEN, S., CHEN, X., & CHENG, Q. (2008). Do Family Firms Provide More or Less Voluntary 
Disclosure? Journal of Accounting Research, 46(3), 499–536.  
88 An alternative explanation for these results may be that ownership concentration allows a higher 
monitoring of the managerial action, thus reducing the demand for public disclosure to solve 
information asymmetries. Therefore, in presence of high proprietary costs managers may chose not to 
disclose. Several studies find results consistent with this hypothesis. See FAN, J. P. H., & WONG, T. J. 
(2002). Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness of Accounting Earnings in East Asia. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(3), 401–425; AJINKYA, B., BHOJRAJ, S., & SENGUPTA, P. 
(2005). The Association Between Outside Directors, Institutional Investors and the Properties of 
Management Earnings Forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research, 43(3), 343–376; BALL, R., & 
SHIVAKUMAR, L. (2005). Earnings Quality in UK Private Firms: Comparative Loss Recognition 
timeliness. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39(1), Pages 83–128. 
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interaction across either internal or external governance mechanisms. For instance, 
when the internal audit is closely related to the audit committee and reports directly 
to it, the effectiveness of both parties as corporate governance mechanisms is 
enhanced (Cohen et al., 2004). Also the external forces play a role. Related research 
suggests that firms have incentives to establish more efficient internal governance 
practices (more ownership concentration) in countries with weaker legal frameworks 
to compensate the inefficiency of the legal regime, as an external governance 
mechanism (Durnev & Kim, 2005).  
Despite its relevance for the effective governance of the corporations, very little of 
the extant governance research in accounting examines these interrelationships and 
the implication for corporate disclosure (Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Doidge et al., 
2007; Berretta et al. 2010). Therefore, research in that area could benefit from 
analysis of the interaction among internal and external corporate governance 
mechanisms, whether they serve as complement or substitutes, and whether 
corporate disclosure enhances or substitutes for those mechanisms (Armstrong et al., 
2010; Carcello et al., 2011). 
 
4. Framework of research and research questions  
The starting point of the literature review has been to recognize that disclosure plays 
a meaningful role for the capital market efficiency (Healy & Palepu, 2001). It serves 
two important and interrelated functions: allowing investors to evaluate the return of 
their investments (valuation role) and providing investors with useful information to 
monitor managerial use of their capital, once provided (stewardship role).  
The managers’ communication with outside investors occurs by providing 
information through multiple venues. First of all, there are some disclosures that are 
mandatory such as financial statements, footnotes, management discussion and 
analysis and other regulatory filings. In addition, firms provide information on a 
voluntary basis through management forecasts, analysts’ presentations and 
conference calls, press releases, internet sites and other corporate reports.  
Early works in the accounting literature, mostly relying on the condition of the 
unravelling result setting, examine the valuation role of disclosure and point out the 
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capital market benefits of voluntary (fully truthful) disclosure. High voluntary 
disclosure increases stock market liquidity (Healy et al., 1999; Welker, 1995) and 
decreases cost of equity (Botosan & Plumlee, 2002; Easley & O’Hara, 2004) and 
debt capital (Sengupta, 1998) (Figure 6: link 1)89. 
Despite its benefits for the capital market, empirical literature fails to identify full 
optimal disclosure strategies. This is because in the real world assumptions of the 
unravelling results are never satisfied. For instance, firms may decide to not fully 
disclose their private information due to the existence of some disclosure costs (i.e. 
competitive costs, litigation costs, proprietary costs) (Verrecchia, 1983). The failure 
of the unravelling arguments, together with factors such as the presence of disclosure 
externalities and agency costs, justifies the existence of mandated disclosure. 
A large number of studies in the mandatory disclosure literature point out that 
financial reporting transparency has beneficial capital market effect, too. For 
instance, research on accounting attributes suggests that earnings persistence is 
negatively related to the cost of capital (Francis et al., 2004) while earnings 
predictability lower the firm’s bid-ask spreads (Affleck-Graves et al., 2002). Most 
studies also agree on that quality of accrual being a separate priced risk factor 
(Francis et al., 2004) (Figure 6: link 2). 
The informational role of mandatory and voluntary disclosure and their benefits for 
the capital market have been largely discussed in paragraph 1.  
The second paragraph focuses on the growing importance of voluntary unverifiable 
disclosure in the reporting package of the firms. This is the natural consequence of 
the business environment’s complexity, and the shortcomings of the financial 
reporting model in reflecting drivers of the long term value creation. However, this 
disclosure is often non-accounting, unregulated and not audited. As a consequence, 
this gives rise to several reporting issues related to the informativeness and the 
credibility of soft disclosure. 
                                                
89 A large body of literature supports the concept that the characteristics of corporate governance 
system have several effects on the market, by influencing, among others, the firm’s performance, its 
cost of equity and debt financing. However, this thesis focus on the indirect capital market effect of 
the corporate governance characteristics, as mediated by their influence disclosure policies. For a 
review of the direct effect of corporate governance on capital market refer to see BROWN, P., BEEKES, 
W., & VERHOEVEN, P. (2011). Corporate Governance, Accounting and Finance: A Review. 
Accounting & Finance, 51(1), 96–172.  
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In the case of supplementary narrative disclosure what is important is not only the 
content of disclosure but also how the information is disclosed. Therefore, disclosure 
strategies assume a prominent role in the communication between managers and 
outside investors.  
However, discretionary disclosure strategies in corporate narratives may be double-
edged swords. They may constitute opportunistic disclosure choices, aimed at 
improving the perception of the audience on the firm’s state of health (impression 
management). On the contrary, they may allow managers to convey additional 
information (incremental information). These two competing schools of thought still 
coexist, and the existing literature fails to disentangle whether discretionary 
strategies in corporate narratives stem from managerial opportunism rather than the 
desire to provide value-relevant information. 
In addition, soft disclosure may not be directly verifiable. As within the “cheap talk” 
framework, managers may have incentives to present information according to a 
favourable perspective for their self-serving objectives. As a consequence, these 
supplementary disclosures may be full lies. If managers can report according to their 
incentives and the information disclosed is not verified, disclosure must be credible 
in order to be useful for the market. Credibility is an “unobservable” characteristic of 
disclosure and can be assessed by referring to several factors, with management 
credibility being one of them (Mercer, 2004). The quality of mandatory disclosure 
(accounting quality) may be an indirect signal of the management credibility 
(Demers & Vega, 2010; Athanasokou & Hussainei, 2009).  
The role of accounting quality for the credibility of voluntary disclosure highlights 
the existence of a linkage between mandatory and voluntary disclosure that has been 
largely explored by the accounting literature (Figure 6: link 3). 
Paragraph 2.2 discusses analytical and empirical studies that examine the 
relationship between accounting quality and other (voluntary) disclosures, reporting 
conflicting results. 
Regardless of whether voluntary disclosure complements or substitutes for financial 
reporting information, these studies point out that voluntary disclosure may be 
endogenously determined by the quality of mandatory disclosure.  
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Therefore, we cannot examine any capital market effect of a given voluntary 
disclosure choice without taking into account the role of financial reporting 
transparency. For instance, Francis et al. (2008) show that greater voluntary 
disclosure is associated with a lower cost of capital, unconditional on other factors. 
However, this relation disappears when they control for the quality of mandatory 
disclosure, as proxied by earnings quality. Thus, they conclude that voluntary 
disclosure has little or no distinct pricing effect. 
The third paragraph introduces the issue of the heterogeneity among firms’ 
disclosure practices. The underlying question is “Which factors explain such 
heterogeneity?”. 
Literature has long discussed on the role of differences among accounting standards, 
but reporting incentives rather than accounting standards per se are the key drivers of 
the observed financial reporting heterogeneity (Ball et al., 2000, 2003). Reporting 
incentives are shaped by many factors that vary across countries and political regions 
such as country’s laws, enforcement, capital market forces, product market 
interaction (Wysocki, 2011). In addition, there are also incentives related to features 
of the firm’s governance systems that vary across firms such as managerial incentive 
plans, board of directors composition and structure or independence of external 
auditor. Therefore, firm’s disclosure choices depend on both the optimal disclosure 
policy and the ability of governance structure to enforce the optimal disclosure 
policy (Core, 2001). 
Given the role of the corporate governance mechanisms for corporate transparency, a 
large number of studies in the governance and accounting literature investigate the 
effectiveness of these mechanisms in monitoring the quality of financial reporting 
process (see Brown et al., 2011 for a review). Several dimensions of the corporate 
governance system have been analyzed, spanning from internal corporate governance 
characteristics (e.g. board of directors, management incentives, ownership structure) 
to external ones (independent auditor, blockholders and analysts). This literature 
suggests that “good” governance structure leads to a greater accounting quality 
(Dechow et al., 1996; Vafeas, 2000; Xie et al., 2003; Garcìa Osma, 2008). In 
addition, it ensures additional voluntary disclosures (Eng & Mak, 2003; Ajinkya et 
CHAPTER ONE 
 75 
al., 2005; Beekes & Brown, 2006; Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007) (Figure 6: link 4). 
Although it is widely acknowledged that the firm’s governance structure affects its 
disclosure choices (Dechow, 1996; Vafeas, 2000; Klein, 2002), there is still an open 
debate on whether disclosure acts as a complement or a substitute for other corporate 
governance mechanisms (LaPorta et al., 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Beekes & 
Brown, 2006).  
On the one hand, effective corporate governance complements firm disclosure 
strategies, thus helping reduce agency conflicts between managers and shareholders 
(Healy & Palepu, 2001; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005). On the other hand, high 
information asymmetries increase the market demand for other governance 
mechanisms in order to compensate the inefficiency of financial reporting (Bushman 
et al., 2000).  
Reconciling the previous conflicting evidence is not a trivial task. Moreover, the 
results of this literature should be interpreted with caution as most research in this 
area does not take into account the potentially endogenous nature of firms corporate 
governance and disclosure policies.  
Studies in the traditional accounting literature assume that corporate governance 
characteristics are exogenous at the time managers make a disclosure choice. 
However, the same firm and/or management characteristics that may affect the 
disclosure variables may also affect the corporate governance variables90. According 
to Beyer et al. (2010) “When shareholders design management incentives and 
governance structure in order to maximize the value of their investment, they take 
into account how management incentives and governance structure affect 
                                                
90 A clear example of endogeneity issue is provided by some recent contributions concerning the 
relationship between the board of directors and the information environment. Armstrong et al. (2010) 
point out the existence of two streams of literature. The first one supports the idea that firms consider 
the information environment they are endowed with and then choose an effective level of board 
independence (e.g. BOONE et al., 2007; COLES et al., 2008; LINCK et al., 2008; LEHN et al., 2009). 
Consistent with this prediction, several recent papers in the finance literature document evidence of a 
negative relation between board independence and information acquisition and processing costs. 
Another strand of literature, claim that managers can commit to certain accounting and disclosure 
policies to alter their firms’ transparency and achieve various economic objectives (FIELDS et al., 
2001; HEALY & PALEPU, 2001). There are also studies suggesting that independent directors 
themselves might influence transparency (KLEIN, 2002; AHMED & DUELLMAN, 2007). See 
ARMSTRONG, C. S., CORE, J. E. AND GUAY, W. R. (2012). Do Independent Directors Cause 
Improvements in Firm Transparency? Working Paper. 
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management disclosure decision” (Beyer et al., 2010: 305). 
Despite the attempt of more recent studies in identifying and addressing the 
endogeneity, this issue still remains unsolved, as the major challenge for the 
accounting and governance scholars is to develop good instruments (if any) that 
explain the corporate governance characteristics that are not correlated with the 
underlying dimensions of the corporate transparency being studied (Larker & 
Rusticus, 2010).  
To summarize, Figure 6 depicts the theoretical framework and indicates the 
paragraphs dealing with each of the aforementioned issues. 
Figure 6. Research framework91  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The objective of this thesis is to contribute to the larger mosaic of theory and 
evidence concerning the role of corporate governance for the firm’s disclosure 
policies and the capital market, by examining the interaction among corporate 
governance, mandatory and voluntary disclosure.  
To date, existing empirical studies explore the relation between governance and 
disclosure by analyzing the extent to which actors in the corporate governance 
                                                
91 The line connecting Corporate Governance to Capital Market indicates the literature supporting the 
concept that the characteristics of corporate governance system have direct effects on the market. See 
BROWN, P., BEEKES, W., & VERHOEVEN, P. (2011). Corporate Governance, Accounting and Finance: 
A Review. Accounting & Finance, 51(1), 96–172. As this thesis focuses on the effect of the corporate 
governance characteristics on disclosure policies, this literature is out of the scope of this review. 
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framework individually affect the quality of financial accounting information (e.g. 
accounting quality), or alternatively, different features of voluntary disclosure.  
Recognizing the interrelationship across corporate governance mechanisms as well 
as among various sources of corporate information (i.e. financial accounting 
information, mandatory and voluntary disclosure) (Beyer et al., 2010), this thesis 
investigates (i) the nature of the relationship between mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure (ii) controlling for mandatory disclosure, the role of internal and external 
corporate governance characteristics for the firm’s decision to disclose information 
not mandated by the law (iii) the influence of the governance system on the 
informativeness of discretionary disclosure strategies across alternative disclosure 
media. 
This way, it answers the recent call in the accounting literature for considering the 
interdependencies between various factors that shape the corporate information 
environment (Beyer et al., 2010). It also allows to gain a deeper understanding of the 
trade-offs between monitoring mechanisms and corporate transparency and among 
various monitoring mechanisms as well as sources of corporate information. 
Within this framework, the second section of this thesis presents two empirical 
analyses based on archival and hand-collected data which share a similar setting and 
investigate two interrelated research questions. 
The first study (chapter two) is entitled “The interplay between mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure. The case of risk reporting by Oil&Gas companies”. It aims at 
understanding the interplay between mandatory disclosure and the release of 
additional information not mandated by the law. As related question it also examines 
the influence of firm- and country-level incentives on voluntary disclosure strategies. 
To clearly distinguish between mandatory and voluntary information, the analysis is 
focused on the risk disclosure provided by Oil&Gas companies. In such a setting, the 
study examines (i) whether firm’s voluntary disclosure choices are affected by their 
own mandatory disclosure strategies (substitute vs. complement) (ii) the influence of 
firm-level incentives (board-based monitoring) and country-level incentives (strength 
of the institutions) on the decision to disclose voluntary information (iii) whether the 
institutional environment plays a moderating role for the relationship between either 
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board monitoring or mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure policies. Figure 7 
shows the focus of this study within the research framework.  
Figure 7. Research framework: The interplay between mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure. The case of risk reporting by Oil&Gas companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This study makes several contributions both to theory and practice. Firstly, to the 
best of the author’s knowledge, it is the first empirical analysis that provides direct 
evidence on the interplay between mandatory and voluntary disclosure, thus 
complementing theoretical studies on this topic (Einhorn, 2005; Bagnoli & Watts, 
2007). Secondly, by analysing the influence of both firm- and country-level 
incentives on voluntary disclosure, it contributes to the emerging literature on the 
interplay between internal and external governance mechanisms and their influence 
on corporate transparency (Durnev & Kim, 2005; Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Doidge 
et al., 2007; Berretta et al., 2010). Finally, its evidence provides regulators and policy 
makers with useful knowledge in order to design new mandatory disclosure 
regulation in light of their impact on voluntary disclosure decisions. 
The second study (chapter three) is entitled “Why are managers optimistic? An 
investigation of corporate environmental disclosure tone”. It examines whether and 
to what extent firm’s governance characteristics affect the informational value of 
discretionary disclosure strategies in corporate narratives.  
The analysis focuses on the environmental information provided by Oil&Gas 
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companies through both mandatory (10-K) and voluntary (press-releases) disclosure 
channels. More specifically it investigates (i) whether discretionary strategies in 
environmental disclosure represent managerial opportunistic behaviour aiming at 
managing users perception of corporate achievement rather than providing 
information useful for predicting future environmental performance (i.e. impression 
management vs. incremental information) (ii) whether and to what extent the 
informativeness of discretionary strategies varies according to reporting incentives 
coming from the board of directors’ characteristics. Figure 8 shows the focus of this 
study within the research framework.   
Figure 8.  Research framework: Why are managers optimistic? An investigation of 
corporate environmental disclosure tone 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This research provides several contributions. First of all, it answers the recent call in 
the impression management literature for incorporating both possibilities (impression 
management vs. incremental information) into research design aiming at 
investigating the discretionary disclosure strategies in corporate narratives (Merkl-
Davies & Brennan, 2007). Secondly, using two different theories to explain the 
board of directors’ influence on the informativeness of the disclosure strategies and 
combining them in a matrix, it investigates the influence of two dimensions of the 
board activity (monitoring and stakeholder orientation) both simultaneously and in 
isolation. Finally, its results could provide investors and policy makers with valuable 
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insight to interpret managers’ use of discretionary strategies in corporate narratives, 
thus contributing to the regulators’ debate on whether (and under what conditions) 
they should be held legally accountable for qualitative disclosures.  
  
 
 
 
SECOND SECTION 
RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
 
 
  
 
 CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN MANDATORY AND 
VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE. THE CASE OF RISK 
REPORTING BY OIL&GAS COMPANIES 
 
1. Introduction. – 2. Theoretical background and hypotheses. – 2.1 
The role of mandatory disclosure for voluntary disclosure. – 2.2 The 
influence of firm- and country-level incentives on voluntary 
disclosure. – 2.3 The interaction between firm- and country-level 
incentives. – 3. Research method. – 3.1 Sample selection and data 
source. – 3.2 Measuring voluntary and mandatory disclosure. – 3.3 
Measures of firm- and country-level incentives. – 3.4 Control 
variables. – 4. Results. – 4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation 
analysis. – 4.2 Regression analysis. – 4.2.1 Analysis of the interplay 
between mandatory and voluntary disclosure. – 4.2.2 Analysis of the 
influence of firm- and country-level incentives. – 4.2.3 Analysis of 
the interaction between firm-level and country-level incentives. – 5. 
Conclusion. 
 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this study is to investigate the interplay between mandatory disclosure 
and the release of additional information not mandated by the law and the stock 
exchange. 
Theory predicts that both voluntary and mandatory disclosure reduce information 
asymmetries (Botosan & Plumlee, 2002; Easley & O’Hara, 2004), increase stock 
market liquidity (Healy et al., 1999) and improve capital market efficiency (Healy & 
Palepu, 2001). However, despite mandatory disclosure, voluntary disclosure is 
selective and managers may have greater ability and stronger incentives to withhold 
information. For instance, managers may decide not to disclose additional value-
relevant information due to the existence of some disclosure costs (i.e. competitive 
costs, litigation costs, proprietary costs). Therefore, the extent of voluntary disclosure 
depends on the trade-off between benefits coming from a reduction in the 
information asymmetries and costs related to its proprietary nature (Verrecchia, 
1983, 2001).  
Recent studies (Bagnoli & Watts, 2007) show that mandatory disclosure may affects 
this trade-off, by altering the information asymmetries in the market. It increases the 
part of the firm value that is already explained by information mandated by the law, 
thus reducing the benefits of additional voluntary (proprietary) disclosures. As a 
consequence, firms lower their voluntary disclosure, as mandatory disclosure might 
substitute for it (Grossman & Hart, 1980; Milgrom, 1981; Verrecchia, 1983). 
Conversely, firms may use mandatory disclosure to reinforce the credibility of 
voluntary information. In this latter case, firms may complement mandatory 
disclosure with supplementary voluntary information in order to avoid the negative 
market response to the non-disclosure decision (Imhoff, 1978; Waymire, 1985; 
Francis et al., 2008). Even though the debate on the relationship between mandatory 
and voluntary disclosure dates back to early theoretical studies in the literature, the 
related empirical evidence is limited and provide contrasting results. Therefore, the 
nature of the interaction between mandatory and voluntary disclosure still remains an 
empirical issue in the existing literature.    
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This study tries to fill the gap, by empirically examining whether firm’s voluntary 
disclosure choices are affected by their own mandatory disclosure strategies 
(substitute vs. complement). As related questions, it investigates the influence of 
firm-level incentives coming from the board-based monitoring and the country-level 
incentives related to the strength of the institutions on the decision to disclose 
voluntary information. Finally, it examines whether the institutional environment 
plays a moderating role for the relationship between either board monitoring or 
mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure policies. 
To exploit this research question, a content analysis of the annual report risk 
disclosure is conducted provided by a sample of 111 EU companies belonging to the 
Oil&Gas industry in 2010. The focus is explicitly on risk disclosure since it provides 
an ideal setting for studying the interplay between mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure strategies on the same type of information. Self-constructed indices of 
disclosure are built, capturing the extent of mandatory and voluntary information 
related to the overall risk exposure (financial and non-financial risk exposure). To 
mitigate the concern for disclosure indices’ subjectivity, several tests are also 
performed assessing their internal as well as external validity. 
The empirical analysis starts examining the nature of the relationship between 
mandatory and voluntary risk disclosure strategies. By relying on Einhorn’s (2005) 
theoretical study, it is argued that the relationship between the two is a non-
monotonic one, and varies according to the level of mandatory risk disclosures. 
Specifically, it is anticipated that at low level of mandatory disclosure, voluntary 
disclosure complement mandatory information. Conversely, when the level of 
mandatory disclosure becomes particularly high, managers stop providing additional 
proprietary information, as a great portion of the information asymmetries is already 
mitigated by disclosures mandated by the law. Therefore, in such a setting a further 
increase in mandatory disclosure translates into a reduction of voluntary information, 
leading to a substitutive relationship between them. Consistent with these 
hypotheses, it is found that firms with a low mandatory risk disclosure, tend not to 
disclose supplementary information on non-financial risk factors. As mandatory risk 
disclosure increases, the likelihood of voluntary risk disclosure also increases, 
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leading to a positive relationship between mandatory and voluntary information. 
However, this relationship holds up to a threshold, above which it becomes negative.  
Next, it is exploited the cross-sectional variation of voluntary disclosure strategies 
according to two set of incentives: (i) internal monitoring provided by the board of 
directors (firm-level incentives) (ii) external monitoring provided by the institutional 
and regulatory regime (country-level incentives). To proxy for the board-based 
monitoring, this study relies on characteristics of the board of directors’ composition, 
leadership, competence and structure. In line with the agency theory, it is predicted 
(and found) that firms with a greater monitoring intensity, voluntarily provides more 
information on non-financial risk factors. To capture the influence of regulatory and 
enforcement regime, Leuz’s country-cluster classification (2010) is followed, and the 
sample firms are partitioned in two groups according to the characteristics of the 
capital market, the degree of investor protection and the strength of the enforcement 
regime. Contrary to the prediction, no evidence is found that the external monitoring 
plays a role for voluntary disclosure strategies above and beyond the one provided by 
internal board-based monitoring. The results remain unchanged, even after 
controlling for the role of mandatory disclosure.  
Then, the analysis turns on the interaction between firm-level and country-level 
incentives. Specifically, it is investigated if and to what extent regulatory 
environment, as an external governance mechanism, shapes the relationship between 
board monitoring and voluntary risk disclosure. This is done following the recent call 
in the corporate governance literature for studying whether internal and external 
governance mechanisms serve as a complement or substitutes for achieving high 
level of corporate transparency (Carcello et al., 2011). Still using Leuz’s  country-
cluster classification (2010), the proxies for board monitoring are combined into one 
summary factor capturing the monitoring intensity of the board of directors. A weak 
evidence is found that in countries classified as outside economies, with a strong 
regulatory and enforcement regime, the external monitoring provided by the 
institution substitutes for the internal board-based monitoring on voluntary disclosure 
choices. 
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Finally, as empirical question it is analyzed whether institutional environment has a 
moderating effect for the relationship between mandatory and voluntary disclosure. 
The evidence suggests that there is no difference in the sign and the significance of 
the association between mandatory and voluntary disclosure across strong and weak 
institutional environment. However, given the magnitude of coefficients on 
mandatory disclosure indices, the conclusion is that in countries with a strong 
regulatory and enforcement regime, the firm-specific level of mandatory disclosure 
plays a weakened role for voluntary disclosure choices.  
This study makes several contributions both to theory and practice. Firstly, empirical 
evidence is provided that complements the theoretical studies exploring the interplay 
between mandatory and voluntary disclosure (Einhorn, 2005; Bagnoli & Watts, 
2007). Empirical studies on this relationship have focused on the quality of financial 
reporting vs. other supplementary information (Francis et al., 2008; Mouselli et al., 
2012; Hui et al., 2009). However these disclosures are different in scope, subject, 
timing and other characteristics. The novelty of this study is to examine the interplay 
between mandatory and voluntary disclosure choices, by looking at the same type of 
information (i.e. the overall company exposure at risk). It is documented that, on 
average, firms use voluntary risk disclosure to complement information mandated by 
the law. However, when a great portion of the firm’s value variance is already 
explained by information mandated by the law, firms stop providing voluntary risk 
information since proprietary costs overcome benefits coming from a further 
reduction in the information asymmetries. 
Furthermore, this study contributes to the literature on risk disclosure, by analyzing 
the influence of both firm-level and country-level incentives for the manager 
decision to provide additional risk information, and whether they play a role above 
and beyond the influence of mandatory risk disclosure. Despite the recent increase in 
risk reporting research, existing studies focus on firm-specific determinants of risk 
disclosure such as the sector type, size, leverage (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Beretta & 
Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley & Shrives, 2006) or governance characteristics related to 
the board size, board independence and audit committee size (Elzahar & Hussainey, 
2012). It is added to this literature the analysis of the role of external monitoring by 
the institution, along with the internal monitoring provided by the board of directors, 
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and the potential for a substitution between them. Doing so is also a contribution to 
an emerging literature on the interplay between internal and external governance 
mechanisms and their influence on corporate transparency (Durnev & Kim, 2005; 
Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Doidge et al., 2007; Berretta et al., 2010). 
Additionally, previous studies on risk reporting generally focus on a single country 
such as UK (Linsley & Lawrence, 2007; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012), Italy (Berretta 
& Bozzolan, 2004) or Malaysia (Amran et al., 2009). Conversely, this study is one of 
the first that provides international evidence for a sample of EU firms. Furthermore, 
it focuses on a particularly sector (the Oil&Gas industry) for which risk disclosure 
arises as a focal issue due to the uncertainty and the turbulence of their information 
environment and the high demand for information on factors affecting the current 
and future firm profitability. 
The results also have non-negligible practical contributions. The evidence of a close 
relationship between mandatory and voluntary disclosure, that changes according to 
the level of mandatory disclosure may support investors when evaluating firms’ 
voluntary disclosure or non-disclosure decisions. Furthermore, the documented 
incentive effect of board-based monitoring on voluntary disclosure that varies across 
institutional regime, informs investors on the corporate governance features that 
affect firm transparency, and their relative importance according to the firm’s 
country of origin. Finally, this study’s evidence provides regulators and policy 
makers with useful knowledge in order to design new mandatory disclosure 
regulation in light of their impact on voluntary disclosure decisions. 
The study proceeds as follows. The next paragraph provides the theoretical 
background and develop hypotheses. The third paragraph illustrates the data and 
methodology used to verify this prediction. The forth paragraph discusses the results, 
while the fifth concludes the study presenting its limitation and the direction for 
future research. 
 
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses 
2.1 The role of mandatory disclosure for voluntary disclosure 
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Firms have incentives to voluntarily disclose more information due to the benefits 
coming from high level of transparency. Voluntary disclosure theories typically 
agree on that one of the main benefits from making voluntary disclosure is mitigating 
information asymmetry among traders, thus leveling the playing field in the capital 
market. In line with this prediction most prior empirical research explores the 
relation between disclosure levels and capital market outcomes. For instance, high 
disclosure is associated with less information asymmetry (Coller & Yohn, 1997), 
greater stock liquidity (Healy et al., 1999), lower cost of equity capital (Botosan 
1997; Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991) as well as the interest cost of issuing debt 
(Segupta, 1998). Furthermore, disclosure by lesser known firms enlarges investor 
base by attracting more U.S. institutional investors (Bradshaw et al., 2004) and 
mutual funds (Aggarwal et al., 2005), which in turn improves the level of risk 
sharing in the economy (Leuz & Wysocki, 2008).  
Although voluntary disclosure plays a pivotal role for the capital market efficiency, it 
is also costly for the firm. In addition to the costs of developing and presenting 
financial information (that occurs either for mandatory or for voluntary disclosure) 
firms that voluntary disclose information may also incur in proprietary costs due to 
the lost of competitive advantage or the higher exposure to regulatory oversights. 
Early literature on segment reporting provides evidence consisting with the idea that 
disclosures of profitable segments entail significant proprietary costs (Darrough & 
Stoughton, 1990; Wagenhofer, 1990; Gigler, 1994; Hayes & Lundholm, 1996; 
Berger & Hann, 2003). For instance, competitors may use the information disclosed 
by the firm to change their product plans (Lev, 1992; Darrough, 1995) imposing on 
the firm a reduction in future cash flows (proprietary cost) (Dye, 1990). Other than 
proprietary costs, firms also consider litigation costs in making their disclosure 
decisions. Some studies point out that managers pre-disclose bad news to reduce the 
threat of shareholder litigation (Skinner, 1994). However, litigation risk may also 
dampen managers incentive to voluntarily provide some type of information such as 
forward-looking disclosure (Healy & Palepu, 2001). 
Due to both positive and negative sides of voluntary disclosure decision, firms trade-
off between benefits coming from a reduction in the information asymmetries and 
costs of revealing proprietary information (Leuz & Wysocki, 2008). However, as 
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voluntary disclosure is part of the overall disclosure strategy, firms may 
communicate with external shareholders also through mandated disclosures (Healy 
& Palepu, 1995). As a consequence, mandatory disclosure strategies may alter the 
trade-off between benefits and costs of producing voluntary information, thus 
affecting the voluntary disclosure decisions.92 More specifically, mandatory 
information might reduce the part of the firm value variance being unexplained by 
the market, thus lowering the net benefits of providing additional proprietary 
disclosures (Bagnoli & Watts, 2007). Several empirical studies indicate that 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure may substitute each other. For instance, Healy & 
Palepu (2001) claim that when mandatory disclosure is imperfect managers use 
voluntary disclosure to communicate their private information to investors. Chen et 
al. (2002) find that managers voluntarily disclose balance sheets information along 
with quarterly earnings announcements only when current earnings are relatively less 
informative, in response to the investor demand for information to supplement poor 
earnings. Hui et al. (2009) show that high levels of earnings conservatism reduce the 
information asymmetries between firms and their shareholders, thus leading to a 
lower management forecast activity.  
Nevertheless, the nature of the relationship between mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure is far from being clear, and gives rise to a debate that dates back to 
theoretical studies on voluntary disclosure. One strand of this literature argues that 
high information asymmetries between managers and shareholders generate a 
demand for increased voluntary disclosure, as the value of new information is higher 
in such a setting (Grossman & Hart, 1980, Milgrom, 1981; Verrecchia, 1983). 
Therefore, firms with a low level of mandatory disclosure would increase voluntary 
disclosure in order to mitigate the information asymmetries between managers and 
shareholders (Francis et al., 2008). It follows that the relationship between voluntary 
and mandatory disclosure is a substitutive one, since the former compensate for the 
latter (Imhoff, 1978; Cox, 1985; Waymire, 1985). However, another strand of 
                                                
92 Beyer et al. (2010) point out that the information environment is complex and can be shaped by 
both mandatory and voluntary disclosure as well as information provided by third parties. Even 
though it is recognized that third party information plays a pivotal role in shaping the information 
environment, in the following the focus will explicitly be on mandatory and voluntary information 
disclosed by the firm to the market. 
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literature underlines that in context of poor mandatory disclosure, additional 
voluntary information will not be evaluated as credible by investors (Lung & 
Lundholm, 1993). Thus, the likelihood of disclosure increases only when the 
information quality increases. In such a setting, the market will interpret non 
disclosure as bad news discounting the firm’s value (Francis et al., 2008). This leads 
to a complementary relationship between mandatory and voluntary disclosure 
(Mouselli et al., 2012).  
Nevertheless, these two views are not necessarily at the odds. In her theoretical study 
about the interplay between mandatory and voluntary disclosure, Einhorn (2005) 
suggests that there is a non-monotonic relationship between mandatory and voluntary 
information, whereas mandatory disclosure affects and may reverse voluntary 
disclosure policies. Drawing upon Einhorn’s  findings (2005), it is anticipated the 
existence of a non-monotonic relationship between them. Specifically, it is argued 
that the nature of the interaction between mandatory and voluntary disclosure 
strategies varies according to the level of mandatory information. At a low level of 
mandatory disclosure, a complementary relationship is expected. Firms with poor 
mandatory disclosure will also provide low voluntary information due to the lack of 
credibility. When the level of mandatory disclosure increases, this creates an 
environment in which firms may credibly convey their additional private 
information, increasing the likelihood of voluntary disclosure. However, it is 
predicted that this positive relationship occurs up to a threshold in which it starts 
reversing. When the level of mandatory disclosure goes above a threshold, the 
credibility issue tends to disappear, while firms’ concern on proprietary cost becomes 
much more relevant. In such a setting, as a big portion of the firm’s value is already 
explained by mandatory disclosure, the benefits of providing additional information 
start decreasing, while the cost does not. It follows that managers may decide not to 
disclose additional voluntary information to the market, leading to a negative 
relationship between mandatory and voluntary disclosure. 
Formally, these two hypotheses are predicted: 
HP1a Ceteris paribus, at a low level of mandatory disclosure firms use voluntary 
disclosure to complement mandatory information 
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HP1b Ceteris paribus, at a high level of mandatory disclosure firms use voluntary 
disclosure to substitute mandatory information 
 
2.2 The influence of firm- and country-level incentives on voluntary disclosure  
Voluntary disclosure strategies depends not only on the extent to which mandatory 
disclosure affects the trade-off between benefits and costs of voluntary disclosure, 
but also on the incentives facing managers when disclosing additional information 
(Core, 2001). The focus is on two dimensions of reporting incentives: (i) firm-level 
features (ii) country-level institution, as results from prior studies establish a role for 
both factors in shaping firms disclosure strategies. The first set of incentives relates 
to the internal corporate governance system, in particular to the characteristics of the 
board of directors, while the second concerns the role of external control mechanism 
(e.g. institutional regime). 
Although firms may rely on several corporate governance mechanisms, the existing 
literature agrees on that one of the most influential internal control mechanism is the 
monitoring provided by the board of directors and the audit committee. The role of 
board of directors for corporate disclosure has been extensively examined in relation 
to mandatory disclosure (Dechow et al., 1995; Peasnell et al., 2000; Beekes et al., 
2004; Healy & Palepu, 2001), while its impact on voluntary disclosure has received 
increased attention only in the last years (Garcìa-Meca & Sanchez-Ballesta, 2010).  
According to the agency theory, the board of directors performs a monitoring 
function over the quality of disclosure, helping reduce the information asymmetries 
between managers and shareholders and limiting the potential for opportunistic 
behaviour (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). As voluntary disclosure is selective, 
unregulated and unaudited, opportunistic managers may have incentives to 
manipulate or distort such information for their personal interest. Management may 
conceal or not disclose negative organizational outcomes during their tenures 
(Harrison & Harrell, 1993). Sometimes, managers deliberately hide negative 
financial data to avoid alarming stockholders and bankers or to trade on withheld 
private information. Therefore, the board of directors provides an “internal 
monitoring package” that reduces the possibility for managers to engage in self-
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serving behaviour, at the same time forcing them to disclose additional information. 
According to this view, both board of directors and voluntary disclosure are 
complementary mechanisms of accountability aiming at reducing the information 
asymmetries and the agency costs (Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007). This gives rise to a 
positive association between board of directors monitoring and voluntary disclosure, 
which finds largely empirical support (Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Li et al., 2008). 
However, evidence also exists on the opposite pattern. Eng & Mak (2003) find that 
as the proportion of outside directors in the board increases, firms tend to reduce the 
amount of voluntary disclosure. Barako et al. (2006) and Gul & Leung (2004) also 
document a negative relationship between board independence and voluntary 
disclosure. These latter studies point out the substitution effect between board of 
directors and corporate disclosure. The underlying rationale is that, as voluntary 
disclosure is costly, firms may prefer to reduce the information asymmetries by 
improving other internal corporate governance mechanisms. In such a setting the 
internal corporate governance system provides investors with a “warranty” that 
substitutes disclosure in its role of reducing information asymmetries and the agency 
costs. Despite the potential for substitution, Cerbioni & Parbonetti (2007) suggest 
that in the presence of a strong demand for information on critical aspect of a firm’s 
activities and future performance, firms seek to satisfy this demand by disclosing 
additional value-relevant information, to prevent investors from interpreting 
nondisclosure as “bad news”. Moreover, Patelli & Prencipe (2007) point out that 
effective board of directors (as measured by the board independence) and voluntary 
disclosure tend to coexist since the existence of either of the two mechanisms 
attenuates the costs the firm bears to introduce the other. According to this view and 
in line with the well documented complementary hypothesis between disclosure and 
corporate governance, a positive association is predicted between board monitoring 
and voluntary disclosure. 
HP2 Ceteris paribus, voluntary disclosure is increasing in the level of board 
monitoring 
The second set of incentives derives from the features of the institutional 
environment. The focus is particularly on characteristics of the regulatory and 
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enforcement regime as an external control mechanism that can shape managerial 
incentives in providing voluntary information (LaPorta et al., 1998).  
Disclosure literature has largely recognized the role of the legal/judicial regime for 
corporate transparency. Ball (2001) suggests that corporate disclosure practices 
evolve as a function of the country’s economic, legal, and political infrastructure. In 
the context of mandatory disclosure Burgstaler et al. (2006) argue that institutional 
factors and market forces shape firms’ incentives to report earnings that reflect the 
underlying economic performance. In accordance, a large number of studies 
document that common law countries have a high level of transparency relative to 
the civil low countries (Jaggi & Low, 2000). For instance, Ball et al. (2000a) show 
that financial reporting quality (as proxied by the earnings timeliness) is higher in 
East Asian countries with more market-oriented reputation than countries with strong 
political influence on financial reporting practices. Similarly, Ball et al. (2000b) 
document that in shareholder-oriented corporate governance system accounting 
income is significantly more timely than in stakeholder-oriented system. 
Nevertheless, the influence of institutional environment on voluntary disclosure 
practices is much less clear. Hope (2003) predicts that the level of enforcement of 
accounting standards is positively associated with the analyst forecast accuracy. 
Francis et al. (2003) argue that a strong regulatory and enforcement regime creates 
an environment of higher credibility that enhances firms incentive to voluntary 
disclose additional value-relevant information. Furthermore, countries with strong 
investor protection, having institutional features that are typical for “outsider 
economies”, are characterized by higher demand for public disclosure, as investors 
are “arm’s length” and do not have any privileged access to information (Leuz, 
2010). As a consequence, managers are forced toward more transparent disclosure 
practices (Bushman et al., 2004). On the contrary, in countries with weak investor 
protection managers have low incentives to provide costly voluntary disclosure due 
to the lower demand and credibility of public disclosure. 
Moving from these arguments it is predicted that an increasing strength of the 
regulatory and enforcement regime (i) creates an environment of higher credibility 
for voluntary disclosure, (ii) increases the demand for public disclosure channel to 
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reduce information asymmetries. Both these factors enhance firms incentive to 
voluntary disclose additional value-relevant information. Therefore, a positive 
relationship is predicted between the strength of regulatory regime and voluntary 
disclosure. 
HP3 Ceteris paribus, voluntary disclosure is increasing in the strength of regulatory 
and enforcement regime. 
 
2.3 The interaction between firm- and country-level incentives  
As a further element of this analysis, this study examines the interaction between 
incentive deriving from internal vs. external monitoring and their impact on 
disclosure strategies. This is done following the suggestion of Denis & McConnell 
(2003) and Carcello et al. (2011). They call for studying the interrelationships 
between external and internal corporate governance mechanisms in order to provide 
a better picture of their functioning and their related outcome. The existence of such 
interrelationships is largely documented by the existing literature. For instance, 
Doidge et al. (2007) show that country characteristics (e.g legal protections for 
minority investors and the level of economic and financial development) influence 
firms’ incentives in improving their own governance and transparency more than 
observable firm characteristics. Leuz et al. (2003) show that earnings management 
decreases with the degree of investor protection provided by a country’s institutional 
and legal framework. Durnev & Kim (2005) argue that firms have incentives to 
improve their governance practices in countries with weaker legal frameworks. In 
their empirical examination they also document that ownership concentration 
appears to be a more important tool to solve agency conflict between controlling and 
minority shareholders when investor protection is weaker. According to their 
findings, it seems that firms tend to compensate the inefficiency of the legal regime 
(as an external governance mechanism) by establishing more efficient governance 
practices.  
It follows that differences in the institutional environment are likely to influence also 
the role and the functioning of the board of directors as internal monitoring device 
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over voluntary disclosure practices. Particularly, in line with the augment of Durnev 
& Kim (2005), it could be observed that where regulatory regime ensures a strong 
protection of outside investors, there is less need for other internal control 
mechanisms that constraint managerial opportunistic behaviour. However, the 
relationship between internal monitoring and regulatory environment is still under-
explored and the existing studies report conflicting result. For instance, Cheng & 
Courtenay (2006) suggest that in a regulatory environment that encourages enhanced 
transparency and disclosure, independent directors are likely to promote higher 
levels of managerial disclosure to advance their reputation. According to their view, 
board monitoring over voluntary disclosure is higher in countries with strong 
regulatory and enforcement regime. Nevertheless, Berretta et al. (2010), analyzing 
the Internal Control System disclosure for a sample of EU firms, report opposite 
evidence. They suggest that, in countries where ICS disclosure is enforced by the 
law, managers have incentive to disclose the minimum level of information to 
comply with the regulation when the board monitoring is strong. As a consequence, 
they predict (and find) a negative relationship between board monitoring and ICS 
disclosure. Their result gives support to the substitution hypothesis among alternative 
monitoring mechanisms (Williamson, 1984), providing evidence consisting with the 
idea that board monitoring of management’s voluntary disclosure is lower under a 
strong regulatory regime.  
Given these mixed evidence, it is recognized that differences in regulatory and 
enforcement regime may shape the relationship between board monitoring and 
voluntary disclosure, and the following non directional hypothesis is formulated: 
HP4 Ceteris paribus, the strength of regulatory and enforcement regime moderate 
the relationship between board monitoring and voluntary disclosure 
So far, features of the institutional setting have been hypothesized to affect the 
relationship between board-based monitoring and voluntary disclosure. However, the 
differences across countries also reflect themselves on the provision of information 
that are mandated by the law. Consistent with this view, there is a well established 
literature suggesting that in common law countries the quality of mandatory financial 
reporting is higher than in the civil law countries due to the prevalence of “market 
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forces” (i.e. the amount of publicly traded equity, the size of the market, the extent of 
the private versus public contracting) relative to the “political forces” (Ball et al., 
2000a; Ball et al., 2003; Guenther & Young, 2000; Jaggi & Low, 2000; Francis et 
al., 2003). If countries with strong regulatory and enforcement regime have a higher 
level of compliance to mandated disclosure, and lower level of information 
asymmetries, this in turn can reduce the variability across firm-specific mandatory 
disclosures, affecting the trade-off between benefits and costs of voluntary 
disclosure. For this reasons, it is anticipated that the regulatory and enforcement 
regime may also have a moderating role on the interplay between mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure. However, given the lack of robust theory and evidence on the 
nature of such a relationship, the following non-directional hypothesis is posited: 
HP5 Ceteris paribus, the strength of regulatory and enforcement regime moderate 
the relationship between mandatory and voluntary disclosure 
 
3. Research Method 
3.1 Sample selection and data source 
In order to explore the nature of interaction between mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure and the influence of firm- and country-level incentives, an analysis of risk 
disclosure provided by EU Oil&Gas companies in the fiscal year 2010 is conducted.  
Firstly, the focus is explicitly on risk disclosure for the Oil&Gas industry because it 
provides an interesting setting for studying the interplay between mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure with reference to the same type of information (information on 
the company’s risk profile). In the EU context the disclosure on company risks is not 
fully regulated. Besides the information on financial risks (i.e. information on risk 
arising from the change in the value of financial instrument displayed in the balance 
sheet) which are mandatory, there are also other information on non financial risk 
factors (environmental factor, political factor) that are still not regulated, at least for 
the timespan of this analysis. Despite the US setting, firms from the EU countries are 
only encouraged to disclose information on non-financial risk by several guidances 
(e.g. GRI-Reporting, Carbon Disclosure Project). Therefore, managers have great 
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discretionality on the type, the form, the width and the depth of information to 
disclose, as it is confirmed by the large variance of disclosures practices across 
companies, industries and years (Carbon Disclosure Project - Global 500, 2010). 
Thus, this setting is exploited in order to get measures of voluntary as well as 
mandatory information related to the overall company’s risk exposure.  
Secondly, it was chosen to analyze risk disclosure for one industry only, because 
different industries are likely to display different patterns in disclosure strategies. 
Therefore, this study preferably focuses on a sample with sufficient within-industry 
variability, for which the use of a single measure of disclosure quality seems to be 
appropriate. For this reason, the Oil&Gas industry is selected, that is a global sector 
with similar environment across countries. Thus, any difference in disclosure 
practices among firms is likely to be attributed either to firm-specific characteristics 
(e.g. managers incentive) or to country factors (e.g. disclosure regime, regulatory and 
enforcement regime). The Oil&Gas industry is also interesting from a disclosure 
point of view. For these companies risk disclosure arises as a focal issue due to 
uncertainty and turbulence of the inherent environment and the high stakeholders’ 
demand for transparency in their financial report.  
Finally, according to previous study on voluntary disclosure, the analysis is limited 
to one year only, since firms disclosure choices appear to be relatively constant over 
time (Botosan, 1997). Thus, the attention is turned to the fiscal year 2010 because it 
is recent enough to ensure reasonable access to companies’ report. 
Table 1 shows the sample slection procedure. 
Table 1. Sample selection 
  Freq. 
COMPUSTAT GLOBAL 2010 30573 
 (29582) 
OIL&GAS COMPANIES  991 
 (835) 
IFRS ADOPTERS 156 
 (45) 
FINAL SAMPLE 111 
Table 1 reports the sample selection procedure. Oil&Gas companies are selected by the following 
two-digit SIC code: 1311-1381-1389-2911. The full sample comprises 111 unique firms belonging to 
the Oil&Gas industry from 14 EU countries in 2010.  
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The initial sample comprises all companies from COMPUSTAT GLOBAL Dataset. 
Next, companies operating in the Oil&Gas industry are selected by using the two-
digit sic code classification (1311-1381-1389-2911). Then companies are eliminated 
that are listed in Stock Market other than EU and the EU companies that do not apply 
IFRS. Finally, companies are eliminated that do not provide an English version of 
their annual report and the ones with missing data for the financial and governance 
variables. The total number of companies included in the final sample is 111 
belonging to 14 different EU countries (Table 2). Even though the composition of the 
sample reflects the geographical distribution of Oil&Gas companies in 2010, it 
should be noticed that UK and Norwegian companies account for the majority of the 
sample. This could affect the results because either corporate governance or 
enforcement level varies across EU countries (Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007). 
Table 2. Sample firms by countries of origin 
Countries Freq. Percent Cum. 
    
AUSTRALIA 6 5.41 5.41 
AUSTRIA 2 1.80 7.21 
SWITZERLAND 1 0.90 8.11 
DENMARK 1 0.90 9.01 
FINLAND 1 0.90 9.91 
FRANCE 3 2.70 12.61 
UNITED KINGDOM 55 49.55 62.16 
GREECE 2 1.80 63.96 
IRELAND 5 4.50 68.47 
ITALY 4 3.60 72.07 
NETHERLANDS 1 0.90 72.97 
NORWAY 25 22.52 95.50 
PORTUGAL 1 0.90 96.40 
SWEDEN 4 3.60 100.00 
    
Total 111 100.00 100.00 
Table 2 reports the sample distribution by countries of origins. The full sample comprises 111 unique 
firms belonging to the Oil&Gas industry from 14 EU countries in 2010.  
 
3.2 Measuring voluntary and mandatory disclosure 
Voluntary disclosure index  
To measure voluntary disclosure this study relies on a self-constructed index which 
is sufficiently narrow to distinguish between mandatory and voluntary risk disclosure 
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(Botosan, 1997; Francis et al., 2008)93. To get the disclosure indices a manual 
content-analysis on companies’ annual report for the fiscal year 2010 is performed.  
Content analysis is a well-established method in social sciences to investigate the 
features of narrative disclosure (Krippendorf, 1980). This methodology has been 
chosen because it allows to effectively classify a large amount of qualitative risk data 
in categories of voluntary and mandatory information defined consistently with this 
framework of the analysis (Lajili & Zeghal, 2005). One advantage of self-
constructed indices based on content analysis of financial reports is that, unlike an 
analyst’s subjective assessment of disclosure, they are less biased. However, as 
manual content-analysis is labour intensive, this choice comes at the cost of limited 
sample size due to the difficulty of constructing a database of disclosure rankings for 
a large sample of firms. The limitation of this choice is acknowledged in terms of 
generalizability of the results and subjectivity in the scoring. However, in order to 
keep those factors to a minimum, this study adopts a very straightforward coding 
schema and performs several tests to assess the internal as well as external 
consistency of disclosure indices. Moreover, to reduce the variability across coders, 
and improve the overall reliability of the disclosure indices, the coding process has 
been entirely realized by the author94. 
According to existing research on disclosure this study analyzes disclosure in annual 
reports because they are the official public documents and are considered the most 
important source of a company’s information by external users (Lang & Lundholm, 
1993). Additionally, they are the only source containing a complete picture of risk 
factors that have affected the companies activity during the year. Therefore, they are 
the most suitable documents to analyze firms mandatory and voluntary risk 
disclosure strategies. The electronic version of annual reports from companies 
                                                
93 As this study is interested in analyzing the interplay between voluntary and mandatory disclosure of 
information that share a common signal (risk), other voluntary disclosures such as conference call, 
press release and other interim reporting are ignored.  However, this study attempts to control for 
these additional disclosures using proxy for firm size.  
94 To ensure reliability of the coded output, the coder first undertakes a deeper examination of 
different examples of the various types of risk information in companies report, then he/she performs 
a pilot analysis over a small sub-sample of companies in order to validate the checklist and the 
decision rules. 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
 100 
websites is downloaded and the focus is on a section that provides direct and indirect 
information on the company risk exposure. 
Previous literature adopt a variety of recording units (i.e. word, sentence, theme) to 
identify and code the information examined. Information is selected as coding unit, 
because it can avoid problems of counting the number of the word/sentence in annual 
translated from original languages with different styles of writing. Annual reports 
were read and risk disclosure information identified, according to the widely adopted 
Linsley & Shrives’s (2006) definition of risk. The information identified were then 
separated and coded according to whether it is a voluntary or a mandatory disclosure. 
This study considers information on financial risk factors as mandatory disclosure, 
since it is required and regulated by the IFRS 7. On the contrary, information on non-
financial risk factors can be considered as voluntary disclosure. Therefore, the 
measures of voluntary disclosure are the self-constructed indices that capture the 
quality of disclosure of risk information referring to non-financial risk factors. 
Table 3. Classification of non-financial risk 
              
COMPLIANCE 
& CONTROL 
RISK 
 STRATEGIC RISK  
OPERATIONAL 
RISK  
ENVIRONMENTAL, 
HEALTH & SAFETY 
RISK 
       
Ethical misconduct Industry  Product Quality  Climate change 
Regulatory  Stakeholder engagement Human Resources Health & Safety 
Litigation risk  Reputation  Product Development Environmental 
Legal  Brand name erosion Efficiency   
Tax  Third parties dependence Capacity   
  Pricing   Performance gap   
  Competition  Sourcing   
  Political   Obsolescence/shrinkage  
  Geographical  Business interruption  
  Capital availability Infrastructure    
  Management of growth Product/service failure  
  Reserves replacement    
    Catastrophic loss         
Table 3 reports the classification of non-financial risk, our proxy for voluntary disclosure. Information 
about non financial risk factors is assigned to one type of risk and then classified in one of the four 
categories of non-financial risks. the categories and types of risks are specified following the Arthur 
Andersen Business Risk Model, modified according to specific features of the business model of our 
sample firms.  
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Particularly, any information on non-financial risk factors is classified according to 4 
sub-categories developed in accordance to previous studies (Arthur Andersen 
Business Risk Model) and showed in Table 395.  
In order to capture the quality of voluntary non financial risk disclosure a 4-point 
scale is used. To each item of information on non-financial risk factors identified, a 
score of 0 is assigned if firms provide no disclosure; 1 if firms provide a general 
description of non-financial risk factors (minimum coverage); 2 if firms provide a 
description of non-financial risks and commentary on action taken to mitigate the 
risks (sufficient); 3 if firms provide extensive information consisting in a detailed 
description of non-financial risk factors, a risk commentary on action taken 
accompanied by an assessment of the risks and/or quantitative risk information 
and/or changes over the year (extensive).96 Appendix B Panel A provides an example 
of coding process for non financial risk disclosure.  
A partial index (NF_SCOREj) is computed by dividing the score for the observed 
disclosure in any category j of non financial risk factor (NFj) to the maximum score 
to be assigned to the category j (max_NFj) as follows: 
 
where: 
  
 
 
 
scorek= assigned score to the item k; 
                                                
95 Appendix A Panel A provides further details on coding rules while Panel B presents detailed 
classification and definition of non-financial risks. 
96 Given the voluntary nature of non-financial risk disclosure, to define the coding scheme all the 
relevant section of the annual report is first read and the type of non-financial risk information 
provided by sample companies is identified. Then, the information disclosed is categorized using a 4-
point scale. As a consequence, the coding schema turns out to be appropriate to classify all the 
possible disclosure strategies adopted by sample firms.  
! 
max_NFj = max_ scorek * tot _ item
k=1
n
" k  
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itemk= specific type of risk disclosed within the category j of non financial risk; 
max_scorek= maximum score to be assigned to the items; 
tot_itemk= total items within the category j of non financial risk. 
To obtain the final proxy for voluntary disclosure on non-financial risk for companyi 
(NF_SCOREi) the partial scores for each category are summed as follows: 
 
 
Mandatory disclosure index 
To proxy for mandatory disclosure this study relies on information on financial risks 
that firms are required to disclose in their annual report. In accordance with the 
measurement of the voluntary disclosure, the measure of mandatory disclosure is 
obtained by performing a content analysis of the audited section of firms’ annual 
report (footnotes). Still adopting the information as coding unit, the Linsley & 
Shrives’s (2006) definition of risk, it is followed a coding schema similar to the IFRS 
check-list (E&Y). Therefore, information on financial risk is classified according to 
one of the categories identified by the IFRS 7 (credit risk, liquidity risk, market risk) 
and showed in APPENDIX A Panel C97. 
For any item required by IFRS 7, 1 is assigned if the information is disclosed and 0 
otherwise. The same weight is assigned to the qualitative and the quantitative 
information as they are both compulsory and strictly regulated by the most recent 
versions of the accounting standard. For each category of financial risk j a partial 
coverage score (F_SCOREj) is computed capturing the relative amount of items k 
disclosed as the sum of the items disclosed (itemk) related to the total amount of 
relevant items (tot_itemk)98. 
 
                                                
97 This study refers to the version of IFRS 7 that includes amendments resulting from IFRSs issued up 
to 31 December 2009 since the sample period includes annual reports published in 2010 fiscal year 
end. This study also considers the amendments to IFRS 7 occurred during the sample period, and 
accounts for any differences in the risk information required.  
98 As relevant items all the item required by IFRS 7 are considered unless the company explicitly says 
that they are irrelevant/unrepresentative.  
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Then, the final proxy for mandatory disclosure on financial risk for company i 
(F_SCOREi) is obtained as the sum of the partial scores for each category as follows: 
 
 
Appendix B Panel B provides coding examples for selected financial risk 
disclosures.  
Validity of voluntary and mandatory disclosure indices 
As discussed in the previous section this study relies on self-constructed disclosure 
indices to capture the cross-sectional variation of voluntary as well as mandatory 
disclosure. However, given the degree of subjectivity and the potential for bias, it is 
necessary to perform various tests in order to assess their internal as well as external 
validity. Previous literature suggests that firm disclosure strategies are expected to be 
similar along all the disclosed items (Botosan, 1997). As a consequence, a 
correlation analysis among all the subcomponents of NF_SCORE and NF_SCORE is 
performed in order to examine their internal consistency. Panel A of Table 4 
provides the results of correlation analysis for NF_SCORE. 
As expected, both the parametric and non-parametric correlation coefficient for all 
the sub-components of NF_SCORE are highly correlated with each other and also 
with NF_SCORE (p-value 10%), indicating that firms that tend to disclose more 
according to one type of risk factors, provide detailed information also over the other 
categories of non financial risks. Panel B in Table 4 reports the correlation analysis 
between the subcomponent of F_SCORE and the summary score. Again, a high level 
of internal consistency is observed for the subcomponents of F_SCORE as it is 
documented by the significance of both the Pearson and the Sperman correlation 
analysis. 
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Table 4. Validation of disclosure indices 
                
Panel A: Correlation between voluntary disclosure index and its sub-components   
  A B C D E  
A: NF_SCORE   0.820* 0.867* 0.834* 0.867*  
B: NF_SCORE_CC  0.843*  0.715* 0.621* 0.626*  
C: NF_SCORE_STR  0.851* 0.710*  0.709* 0.637*  
D: NF_SCORE_OPR  0.735* 0.547* 0.726*  0.643*  
E: NF_SCORE_EHS  0.890* 0.623* 0.601* 0.474*    
                
Panel B: Correlation between mandatory disclosure index and its sub-components   
 A B C D E F G 
A: F_SCORE  0.832*  0.815*  -0.005 0.538* 0.565*  0.672*  
B: F_SCORE_CR 0.844*   0.526* -0.134 0.276* 0.358* 0.363*  
C: F_SCORE_LR 0.829*  0.542*  -0.057 0.396* 0.325*  0.406* 
D: F_SCORE_IRR -0.019 -0.121 -0.024  -0.151 -0.109 0.229*  
E: F_SCORE_CUR 0.627*  0.378* 0.411* -0.146  0.462* 0.711* 
F: F_SCORE_PRR 0.639* 0.395* 0.376* -0.171*  0.586*   0.806* 
G: F_SCORE_MR 0.723*  0.399* 0.446*  0.140 0.586*  0.847*   
                
Panel C: Correlation between voluntary and mandatory disclosure index and firm-characteristics 
  A B C D E F 
A: F_SCORE   0.252* 0.281* 0.590* 0.433* -0.491* 
B: NF_SCORE  0.363*  0.058 0.306* 0.032 -0.312* 
C: ROE  0.102 0.045  0.490* 0.098 -0.492* 
D: SIZE  0.616* 0.514* 0.325*  0.618* -0.689* 
E: LEV  0.174* 0.100 -0.376* 0.400*  -0.514* 
F: SD_RET   0.013 0.097 -0.066 -0.082  -0.287*   
Table 4 reports the results of the validity test for the self-constructed disclosure indices. Panel A tests 
the internal consistency of the index capturing mandatory disclosure on financial risk. Panel B tests 
the internal consistency of the index capturing voluntary disclosure on non-financial risk. Panel C 
tests the external consistency of both mandatory and voluntary disclosure indices. The full sample 
comprises 111 unique firms belonging to the Oil&Gas industry from 14 EU countries in 2010. 
NF_SCORE_CC is the partial disclosure index relative to the Compliance&Control Risk category. 
NF_SCORE_STR is the partial disclosure index relative to the Strategic Risk category. 
NF_SCORE_OPR is the partial disclosure index relative to the Operational Risk category. 
NF_SCORE_EHS is the partial disclosure index relative to the Environmental, Health&Safety Risk 
category. F_SCORE_CR is the partial disclosure index relative to the Credit Risk category. 
F_SCORE_LR is the partial disclosure index relative to the Liquidity Risk category. F_SCORE_IRR 
is the partial disclosure index relative to the Interest Rate Risk category. F_SCORE_CUR is the 
partial disclosure index relative to the Currency Risk category. F_SCORE_PRR is the partial 
disclosure index relative to the Price Risk category. F_SCORE_MR is the partial disclosure index 
relative to the Market Risk category. See Table 6 for other variables definitions. * denotes 
significance at 10% level (two-tailed). 
As second validity test for indices, this study explores the relationship between the 
level of disclosure and various firm characteristics. Panel C in Table 4 report the 
results of the correlation analysis between the summary indices and three proxies of 
firms financial and operating structure. In particular the firm size, the level of firm 
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profitability, the leverage and the degree of operating risk are considered. According 
to previous studies (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999), mandatory disclosure index is highly 
related to the firm size and leverage, while it exhibits a non significant correlation 
with the level of operating risk. On the contrary, the voluntary disclosure index is 
positively and significantly related with the size, whereas it shows a very weak 
correlation with the other measures of firms financial and operating structure. 
In sum, the results of the previous tests confirm (i) the internal consistencies among 
the various components of NF_SCORE as well as F_SCORE, (ii) the significant 
correlations between the summary indices and various financial and operating firm 
characteristics. Therefore, this analysis suggests the validity of NF_SCORE and 
F_SCORE in capturing the mandatory and voluntary disclosure levels of firms risk 
disclosure.  
 
3.3 Measures of firm- and country-level incentives 
Board of directors’ monitoring  
To capture the cross sectional determinants of voluntary disclosure, this study relies 
on a set of variables which proxy for firm level as well as country-level incentives. 
As firm-level incentive, the internal monitoring provided by the board of directors is 
analyzed. Board of directors holds the responsibility for setting objectives and 
controlling the firm’s activities (Fama & Jensen, 1983). It has the duty to oversee 
management decision affecting the overall level of corporate transparency (Vafeas, 
2000).  In the agency framework the ability of the board monitoring to constrain the 
managers incentive to withhold and/or manipulate the information disclosed, mainly 
depends on board of directors characteristics (Zahra & Pearce, 1989) Following the 
existing literature, this study relies on seven board of directors’ characteristics. 
The first three proxies refer to the composition of the board of directors. They are (i) 
board size (ii) board independence and (iii) the number of directors serving multiple 
boards. The trade-off between having a large rather than a small board has been 
subject to considerable research effort (Armstrong et al., 2010). From one hand, 
smaller board is supposed to monitor more effectively because it is more cohesive 
and productive, while a board comprised of too many directors may experience 
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coordination costs and free-riding problems that prevent the effective monitoring on 
the financial reporting practices (Lipton & Lorsh, 1992; Jensen, 1993). From the 
other hand, larger boards may offer a better advice to the CEO due to the broader 
expertise of their members (Dalton et al., 1999). Coles et al. (2008) exploit this 
duality of views by examining whether one board size fits all. They conclude that the 
relationship between board size and firm value is U-shaped, because different firms 
have distinct optimal board size. In particular, complex firms (i.e. large, diversified 
and highly-leveraged firms) have larger boards than simple ones99. To examine how 
board size affects its monitoring on voluntary disclosure practices, the total number 
of directors sitting on the board (B_SIZE) is computed. Following Coles et al. (2008) 
suggestions, this study also considers the squared of B_SIZE (B_SIZE2), as 
additional explanatory variable to capture the potential non linear relationship 
between board size and voluntary disclosure. 
A second dimension of the board composition is the board independence (IND). 
Director independence is considered a key attribute for board of directors monitoring 
ability. Independent outside directors may bring a greater breadth of experience and 
are in a better position to control managers and protect the interests of other parties 
(Fama, 1980). They not only ensure a better monitoring over financial reporting 
process, but are also less aligned to managers, thus encouraging them to disclose 
additional information (Eng & Mak, 2003; Chen & Jaggi, 2000). The presence of 
independent directors has been related to management voluntary disclosure in a 
number of international studies (e.g., Ho & Wong, 2001; Chau & Gray, 2002; 
Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005). Following this well grounded 
literature, board independence is measured as the proportion of independent directors 
on the board, and it is expected to be positively related to voluntary disclosure. 
The third proxy is the presence of directors with multiple appointments (EXT), a 
condition often referred as interlocking directors or directors busyness. In the 
                                                
99 Coles et al. (2008) go one step further and argue that the non-linear relation between board size and 
firm value is driven by differences between complex and simple firms, with Tobin’s Q increasing in 
board size for complex firms, while decreasing in for simple firms. However, the examination of the 
reasons why either large or small boards are optimal goes beyond the scope of this analysis, this study 
just considers the potential for non-linear relationship between board size and voluntary disclosure, 
and include some controls for firm complexity (such as size and leverage) to take properly into 
account these aspects. 
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agency-related literature the role of interlocking directors is highly debated. Some 
studies argue that directors who serves on multiple boards develop reputational 
capital as experts and are therefore more experienced in their monitoring function 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983; Kosnik, 1987; Kaplan & Reishus, 1990; Shivdasani, 1993). 
However, other research points out the costs coming from directors busyness, such as 
the lack of time and resources to effectively perform their duties (Fich & White, 
2005; Fich & Shivdasani, 2006). It is not surprising that empirical analyses on the 
association between director interlock and corporate transparency also suggest 
conflicting results, with some reporting a positive association (Brickley et al., 1999), 
while other finding a negative one (Erickson et al., 2006, Bowen et al., 2008; Devos 
et al., 2009). As a consequence, the director interlock with the logarithm of the total 
number of external appointment for each board of directors is measured, but no 
directional hypothesis on its association with voluntary disclosure practices is 
formulated. 
In addition to the board composition, attributes related to the board leadership, 
structure and competence are also measured. The board leadership refers to the 
combination in the same individual of the role of chairman of the board and the role 
of chief executive officer (D_CEOD). In the agency-centered theories this condition 
has been blamed for higher agency costs, lower board independence and ineffective 
monitoring (Ho & Wong, 2001). As a consequence, codes of best practice in 
corporate governance recommend the separation of these roles (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). The concentrated decision making power resulting from CEO duality could 
also have adverse effect over corporate transparency, reducing the board ability to 
execute its oversight on the dissemination of corporate information to outsiders 
(Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994; Gul & Leug, 2004). Thus, a negative relationship 
between CEO duality and voluntary disclosure is predicted. 
The proxy for the board structure is the provision of a specific audit committee. The 
board may appoint various sub-committees to whom delegate various activities in 
order to enhance its overall monitoring ability. However, the audit committee is the 
most important in ensuring the oversight over the firms’ financial report and internal 
control. In addition, when there is no formal risk committee, the audit committee 
should assess the risk management in place, identifying and managing financial and 
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non financial risks in the company. As the presence of the audit committee is almost 
widespread among all companies, being required by the existing corporate 
governance codes and best practices, the monitoring ability of the audit committee is 
measured with the logarithm of the number of directors sitting in the audit committee 
(AC_SIZE) that is expected to be positively related with voluntary disclosure 
(DeFond et al., 2005).  
As final dimension of the board monitoring ability the board competence that refers 
to overall expertise of the board of directors in accounting and finance area (B_FE) is 
captured. Directors with a background in public accounting, auditing, or financial 
operation have more technical knowledge and higher expertise with regard to 
monitoring and advising financial reporting and disclosure issues. They are more 
aware of their formal responsibilities and may also lead to a greater cooperation 
between the internal and the external auditor, which in turn enhance the overall 
firm’s transparency. Several studies have found that directors expertise is associated 
with measures of financial reporting quality such as lower earnings management 
(Carcello et al., 2010; Dhaliwal et al., 2010) and higher accounting conservatism 
(Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008). In the light of the previous discussion, the board 
expertise is also expected to be positively related with the level of voluntary 
disclosure, as financial and accounting experts are more familiar with accounting and 
disclosure practices.  
Given the absence of specific European rules to identify the expertise of directors, 
this study relies on classification criteria similar to the ones defined by the SEC rules 
in the US context, in order to keep the subjectivity of this coding to the minimum. 
Each board member biography is read and director is classified as 
accounting/financial expert  according to the classification criteria. Specifically, a 
board member is considered to be an accounting/financial expert if she/he has 
experience as public accountant, chief accounting officer, auditor CFO, controller or 
former CEO of a for-profit organization. The proxy of board of directors competence 
is the logarithm of the number of directors with accounting/financial expertise. 
Country-level institution 
To explore the effect of country-level incentives on disclosure policies, some 
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features of the institutional framework are taken into account that can shape the level 
of internal monitoring provided by the board of directors. 
The characteristics of the institutional environment are multidimensional, including 
the strength of countries’ securities regulation, enforcement, capital market 
development, investor protection, disclosure and transparency of reporting practices. 
However, it has been noticed that these aspects are highly correlated because they all 
reflect the same degree of the underlying quality of investor protection in a country 
(Rossi & Volpin, 2004).  
Leuz (2010) has recently performed a cluster analysis of 31 countries suggesting that 
there exist three institutional clusters with similar institutional features related to the 
level of securities regulation, investor protection and legal enforcement systems 
(Leuz, 2010). Therefore, the role of regulatory and enforcement regime for the level 
of firms transparency is exploited by relying on the country-cluster classification 
proposed by Leuz (2010). In particular, this study follows the grouping of European 
countries into Leuz’s three  country-clusters (2010) as outlined in Table 5 panel A100.  
Table 5. Cluster membership 
              
Panel A: Cluster membership using regulatory and market outcome variables   
       
Cluster 1  Cluster 1   Cluster 1  
AUSTRALIA  AUSTRIA   ARGENTINA  
CANADA  BELGIUM   BRAZIL  
HONG KONG  CHILE   COLOMBIA  
ISRAEL  DENMARK   ECUADOR  
MALAYSIA  FINLAND   EGYPT  
SINGAPORE  FRANCE   INDONESIA  
UNITED 
KINGDOM  GERMANY   JORDAN  
UNITED 
STATES  GREECE   KENYA  
  INDIA   MEXICO  
  IRELAND   NIGERIA  
  ITALY   PAKISTAN  
  JAPAN   PERU  
  
KOREA 
(SOUTH)   PHILIPPINES  
                                                
100 This study refers to the country-cluster membership using regulatory and market outcome variables 
as reported in Panel B of table 3 pg. 243 Leuz (2010). 
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  NETHERLANDS   SRI LANKA  
  NEW ZEALAND   THAILAND  
  NORWAY   TURKEY  
  PORTUGAL   URUGUAY  
  SOUTH AFRICA   VENEZUELA  
  SPAIN   ZIMBABWE  
  SWEDEN     
  SWITZERLAND     
    TAIWAN         
       
Panel B: Cluster membership of sample firms     
       
Outside economies with strong regulatory and 
enforcement (INST=1)  
Inside economies with weak regulatory and 
enforcement (INST=0) 
 Freq. Percent   Freq. Percent 
AUSTRALIA 6 9.09  AUSTRIA 2 4.44 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 55 83.33  SWITZERLAND 1 2.22 
IRELAND 5 7.58  DENMARK 1 2.22 
    FINLAND 1 2.22 
    FRANCE 3 6.67 
    GREECE 2 4.44 
    ITALY 4 8.89 
    NETHERLANDS 1 2.22 
    NORWAY 23 55.56 
    PORTUGAL 1 2.22 
    SWEDEN 4 8.89 
       
TOT 66 100     45 100 
Table 5 reports the distribution of firms according to the Leuz’s (2010) country-cluster classification. 
Panel A provides the results of the cluster analysis using three institutional variables (securities 
regulation, investor protection and enforcement) and three financial development variables from 
Djankov et al. (2008) (i.e. the ratio of stock market capitalisation held by small shareholders to GDP, 
the ratio of the number of domestic firms listed in a given country to its population, and the ratio of 
equity issued by newly-listed firms in a given country to its GDP). Panel B provides the partition of 
our sample firms using the indicator variable INST. Firms belonging to the Cluster 1 are assigned a 
value of INST equal to one; firms belonging to the Cluster 2 are assigned a value of INST equal to 
zero. The full sample comprises 111 unique firms belonging to the Oil&Gas industry from 14 EU 
countries in 2010.  
According to Leuz (2010) the first cluster is interpreted as composed of countries 
having institutional features typical for “outside economies”, with large stock 
markets, low ownership concentration, extensive outsider rights, and strong legal 
enforcement. On the contrary, countries in the last two clusters are characterized by 
smaller stock markets, higher ownership concentration, and weaker investor 
protection and regulatory regime, thus showing institutional features similar to the 
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“insider economies”101. Given the sample firms’ country of origin, the variability 
between cluster 2 and cluster 3 is not exploited since all sample firms allocate 
between the first and the second clusters. This feature is suitable to this research 
design because allows to define a binary variable (INST) taking the value of 1 for 
firms from countries in the first cluster (which is interpreted as countries with strong 
legal and enforcement regime), 0 for firms from countries included in the second 
cluster. Table 5 panel B reports the classification of sample firms according to 
Leuz’s (2010) country-cluster classification and the coding of the binary variable. 
 
3.4 Control variables 
According to the existing literature a set of variables is included to control for 
proprietary costs associated to voluntary disclosure practices (Leuz, 2003). Proxies 
for firm size (SIZE), profitability (ROE), leverage (LEV) and the level of operating 
risk (SD_RET) are included.  
The firm size is controlled using the logarithm of firm total asset. Large firms are 
more visible and therefore face demand for greater transparency from financial 
analysts and third party interested in their results. Furthermore, they suffer from 
higher information asymmetries between managers and outside parties, thus 
benefiting more from increased disclosure aiming at reducing adverse selection and 
agency costs. Finally, they have great potential for costs savings and are in a better 
position to defend themselves from the adverse action of competitors, thus having 
lower costs of producing and disseminating information, as well as competitive 
costs. For all these reasons larger companies face lower proprietary costs and lower 
incentives to withhold information (Prencipe, 2004). According to the previous 
studies on proprietary costs, a positive association between firms’ size and voluntary 
disclosure is predicted.  
High profitable firms have high incentive to voluntary disclose information to signal 
their profitability. However, they can also face more severe proprietary costs as 
                                                
101 According to Leuz (2010) countries in these two clusters are similar to the previous dimensions but 
differ in the strength of their legal systems. However this variation is not exploited as all the sample 
firms allocate between the first and the second cluster.  
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competitors may exploit the information disclosed against the firms, thus dampening 
firms incentive to disclose more (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2007). As a consequence, 
profitability with the return on equity, measured as the net income divided by the end 
of the year book value of equity, is controlled, but no prediction on its impact over 
firms disclosure strategies is made.  
To the extent that public debt ensures an higher level of monitoring of management 
activities, highly leveraged firms are expected to produce more information. 
Nevertheless, leverage is also a proxy for risk in many disclosure related studies and 
the findings show mixed results (Ali, 2005; Linsley & Shrives, 2005; Abraham & 
Cox, 2007; Amran et al., 2009). For instance, an high level of leverage may be 
reached by means of private financing. This can have an adverse effect over the 
demand of public disclosure that in turn can be substituted by other “private” channel 
(Leuz et al., 2003). Therefore, no specific sign will be a priori assigned to the 
relationship between leverage and voluntary disclosure.  
Finally, firms operating risk, measured as the stock volatility (i.e. the standard 
deviation of the daily-stock returns over the fiscal year) are controlled and it is 
expected to be positively related to the level of risk disclosure (SD_RET). Positive 
accounting theory predicts that agency costs is an increasing function of company 
risk. Therefore, to reduce the contracting costs associated with higher levels of risk 
and greater information asymmetry and maximize firm value, companies will 
increase risk disclosure. Moreover, the higher the level of risk, the higher the 
litigation costs the firms may incur by not disclosing such information. However, 
firm-level volatility of stock may also proxy for the extent to which firm-specific 
information is incorporated into stock prices (Morck et al., 2000). As a consequence, 
firms that provide more transparent risk reporting are expected to be perceived as 
less risky, since a great portion of information on contingencies and risk factors is 
already incorporated in stock prices. This, in turn, leads to a decrease in the degree of 
uncertainty and as a consequence of the stock return volatility. Given this conflicting 
augment no directional hypothesis on the relationship between stock return volatility 
and firms’ voluntary disclosure is predicted. 
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Archival data on board of directors are hand-collected from proxy statement, while 
financial variables are collected from COMPUSTAT Database. 
Table 6 provides further details on the measurement and sources of dependent, 
independent and control variables.  
Table 6. Variables definition 
 
Variable 
Name Variable Label Definition Source 
Panel A: Disclosure variables 
NF_SCORE Voluntary Disclosure index 
Self-constructed index 
capuring the extent of Annual 
Report’s disclosure on non-
financial risk factors 
Hand-collected from Annual 
Report  
F_SCORE Mandatory Disclosure index 
Self-constructed index 
capuring the extent of Annual 
Report’s disclosure on 
financial risk factors 
Hand-collected from Annual 
Report  
Panel B: Firm-level incentive variables 
B_SIZE Board Size Total number of directors sitting on company board 
Hand-collected from Annual 
Report  
IND Board Independence 
Proportion of independent 
directors sitting on company 
board 
Hand-collected from Annual 
Report  
AC_SIZE Board Structure 
Natural logarithm of the 
number of directors sitting on 
the audit committee 
Hand-collected from Annual 
Report  
EXT External Appointment 
Natural logarithm of the 
number of directors’ external 
appointment  
Hand-collected from Annual 
Report  
D_CEOD Board Leadership 
Dummy variable =1 if CEO 
is also Chairman of the 
board; 0 otherwise 
Hand-collected from Annual 
Report  
B_FE Board Competence 
Natural logarithm of the 
number of directors with 
financial/accounting 
expertise 
Hand-collected from Annual 
Report  
Panel C: Country-level incentive variable 
INST Strenght of Institution 
Dummy variable =1 if 
sample firm belongs to the 
Leuz’s (2010) Cluster 1; 0 
otherwise. 
Leuz’s (2010) country-cluster 
classification 
Panel C: Control variable 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
 114 
SD_RET Operating Risk Standard deviation of the firm’s daily stock return COMPUSTAT GLOBAL 
ROE Return on Equity 
Net Income divided by the 
end-of-the year book value of 
equity 
COMPUSTAT GLOBAL 
SIZE Firm Size Natural Logarithm of the end-of-the year Total Asset COMPUSTAT GLOBAL 
LEV Leverage 
End-of-the year Total 
Liabilities divided by the 
end-of-the year Total Asset 
COMPUSTAT GLOBAL 
Table 6 reports label of variables used in the empirical analysis, their definition and the sources of the 
data. The full sample comprises 111 unique firms belonging to the Oil&Gas industry from 14 EU 
countries in 2010.  
  
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis  
Table 7 provides a descriptive analysis of the disclosure indices for NF_SCORE and 
F_SCORE and their sub-components. 
Table 7. Survey on risk disclosure  
                  
Panel A: Voluntary disclosure index and its sub-components 
  N   mean   min  p25 p50 p75   max sd 
NF_SCORE 111 0.101 0 0.006 0.066 0.167 0.477 0.112 
NF_SCORE_CC 111 0.092 0 0 0.067 0.133 0.533 0.123 
NF_SCORE_STR 111 0.086 0 0 0.005 0.128 0.538 0.098 
NF_SCORE_OPR 111 0.074 0 0 0.061 0.121 0.394 0.086 
NF_SCORE_EHS 111 0.151 0 0 0 0.222 1 0.224 
         
Panel B: Mandatory disclosure index and its sub-components 
 N   mean  min p25 p50 p75  max sd 
F_SCORE  111 0.407 0.099 0.330 0.405 0.487 0.722 0.122 
F_SCORE_CR 111 0.411 0 0.286 0.430 0.518 0.937 0.176 
F_SCORE_LR 111 0.374 0 0.25 0.375  0.486 0.667 0.151 
F_SCORE_MR 111 0.437 0.185 0.352 0.426 0.495 0.821 0.127 
Table 7 reports the descriptive statistics for disclosure indices and their sub-components. Panel A 
provides results for voluntary disclosure indices and its sub-components. Panel B provides results for 
mandatory disclosure indices and its sub-components. The full sample comprises 111 unique firms 
belonging to the Oil&Gas industry from 14 EU countries in 2010. NF_SCORE_CC is the partial 
disclosure index relative to the Compliance&Control Risk category. NF_SCORE_STR is the partial 
disclosure index relative to the Strategic Risk category. NF_SCORE_OPR is the partial disclosure 
index relative to the Operational Risk category. NF_SCORE_EHS is the partial disclosure index 
relative to the Environmental, Health&Safety Risk category. F_SCORE_CR is the partial disclosure 
index relative to the Credit Risk category. F_SCORE_LR is the partial disclosure index relative to the 
Liquidity Risk category. F_SCORE_MR is the partial disclosure index relative to the Market Risk 
category. See Table 6 for other variables definitions. 
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Given the characteristics of this sample, it is not really surprising that firms voluntary 
providing information on non-financial risk, disclose mostly information related to 
the environmental, health and safety risk (NF_SCORE_EHS). However, the 
disclosure of information for this category seems to exhibit also an high variability, 
with more than a half of the firms not providing any information, while only the last 
25% percentile disclosing a great amount of environmental, health and safety risk 
information. This causes the distribution of NF_SCORE_EHS to be highly skewed 
on the right. The other subcomponent of NF_SCORE, exhibits a very similar 
distribution, where the compliance & control risk have higher mean and median 
value, and a greater standard deviation, while the information on strategic risk tends 
to be reported seldom in median. Finally, disclosure on operational risk has lower 
value of mean and sample variability. Panel B reports the descriptive statistics for 
mandatory disclosure on financial risks and its distribution among the subcategories 
identified by the IFRS7. For this latter group the mean value and the median are 
quite similar while the maximum value of each index is higher and the standard 
deviation is lower then the one reported for non financial risk disclosure indices, that 
seems to be obvious given the different nature of these disclosures.  
Table 8 presents descriptive statistics for variables used in regression analysis. 
Table 8. Descriptive statistics by high/low mandatory disclosure  
                    
Panel A: Disclosure variables   
    N mean min p25 p50 p75 max sd 
NF_SCORE 111 0.101 0 0.006 0.066 0.167 0.477 0.112 
 high 55 0.126* 0 0.006 0.086 0.215 0.477 0.128 
 low 56 0.076 0 0.003  0.044 0.123 0.412 0.089 
F_SCORE  111 0.407 0.099 0.330 0.405 0.487 0.722 0.122 
 high 55 0.503 0.407 0.441 0.487 0.527 0.722 0.078 
 low 56 0.313 0.099 0.265 0.334 0.380 0.405 0.075 
F_SCORE2         
 high 55 0.259 0.166 0.195 0.237 0.278 .5215 0.085 
 low 56 0.104 0.009 0.070 0.111 0.145 .1639 0.043 
          
Panel B: Firm-level incentive variables 
    N mean min p25 p50 p75 max sd 
B_SIZE  111 7.324 3 5 7 9 19 2.899 
 high 55 8.527* 3 6 8 10 19 3.344 
 low 56 6.143 3 5 6 7 11 1.721 
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B_SIZE2  111 61.973 9 25 49 81 361 56.160 
 high 55 83.691* 9 36 64 100 361 70.111 
 low 56 40.643 9 25 36 49 121 23.383 
IND  111 0.386 0 0.2 0.4 0.545 1 0.239 
 high 55 0.429* 0 0.2  0.429 0.571 0.9  0.232 
 low 56 0.345 0 0.183 0.333 0.5 1 0.242 
AC_SIZE  111 1.185 0 1.099 1.386 1.386 2.197 0.479 
 high 55 1.282* 0 1.099 1.386 1.609 2.197 0.449 
 low 56 1.089 0 1.099 1.099 1.386 1.792 0.492 
EXT  111 1.594 0 1.099 1.609 2.197 3.932 0.894 
 high 55 1.712 0 1.099 1.792 2.485 3.932 0.990 
 low 56 1.478 0 1.099 1.386 2.079 3.638 0.780 
D_CEOD  111 0.153 0 0 0 0 1 0.362 
 high 55 0.145 0 0 0 0 1 0.356 
 low 56 0.161 0 0 0 0 1 0.371 
B_FE  111 1.325 0 1.099 1.386 1.609 2.197 0.438 
 high 55 1.400* 0 1.099 1.386 1.609 2.197 0.458 
 low 56 1.250 0 1.099 1.386 1.609 1.946 0.407 
          
Panel C: Country-incentive variable 
    N mean min p25 p50 p75 max sd 
INST  111 0.595 0 0 1 1 1 0.493 
 high 55 0.509* 0 0 1 1 1 0.504 
 low 56 0.679 0 0 1 1 1 0.471 
  
Panel D: Control variables 
    N mean min p25 p50 p75 max sd 
SD_RET  111 0.150 0.012 0.022 0.033 0.050 6.402 0.796 
 high 55 0.133 0.012 0.019 0.027 0.038 5.550 0.744 
 low 56 0.167 0.017 0.028 0.042 0.057 6.402 0.851 
ROE  111 -0.083 -3.273 -0.137 -0.023 0.093 1.155 0.437 
 high 55 -0.065 -3.273 -0.080 0.015 0.117 1.155 0.535 
 low 56 -0.099 -0.948 -0.184 -0.041 0.032 0.7816 0.317 
SIZE  111 5.974 1.279 4.142 5.493 7.795 12.372 2.447 
 high 55 7.046* 1.279 4.891 7.165 8.853  12.372 2.661 
 low 56 4.921 2.125 3.508 4.772 5.852 8.841 1.656 
LEV  111 0.788 -6.691 0.150 0.551 1.431 5.283 1.365 
 high 55 0.979 -6.691 0.349 1.184 1.756 5.283 1.791 
  low 56 0.600 0.001 0.101 0.293 0.784 2.483 0.711 
Table 8 reports the descriptive statistics for variables used for empirical analysis. The full sample 
comprises 111 unique firms belonging to the Oil&Gas industry from 14 EU countries in 2010. Sample 
firms are divided in two sub-groups (high/low) according the sample median of mandatory disclosure. 
Panel A provides results for disclosure indices. Panel B and C provides results for firm-level and 
country-level incentives. Panel D provides results for control variables. * denotes significance at 10% 
level (two-tailed). The p-values of the tests of differences in means for continuous variables are based 
on t-test. The p-values of the tests of differences in means for binary variables are based on test of 
proportions. See Table 6 for variables definitions. 
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For the full sample, the mean (median) of NF_SCORE is 0.101 (0.066) while the 
mean (median) of F_SCORE is 0.407 (0.405). The mean and the median value of 
board members for the sample firms is about seven, moving from three to nineteen, 
while the percentage of independent directors is in mean (median) 38% (40%). 
Among the sample firms the mean (median) number AC_SIZE is of 1.185 (1.386) 
while the mean (median) of B_FE is 1.325 (1.386), suggesting that directors with 
financial/accounting expertise are about 3 for each board. The mean (median) 
number of external appointment is about 6 (4) as shown by the mean (median) value 
of EXT. Regarding the strength of the regulatory and enforcement regime, a half of 
the sample firms belongs to the first country-cluster (strong enforcement, regulatory 
regime, outside economy), while the other half has characteristics similar to the 
inside economies, with weaker regulatory and enforcement system (cluster 2). 
Moving to the control variables, it can be observed that the distribution of the 
operating risk, the profitability and the leverage tend to be positively skewed. On the 
contrary, the degree of skewness for the firm size is very low. Next, the sample firms 
are divided in two sub-groups above and below the median value of F_SCORE 
(0.405). It appears that firms disclosing more mandatory information on financial 
risks tend to disclose significantly more voluntary information on non-financial risks. 
Firms belonging to the two sub-groups are also different regarding to the board 
composition and structure, where firms from the sub-group with high F_SCORE 
having larger boards with a higher percentage of independent directors and a greater 
number of directors sitting in the audit committee (the difference in mean and 
median is significant at 10% in both cases). Board of directors of high F_SCORE 
firms is also significantly more competent in financial and accounting issues and has 
an higher degree of busyness relative to the board of firms with low F_SCORE. 
Finally, firms having higher value of F_SCORE index tend to be significantly larger 
and more leveraged, while the value of operating risk and profitability do not exhibit 
a significant difference across the two sub-samples. 
Table 9 reports the results of the Pearson (Spearman) correlation analysis. As 
expected, NF_SCORE is positively and significantly correlated with the value of 
F_SCORE and F_SCORE. It also has a positive and significant correlation with the 
board monitoring variables, with the only exception of the CEO duality status.  
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However, it is positively but not significantly correlated with the dummy variable 
capturing the strength of the regulatory and enforcement regime. Quite interesting, 
this latter variable is negatively correlated with the size of the board of directors, 
while it is positively correlated with the size of audit committee and the director 
busyness, motivating the interest in exploring the role of the external environment in 
the relationship between voluntary and mandatory disclosure as well as its impact on 
the internal monitoring provided by the board. The correlation among the other 
independent variables is acceptable except for the squared variables of B_SIZE and 
F_SCORE, that are highly correlated with the base level of both variables by 
definition.  
 
4.2 Regression analysis  
4.2.1. Analysis of the interplay between mandatory and voluntary disclosure  
This study investigates the relationship between mandatory and voluntary risk 
disclosure and the influence of firm- and country-level incentives through a 
multivariate regression analysis. In all the models glm regressions (logit link 
function) are performed since the dependent variable is defined as a proportion. The 
empirical analysis starts with a parsimonious model regressing NF_SCORE, that 
proxies for voluntary risk disclosure, on F_SCORE and F_SCORE2, which measure 
the base and the squared level of mandatory risk disclosure, and a set of controls 
(model 1). Model 1 is specified including country dummies and excluding the 
intercept to avoid multicollinearity. 
NF_SCOREi= β1*F_SCOREi + β 2*F_SCORE2i + β 3*SD_RETi + β 4*ROEi + 
β5*SIZEi + β6*LEVi + εi                                                                                                                                           (1) 
This model allows to test Hp1a and Hp1b on the interplay between mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure. According to hypotheses NF_SCORE is expected to be 
positively related with F_SCORE and negatively related with F_SCORE2. Table 10 
reports the results of the first set of regression analysis. 
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Table 10. The interplay between mandatory and voluntary disclosure 
    
(1) 
NF_SCORE 
F_SCORE  8.314** 
  (2.10) 
F_SCORE2  -9.435** 
  (-2.22) 
SD_RET  -0.265 
  (-0.99) 
ROE  -0.503* 
  (-1.75) 
SIZE  0.284*** 
  (6.53) 
LEV  -0.280*** 
  (-2.88) 
   
Intercept  No 
Country-fixed effects  Yes 
Obs.   111 
Table 10 reports the regression analysis on the interplay between mandatory and voluntary disclosure. 
The full sample comprises 111 unique firms belonging to the Oil&Gas industry from 14 EU countries 
in 2010. All regressions are glm (link logit function) *, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5%, 1% 
levels (two-tailed). In parentheses are reported z test statistics. See Table 6 for variables definitions. 
Consistent with the main prediction and in line with the results of univariate analysis, 
a U-shaped relationship between voluntary disclosure and mandatory disclosure is 
found. As expected, a positive and both economically and statistically significant 
relationship between NF_SCORE and F_SCORE (β1= 8.314) is observed, while a 
negative and significant association between NF_SCORE and F_SCORE2 (β2=-
9.435). These results suggest that firms with low mandatory risk disclosure tend to 
provide less voluntary information on non-financial risks. As the level of mandatory 
disclosure increases, firms start disclosing additional value relevant information that 
help investors interpreting the overall risk profile of the firm, thus fostering the 
reduction of information asymmetries in the market.  However, this positive 
relationship occurs up to a threshold. Above this point firms change their trade-off 
between the benefit of disclosing additional information and the associated 
proprietary costs. At high level of mandatory risk disclosure the unknown variance in 
the firm’s value is already low, being explained by the information mandated by the 
law102. Therefore, the costs of voluntarily disclosing information on other non-
                                                
102 It is recognized that this relationship can be shaped by the existence of other disclosures such as 
information provided by external analysts. However, previous literature has shown that analysts 
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financial risk factors overcome the benefits coming from a reduction in the 
information asymmetries, leading to a negative relationship between mandatory and 
voluntary risk disclosure103.  
Looking at the coefficient of control variables, a positive association between 
NF_SCORE and the proxy for firm size is observed, as predicted, suggesting that 
large firms exhibit higher level of voluntary risk disclosure, due to their lower 
proprietary costs and lower incentives to withhold information. On the contrary, 
more profitable and highly leveraged firms face more severe proprietary costs that 
prevent their voluntary disclosure activity. Finally, the degree of operating risk do 
not significantly affect the level of voluntary disclosure, at least for the sample firms. 
In sum, the results of this first analysis are consistent with the idea that voluntary 
disclosure strategies are strictly related to the level of mandatory disclosure, that in 
turn alters the trade-off between benefits and costs of voluntary disclosure. 
Specifically, the reported evidence corroborates the hypotheses of a complementary 
relationship between mandatory and voluntary disclosure at low level of mandatory 
disclosure (Hp1a), and a substitutive relationship between the two when the 
information environment is particularly rich (Hp1b).  
4.2.2. Analysis of the influence of firm-level and country-level incentives  
As second step of analysis, this study examines the cross-sectional determinants of 
voluntary disclosure choices, considering both the firm-level incentives coming from 
the board monitoring (Hp2) and country-level incentives related to the characteristics 
of the regulatory and enforcement regime (Hp3). In order to test hypotheses model 1 
is augmented including board variables and the institutional dummy (INST) to 
capture the marginal effect of the internal board-based monitoring and the external 
                                                                                                                                     
following is increasing in the firm size. To the extent that firm size does not control for these other 
information, the results can be overstated. 
103 In untabulated results a regression of NF_SCORE on F_SCORE is also performed and control is 
made by dividing sample firms in two subgroups according to the median of F_SCORE. Consistent 
with the main analysis, for firms with low F_SCORE the relationship between mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure is found to be complementary, while for firms with high F_SCORE it becomes 
substitutive. However a loss of significance is observed for the coefficient of interests probably 
induced by the limited sample size. 
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monitoring provided by the regulatory and enforcement regime over voluntary 
disclosure practices (model 2)104. 
NF_SCOREi= β0 + β1*F_SCOREi + β2*F_SCORE2i + β3*B_SIZEi + β4*B_SIZE2i + 
β5*INDi + β 6*AC_SIZEi + β 7*EXTi + β 8*D_CEODi + β 9*B_FEi + β 10*INSTi + 
β11*SD_RETi + β12*ROEi + β13*SIZEi + β14*LEVi +  εi                                                             (2) 
Table 11 shows results of the analysis that exploit the cross-sectional variation of 
voluntary disclosure practices according to firm and country-level incentives. 
Column (1) reports coefficients from a regression of NF_SCORE on board 
monitoring variables only; Column (2) report results of regression of NF_SCORE on 
board monitoring and institutional dummy; Column (3) report results of the full 
model considering the role played by mandatory disclosure strategies in addition to 
board-based and the country-level incentives105. Results from Column (1) show that 
the level of voluntary risk disclosure is increasing in almost all board monitoring 
variables. Specifically, NF_SCORE has a positive and significant association with 
the board size (β1=0.553). However, the relationship between board size and 
voluntary risk disclosure is a non-monotonic one, consistent with the idea that either 
small or large boards are both optimal in monitoring management disclosure 
decisions, according to the type of the firm (Coles et al., 2008). The percentage of 
independent directors is positively and significantly related with the disclosure of 
additional voluntary information on risk factors (β3=1.188), suggesting that more 
independent board is a better monitoring device of the managerial behaviour and 
tend to voluntarily increase the level of disclosure, over and above that which is 
mandated by law or stock exchange rules (Donnelly & Mucahy, 2008). According to 
the agency theorists, CEO duality is associated with lower levels of voluntary risk 
disclosures (β8=-0.573) since the board becomes more entrenched with the managers, 
being unable to limit the use of reporting discretion for their own purposes. 
                                                
104 Differently from model 1, model 2 does not include country-dummies when the grouping variable 
capturing the strength of the regulatory and enforcement regime is included to avoid multicollinearity 
problems.  
105 It is recognized that the board monitoring may also affect the level of mandatory disclosure 
provided by the firm. However, this research design is unable to control for this confounding effect. 
As further development, this research will rely on structural regression to take into account this 
endogeneity. 
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Nevertheless, neither the board structure, proxied by the size of the audit committee, 
nor the number of external appointment show a significant association with 
NF_SCORE. Finally, the expertise of directors does not play any role for the 
managers’ decision to provide voluntary risk disclosure.  
Table 11. Firm-level and country-level incentives 
          
    
(1) 
NF_SCORE 
(2) 
NF_SCORE 
(3) 
NF_SCORE 
F_SCORE    8.162** 
    (2.03) 
F_SCORE2    -9.685** 
    (-2.38) 
B_SIZE  0.553*** 0.589*** 0.563*** 
  (3.15) (3.69) (3.67) 
B_SIZE2  -0.027** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
  (-3.34) (-3.84) (-4.01) 
IND  1.188*** 1.209*** 1.1875*** 
  (3.31) (3.64) (3.63) 
AC_SIZE  0.576 0.913*** 0.993*** 
  (1.57) (3.05) (3.23) 
EXT  0.076 0.127 0.259** 
  (0.69) (1.04) (2.08) 
D_CEOD  -0.573* 0.198 0.158 
  (-1.86) (1.07) (0.78) 
B_FE  0.011 -0.042 0.019 
  (0.05) (-0.20) (0.09) 
INST   0.124 0.083 
   (0.58) (0.40) 
SD_RET  -0.351 -0.393 -0.425 
  (-1.41) (-1.35) (-1.61) 
ROE  -0.630** -0.666** -0.686** 
  (-2.17) (-2.46) (-2.53) 
SIZE  0.257*** 0.175*** 0.219*** 
  (4.66) (3.15) (3.67) 
LEV  -0.348*** -0.278*** -0.312*** 
  (-3.44) (-2.98) (-3.34) 
     
Intercept   No Yes Yes 
Country-fixed effects Yes No No 
Obs.   111 111 111 
Table 11 reports the regression analysis on the influence of firm- and country-level incentives on 
voluntary disclosure. The full sample comprises 111 unique firms belonging to the Oil&Gas industry 
from 14 EU countries in 2010. All regressions are glm (link logit function) *, **, *** denotes 
significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels (two-tailed). In parentheses are reported z test statistics. See Table 
6 for variables definitions. 
The sign and the significance of control variables is the same discussed for model 1. 
Overall, results from Column (1) are consistent with the hypothesis 2 predicting a 
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positive effect of firm-level incentives coming from board-based monitoring over 
voluntary disclosure practices. 
Next, the effect of country-level incentives on the firm decision to voluntary disclose 
information on risks not mandated by the existing rules is explored. Column (2) 
reports results of a regression including the dummy variable (INST) capturing 
characteristics of the institutional regime to the board monitoring variables and 
controls. The regression coefficient on board monitoring variables are similar to the 
ones shown in Column (1) either in the magnitude or in the significance with the 
only exception of AC_SIZE and D_CEOD, whose results seem reversing. In 
particular, considering the role played by the characteristics of the institutional 
environment, it appears that the monitoring provided by the audit committee 
becomes significant (β6=0.913), while the power of the CEO-Chairman does not play 
any significant role on voluntary risk disclosure strategies. More interestingly, the 
coefficient on the institutional variable is positive (β10=0.124) but not significant at 
any of the conventional level. This suggests that, contrary to this prediction, the 
country-level incentive related to the strength of the regulatory and enforcement 
regime plays no additional external monitoring on the managers decision to disclose 
non-mandatory risk information, beyond that internally exercised by the board of 
directors. This result, although counterintuitive, is in line with the conflicting 
evidence on the influence of the regulatory and enforcement regime over voluntary 
disclosure choices, and question the existence of a direct link between the external 
monitoring provided by the institution and voluntary risk disclosure practices. 
However, this does not necessarily means that the regulatory and enforcement 
regime does not matter for the relation under analysis. Indeed, it could be argued that 
the external environment does play a role on voluntary disclosure strategies, but 
indirectly, by affecting either the board-monitoring intensity or the enforcement of 
the existing rules on mandatory risk reporting. Therefore, this study will come back 
later on this issue, when examining the moderating role of the institutional 
environment for the influence of board monitoring and mandatory risk disclosure on 
the provision of voluntary information on risk. 
Finally, the full model 2 is run by also including the variable capturing the role of 
mandatory risk disclosure (Column 3). Not surprisingly, the sign of coefficients on 
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F_SCORE and F_SCORE2 repeats those of model 1, without any loose of 
significance. This suggests that the effect of mandatory risk disclosure on the trade-
off between disclosing and not disclosing additional non-mandatory risk information, 
still persists above and beyond the influence of board monitoring and institutional 
variables. Furthermore, in addition to the proxies of board monitoring that were 
significant in Column (2), the number of external appointments also reports a 
positive and significant coefficient (β7=0.258). This evidence supports the strand of 
literature that point out the benefits of having directors on multiple boards for the 
board monitoring activity and corporate transparency. By sitting on multiple board 
these directors may develop a wider experience in monitoring management (Kosnik, 
1987) and are also more likely to have greater incentives to be effective monitors of 
in order to preserve their reputation capital or improve their external labor market 
(Kaplan & Reishus, 1990). However, their monitoring role becomes significant only 
controlling for the influence of mandatory risk disclosure and the other cross-
sectional determinants of voluntary disclosure. 
To summarize, the analysis of the influence of firm-level and country-level 
incentives on voluntary disclosure confirms the prediction on the incentive effect of 
board-based monitoring for the managers decision to disclose information not 
mandated by law and other accounting rules (Hp2). Nevertheless, the results do not 
support Hp3 on the direct influence of the external monitoring provided by the 
institution over voluntary disclosure strategies. Finally, results from regression 
analysis in Column (3) corroborate Hp1a and Hp1b by documenting a highly 
significant U-shaped relationship between mandatory and voluntary disclosure 
strategies, even after controlling for the effect of board-based monitoring and the 
characteristics of the firm’s regulatory and enforcement environment. 
4.2.3. Analysis of the interaction between firm-level and country-level incentives 
So far, the effects of mandatory disclosure over voluntary disclosure strategies and 
the influence of both internal monitoring provided by the board of directors and 
external monitoring related to the institutional environment have been examined. 
However, as discussed in the previous section, no evidence is found consisting with 
the assumption of a direct relationship between country-level incentives and the 
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decision to disclose voluntary risk information. Therefore, as further step, this study 
analyzes the moderating effect of the institutional environment on the role played by 
internal monitoring and mandatory disclosure. It is anticipated that the strength of the 
regulatory and enforcement regime may have an indirect influence on voluntary 
disclosure strategies, by affecting the board-monitoring intensity (Hp4) and/or the 
enforcement of the existing rules for mandatory disclosure (Hp5). In order to test 
these hypotheses, board monitoring proxies are combined into one summary measure 
to interact with the institutional dummy (INST)106. Specifically, a factor  analysis is 
applied to the seven board monitoring variables and retain the first factor that 
exhibits an eigenvalue of 1.468 and explains the 98% of the total variance. Table 12 
provides the factor loadings and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling 
adequacy of the variables combined into the new factor variable (BOD_FACTOR). 
All variables (except from CEO duality) exhibit an acceptable KMO value (above 
0.5) according to the Kaiser (1974) scale.  
Table 12. Factor analysis  
          
     
Variable   Factor loadings kmo 
B_SIZE   0.7013 0.5896 
IND   0.2378 0.6176 
CEO_DUAL   -0.0160 0.4085 
EXT   0.5734 0.6964 
AC_SIZE   0.5699  0.6840 
B_FE   0.5162 0.5299 
     
Number of obs.:   111   
Eigen value:  1.4686   
Variation explained: 0.9841    
Overall kmo:  0.6073    
Table 12 reports results of the factor analysis. Kmo is the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling 
adequacy for variables including in the factor. The first factor is retained which is the only one having 
an eigenvalue greater than 1. The full sample comprises 111 unique firms belonging to the Oil&Gas 
industry from 14 EU countries in 2010. See Table 6 for variables definitions. 
Table 13 reports the descriptives for BOD_FACTOR and other variables used in this 
last set of this analysis. Descriptive statistics are reported for the full sample and the 
                                                
106 This study opts for a factor analysis of these measures instead of interacting any single variable 
with the institutional dummy to avoid multicollinearity problem coming from the presence of too 
many interaction terms. 
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two subgroups of firms belonging to countries with outside economies and strong 
regulatory/enforcement regime (cluster 1) and firms from inside economies and 
weaker institutional setting (cluster 2).  
Table 13. Descriptive statistics by level of regulatory and enforcement regime 
                    
  N mean min p25 p50 p75 max sd 
NF_SCORE  111 0.101 0 0.006 0.066 0.167 0.477 0.112 
 INST=1 66 0.102 0 0.020 0.075 0.153 0.412 0.101 
 INST=0 45 0.099 0 0 0.036 0.189 0.477 0.128 
F_SCORE  111 0.407 0.099 0.330 0.405 0.487 0.722 0.122 
 INST=1 66 0.387* 0.099 0.305 0.385 0.452  0.708 0.116 
 INST=0 45 0.437 0.182 0.369 0.454 0.519 0.722 0.125 
F_SCORE2  111 0.181 0.009 0.109 0.164 0.237 0.521 0.103 
 INST=1 66 0.163* 0.009  0.093 0.149 0.204 0.502 0.096 
 INST=0 45 0.207 0.033 0.136  0.206 0.269 0.521 0.108 
BOD_FACTOR  111 9.40e-10 -1.644 -0.509 -0.084 0.553 2.819 0.830 
 INST=1 66 -0.030 -1.644 -0.488 -0.034 0.367 1.984 0.744 
 INST=0 45 0.044 -1.497 -0.535 -0.163 0.621 2.819 0.950 
SD_RET  111 0.150 0.0125 0.022 0.033 0.050 6.402 0.796 
 INST=1 66 0.126 0.013 0.028 0.039 0.053 5.550 0.678 
 INST=0 45 0.185 0.012 0.019 0.026 0.034 6.402 0.950 
ROE  111 -0.083 -3.273 -0.137 -0.023 0.093 1.155 0.437 
 INST=1 66 -0.172* -3.273 -.0181 -0.041 0.024 0.413 0.481 
 INST=0 45 0.049 -0.948 -0.060 0.079 0.171 1.155 0.325 
SIZE  111 5.974 1.279 4.142 5.493 7.795 12.372 2.447 
 INST=1 66 5.023* 2.126 3.513 4.822 5.519 12.372 2.086 
 INST=0 45 7.369 1.279 5.885 7.725 8.820 12.158 2.279 
LEV  111 0.788 -6.691 0.149 .551 1.431 5.283 1.365 
 INST=1 66 0.492* -5.243 0.113 .293 0.639 5.283 1.097 
  INST=0 45 1.223 -6.691 0.778 1.431 2.086 4.616 1.599 
Table 13 reports the descriptive statistics for variables used in the analysis of the role of firm- and 
country-level incentives. The full sample comprises 111 unique firms belonging to the Oil&Gas 
industry from 14 EU countries in 2010. Sample firms are divided in two sub-groups, according to 
whether they belong to the Cluster 1 (INST=1) or Cluster 2 (INST=0). * denotes significance at 10% 
level (two-tailed). The p-values of the tests of differences in means for continuous variables are based 
on t-test. The p-values of the tests of differences in means for binary variables are based on test of 
proportions. See Table 6 for variables definitions. 
The starting point is a parsimonious model which regresses NF_SCORE on 
BOD_FACTOR and the institutional dummy. Then, still using the BOD_FACTOR 
previous models are augmented to include (i) the interaction terms between board 
factor and institutional dummy, (ii) the interaction between institutional dummy and 
F_SCORE and F_SCORE2, to take into account the moderating effect of 
institutional environment over both board monitoring and mandatory disclosure 
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(model 3). Again, country dummies are excluded given the partitioning of sample 
countries according to the strength of the regulatory and enforcement regime. 
NF_SCOREi= β 0 + β 1*F_SCOREi + β 2*F_SCORE2i + β 3*BOD_FACTORi + 
β4*INSTi + β 5*INST_BODFACTORi + β 6*INST_F_SCOREi + 
β7*INST_F_SCORE2i + β8*SD_RETi + β9*ROEi + β10*SIZEi + β11*LEVi + εi        (3) 
Table 14 provides results from the analysis of the interaction between firm-level 
incentives coming from the board monitoring intensity and country-level incentives 
related to the institutional environment. Column (1) reports results of the base model, 
while column (2) includes the interaction term between board monitoring and 
institutional dummy. Finally, column (3) reports the full regression with mandatory 
disclosure proxies by also allowing these coefficients to vary according to the 
strength of the regulatory and enforcement regime.  
Table 14. The interaction between firm-and country-level incentives  
          
    
        (1) 
NF_SCORE 
      (2) 
NF_SCORE 
               (3) 
NF_SCORE 
     
F_SCORE    79.842** 
    (2.41) 
F_SCORE2    -67.044** 
    (-2.36) 
BOD_FACTOR  0.318** 0.323** 0.287** 
  (2.53)  (2.54) (2.06) 
INST 0.238 0.287 22.206** 
  (1.24) (1.15) (2.31) 
INST_BOD_FACTOR  -0.059 0.185 
   (-0.31) (0.84) 
INST_F_SCORE   -72.189** 
    (-2.16) 
INST_F_SCORE2   56.574** 
    (1.96) 
SD_RET  -0.306 -0.304 -0.178 
  (-0.75) (-0.76) (-0.64) 
ROE  -0.568** -0.578** -0.477* 
  (-2.11 ) ( -2.10) (-1.95) 
SIZE  0.222*** 0.231*** 0.231*** 
  (4.25) (3.84) (3.87) 
LEV  -0.206** -0.209** -0.125 
  (-2.40) (-2.38) (-1.55) 
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Test on coeff.       
(β3+β5)=0  - 0.2159 0.0280 
(β1+β6)=0  - - 0.0887 
(β2+β7)=0  - - 0.0313 
Intercept  Yes Yes Yes 
Country-fixed effects No No No 
Obs.  111 111 111 
Table 14 reports the regression analysis on the interaction between firm-and country-level incentives 
and their influence on voluntary disclosure. The full sample comprises 111 unique firms belonging to 
the Oil&Gas industry from 14 EU countries in 2010. All regressions are glm (link logit function) *, 
**, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels (two-tailed). In parentheses are reported z test 
statistics. See Table 6 for variables definitions. 
Consistent with the analysis in section 4.2.2, the first regression shows a positive and 
significant effect of board-based monitoring over voluntary risk disclosure 
(β3=0.318), while a positive but not significant effect of the institutional dummy 
(Column 1). Next, the coefficient on board factor is allowed to vary across the 
dummy variable, in order to test whether the internal board-based monitoring over 
voluntary disclosure choices differs according to the strength of the regulatory and 
enforcement regime (Hp4). Column 2 of table 14 reports results of this interaction. 
The coefficient on BOD_FACTOR still remains positive and significant (β3=0.323), 
while the coefficient on the interaction term INST_BOD_FACTOR is negative but 
not significant at a conventional level (β5=-0.059). This suggests that voluntary risk 
disclosure is increasing in board-based monitoring only in countries with weak legal 
and enforcement regime (cluster 2). On the contrary, the total effect of board-based 
monitoring on voluntary disclosure for firms belonging to cluster 1 (β3+β5) is 
positive but not significant107. Therefore, the interpretation of these results is that in 
countries with strong institutional environment the internal monitoring provided by 
the board of directors does not play any additional role on the level of voluntary risk 
disclosure. Finally, column (3) reports results of the full model adding mandatory 
disclosure proxies, to test whether institutional forces has an indirect effect on 
mangers decision to disclose additional information, by influencing the degree of 
enforcement of the existing rules for mandatory risk disclosure. The coefficient on 
F_SCORE is still positive and significant (β1=79.842), suggesting a complementary 
                                                
107 The results of the Wald test on the INST and INST_BOD_FACTOR coefficients, do not allow to 
reject the hypothesis that they are jointly equal to 0. 
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relationship between mandatory and voluntary disclosure in weak institutional 
environment, when the amount of mandated risk information available to the market 
is low. However, the coefficient on the interaction term between F_SCORE and 
INST is negative (β6=-72.189), thus documenting a decreasing marginal effect of 
mandatory disclosure for voluntary disclosure strategies in countries with strong 
regulatory and enforcement regime. Similarly, the negative coefficient on 
F_SCORE2 (β2= -67.044) supports the substitution hypothesis between mandatory 
and voluntary disclosure for firms belonging to weak institutional regime. However, 
the marginal effect for firms from cluster 1 is positive and significative (β7=56.574). 
Despite the marginal effects for countries with strong regulatory and enforcement 
regime, the total effect of mandatory risk disclosure for the provision of voluntary 
risk information still behaves in the predicted fashion. Summing up coefficients on 
the main effects and the interaction terms, a positive relationship between mandatory 
and voluntary risk disclosure at a low level of mandatory disclosure (β1+β6=7.651) is 
still obtained, that becomes negative at a high level of mandatory disclosure (β2+β7=-
9.470), even though the magnitude of the coefficients is lower than the one reported 
for firms in weak institutional regime108.  
To conclude, the evidence partially confirms Hp4 on the substitution between internal 
and external monitoring for the managers decision to disclose additional information 
non mandated by the laws. Moreover, consistent with Hp5 it appears that the strength 
of the institutional environment also moderates the relationship between mandatory 
disclosure and voluntary disclosure. Specifically, a U-shaped relationship between 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure is observed both in weak and strong institutional 
setting. However, since the information environment is extremely rich for all the 
firms belonging to cluster 1 due to the higher level of enforcement of the existing 
rules, the effect of the cross-sectional variation among firm-specific level of 
mandatory disclosure is more attenuated, relative to one observed in countries with 
weak institutional regime.  
                                                
108 The test on the joint significance of the coefficients is significant in both cases. A likelihood-ratio 
test is also performed on the full model and the constrained model without the interaction term to test 
the hypothesis that the coefficient interaction term are all equal to 0. This test also confirms the main 
results.  
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5. Conclusion 
Most existing studies on voluntary disclosure do not consider its interaction with the 
information mandated by the law (Einhorn, 2005). This research tries to disentagle 
the nature of the relationship between mandatory and voluntary disclosure, by 
analyzing mandatory and voluntary risk information provided by a sample of EU 
Oil&Gas companies. The proxies for mandatory and voluntary risk disclosure are 
self-constructed disclosure indices capturing the extent of mandatory information on 
financial risk and voluntary information on non-financial risk factors.  
The first main result is the existence of a non-monotonic relationship between 
mandatory and voluntary risk disclosure. A significant positive association between 
the voluntary risk disclosure index and the mandatory risk disclosure index is found 
that becomes negative when the association between voluntary risk disclosure and 
the squared value of mandatory risk disclosure index is analyzed. These results are 
consistent with a complementary relationship between mandatory and voluntary 
information, at a low level of mandatory disclosure. However, when the information 
mandated by the law becomes particularly high, the relationship between them turns 
to a substitutive one. 
Recognizing that voluntary disclosure also depends upon managerial incentives, this 
study then examines the influence of firm-level incentives coming from the board 
monitoring over voluntary disclosure choices and country-level incentives related to 
the regulatory environments. It is found that while voluntary disclosure is increasing 
in the board-based monitoring, its relationship with the external monitoring provided 
by the institutions is positive but not significant. Next, the potential for a moderating 
role of the institutional environment is exploited. Weak evidence is found that the 
strong regulatory and enforcement regime play a role in shaping the relationship 
between either board-monitoring and voluntary disclosure choices. On the contrary, 
it is observed that the effect of mandatory disclosure for voluntary disclosure seems 
to be stronger in countries with weak institutional environment. These results support 
the view that strong institutional environment reduces the influence of firm-specific 
mandatory disclosure on voluntary disclosure strategies due to the higher level of 
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enforcement of mandatory disclosure regulation, that in turn reduces the variance 
across firm-specific level of compliance to mandated disclosure rules. 
Taken together, this study’s evidence suggests that firms use voluntary disclosure to 
complement the information in mandatory filings. Therefore, firms with poor 
mandatory disclosure tend not to disclose additional value-relevant information, due 
to the credibility issue. When the level of mandatory disclosure increases it creates 
an environment in which firms may credibly convey their private information. 
However, this complementary relationship occurs up to a threshold, above that it 
starts reversing, since the costs of disclosing additional proprietary information 
overcome its benefits. The results also suggest that the documented relationship 
between mandatory and voluntary disclosure still persists even after controlling for 
the firm-level and the country-level determinants of voluntary disclosure strategies.  
This study is closely related to the theoretical study on the interaction between 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure (Eihnorn, 2005; Bagnoli & Watts, 2007), 
providing empirical evidence on the nature of such a relationship. It also adds to the 
risk disclosure literature by exploring the role of both internal board monitoring and 
external monitoring provided by the institutions, and the interplay among them 
(Abraham & Cox, 2007; Linsley & Lawrence, 2007; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; 
Berretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Amran et al., 2009; Berretta et al., 2010). 
The results of this study have important theoretical and practical implications. One 
implication is that firms voluntary disclosure strategies cannot be studied without 
taking into account the impact of their mandatory disclosures. Correspondingly, 
regulators cannot evaluate the impact of new regulation for mandatory disclosure, 
without considering their influence on the firm-specific mix between mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure. In addition, this study sheds light on the potential externalities 
coming from regulatory changes. The evidence indicates that when the information 
environment is particularly rich, a new regulation that reduces the scope of 
mandatory information, may have positive externalities on voluntary disclosure. 
Conversely, regulatory requirements that lead to a more expansive mandatory 
disclosure may produce negative externalities on voluntary disclosure, by reducing 
the firms net benefit of providing additional value relevant information.  
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This study is also subject to several limitations that suggests a number of other 
venues for future research. The most important challenge of this work is the 
endogeneity that characterizes firms decision to voluntary provide information, 
mandatory reporting choices and the characteristics of the internal and external 
governance mechanisms. One important extension would be to build more robust 
statistical test (3SLS) to take into account also the endogenous nature of corporate 
governance and disclosure. Another significative limitation of this study is the 
limited generalizability of the evidence because of the choice to analyze one year and 
one industry only. Thus, a natural improvement of this work would be to check for 
the robustness of these results across different industries and years. Finally, in this 
study the focus has been on the two most important channels of communication 
between firm and investors (mandatory and voluntary annual report disclosure). 
However, it should be noted that firms may mitigate information asymmetries 
through several other channels such as management forecasts, press releases, 
conference calls. In addition, third party information (i.e. information diffused by 
external analysts) may play a significative role. Therefore, future research on the 
relationship between mandatory and voluntary disclosure in capital markets should 
consider the interactions among all these different information channels. 
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 1. Introduction 
In a context of growing competitiveness and scarce resources disclosure on 
environmental issues and, more in general CSR activities, has become of increasing 
relevance not only for the external community but also for capital market 
participants. Empirical studies suggest that it translates into a decrease of the cost of 
equity capital, an increase in the firm’s value and a decrease in the analyst forecast 
error (Aerts et al., 2008; Plumlee et al., 2008; Dhaliwal et al., 2011). Such evidence 
would explain why there has been a growing diffusion of this type of disclosures 
either in the annual report or in ad-hoc stand-alone reporting (Bebbington et al., 
2008; Simnett et al., 2009). A recent survey conducted by KPMG (2011) points out 
that 95 percent out of the 250 largest global companies now report on their CSR 
activities.  
At the same time, a debate has opened in the academic literature over its potential for 
increasing firms’ accountability towards stakeholders, versus being just another tool 
for corporate public relations (Cho et al., 2012). For instance, anecdotal evidence 
shows that companies engaging in unscrupulous business practices (e.g. oil 
companies) may turn to environmental disclosure as a form of promotional strategy, 
to counter the negative public sentiments in the aftermath of environmental disasters 
(Du & Vieira, 2012). In these cases, the discrepancy between the declared intentions 
and the environmental consequence of their actions results in a sense of skepticism 
about their real commitment toward CSR strategies. According to this perspective, 
environmental reporting is considered a tool to cheat on stakeholders, hide the firm’s 
detrimental impact on local communities, and ultimately manage organizational 
legitimacy (Woolfson & Beck, 2005).  
A factor that further contributes to this skepticism is the still voluntary and 
unregulated nature of environmental disclosure. In the U.S setting109 according to the 
                                                
109 According to the requirements relating to environmental disclosure in SEC filings, a duty to 
disclose actual or potential environmental liabilities in SEC filings may arise under: (i) the specific 
disclosure requirements of Regulation S-K promulgated under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended 
(the “Securities Act”); (ii) the general antifraud provisions of the Securities Act or the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”); (iii) and the requirements of Form 20-F with respect to 
foreign private issuers filing annual reports or registration statements pursuant to the Securities Act or 
the Exchange Act. Moreover there are several accounting standards and guidance governing 
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existing disclosure requirements in Regulation S-K and accounting guidance (i.e. 
FAS 5), companies are required to disclose a variety of environmental information. 
Nevertheless, securities regulations and accounting standards do not specifically 
address the way in which this information should be presented. Therefore, managers 
may engage in a number of communication tactics that can enhance the 
informativeness of such disclosure, but also increase their potential for controlling or 
manipulating the impression conveyed to external stakeholders (Clatworthy & Jones, 
2001).  
Motivated by these factors, the aim of this study is to investigate whether managers 
use environmental disclosure opportunistically to affect the users perception of 
corporate achievement (i.e. impression management), or rather provide useful 
information for predicting future environmental performance. Moreover, it explores 
whether and to what extent the informativeness of discretionary disclosure strategies 
varies according to reporting incentives coming from the board of directors’ 
characteristics. 
This study analyzes a sample of firms listed in the US Stock Exchange in 2009 and 
2010, belonging to the Oil & Gas industry. The Oil & Gas is one of the most 
controversial industries, at the heart of the public debate around companies’ 
environmental violations and abuses. Therefore, for these companies environmental 
disclosure may serve as an effective tool for gaining a broader social acceptance, 
ensuring the continuous flow of resources and contribute to their long-term 
prosperity (De Roeck & Delobbe, 2012). 
This analysis starts by recognizing that discretionary disclosure strategies in narrative 
sections of corporate documents can be used either for impression management or 
for incremental information purposes. Most of the research on environmental 
disclosure with few exceptions (Clarkson et al., 2008), seems to ignore this duality 
and often implicitly adopts the opportunistic view (Neu et al., 1998; Cho et al., 2010; 
Jones, 2011). This approach, however, may be misleading unless one can 
demonstrate that discretionary choices in corporate environmental disclosure reflects 
                                                                                                                                     
environmental liabilities (i.e. FAS 5) [Davis Polk, Environmental Disclosure in SEC Filing, Jan. 21, 
2009]. 
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managerial opportunistic behavior aiming at exploiting information asymmetries 
through engaging in biased reporting. Therefore, this study attempts to differentiate 
between these two perspectives, analyzing the relationship between manager’s use of 
language and future environmental performance. 
Specifically, the focus is on the bias towards positive tone and formulate two 
alternative hypotheses. The incremental information hypothesis posits that managers 
use optimistic tone in environmental disclosure to signal expected positive future 
environmental performance. Conversely, under the impression management 
hypothesis, managers would use optimistic tone to conceal expected negative future 
environmental performance. The empirical results support the incremental 
information hypothesis, documenting that sample firms use optimism in 
environmental disclosures to signal future positive environmental performance.  
Next, this study exploits the cross sectional variation across board of directors 
characteristics to investigate their influence on the tone’s informativeness. This 
occurs following a recent stream of literature that investigates the relationship 
between discretion in corporate narratives and some corporate governance 
characteristics, mainly related to the board of directors. These studies find that board 
monitoring constrains managerial incentives to engage in discretionary disclosure 
strategies (Abrahamson & Park, 1994; García Osma & Guillamón-Saorín, 2011). 
However, recent research points out that, other than board monitoring, the board 
stakeholder orientation plays a role in shaping environmental disclosure (Mallin et 
al., 2012). The analysis of the use of language in environmental disclosures is added 
to this literature and, considering either the impression management or the 
incremental information hypothesis, it is anticipated that strong board monitoring 
and stakeholder orientation lead managers to use the tone bias in environmental 
disclosure not to mislead stakeholders, but rather to convey truthful information. 
To examine the influence of board monitoring and stakeholder orientation on the 
informativeness of tone, both separately and simultaneously, some agency- and 
resource dependence-measures of the board characteristics are combined in two 
different factors. Then, the firms are partitioned according to the sample median of 
these factors, and using a matrix format, four clusters are created corresponding to 
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different “board types” (effective monitored - stakeholder oriented; effective 
monitored - not stakeholder oriented; ineffective monitored – stakeholder oriented; 
ineffective monitored – not stakeholder oriented). It is predicted, and found, that the 
contemporaneous presence of board monitoring and stakeholder orientation pushes 
effective monitored & stakeholder oriented firms to use more optimistic language to 
truthfully convey information on future environmental performance, thus both 
meeting stakeholders’ societal expectations and providing market participants with 
effective signal on future superior environmental performance. 
Finally, this study investigates whether the main results are driven by the mandatory 
nature of 10-K environmental disclosure, performing an additional analysis on 
environmental disclosure in press releases. Press releases are different in nature and 
scope, being also subject to lower litigation risk (Aerts & Cormier, 2009; Guillamon-
Saorin et al., 2012). Therefore, it is anticipated that managers can be strategic in their 
choice of language in environmental press releases. The Heckman model is used to 
control for selectivity in the firms’ decision to issue an environmental press release 
(Guillamon-Saorin et al., 2012) and it is still found that managers use optimistic tone 
in environmental press releases to predict future environmental performance. 
Therefore, these results suggest that managers’ language choices do not differ across 
alternative disclosure media. 
The research contributes in several ways to the literature and the practice. First of all, 
it answers the recent call in the disclosure literature for incorporating both 
possibilities (impression management vs. incremental information) into research 
design aiming at investigating the discretionary disclosure strategies in corporate 
narratives (Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007).  
Second, it does not only assesses the extent of discretion in environmental reporting, 
but it also identifies some corporate governance dimensions that may affect the 
informative - rather than opportunistic - role, thus contributing also to the corporate 
governance literature. By combining two different theories to explain the board of 
directors’ influence on the informativeness of the tone, it is also possible to 
investigate the influence of two roles of the board both simultaneously and in 
isolation. This evidence indicates that corporate board significantly affects disclosure 
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tone in environmental narratives only when they exhibit both strong monitoring and 
high stakeholder orientation. 
Finally, this research contributes to the literature’s debate on whether CSR disclosure 
is more about increased transparency or corporate image manipulation (Cho et al., 
2012). In line with prior work (Mallin et al., 2012) it is found that the presence of 
stakeholder oriented boards increases the ability of external stakeholders to enforce 
their environmental claims, forcing managers to transparent communication and 
avoiding unduly optimistic disclosures. 
Moreover, these results could provide investors with valuable insight to interpret 
managers’ use of language in corporate narratives. While it is not provided a general 
examination of disclosure tone, the evidence on environmental disclosure suggests 
that managers use optimistic language to truthful reveal their private information 
about future firm performance. These results also contribute to the regulators’ debate 
on whether and under what conditions managers should be held legally accountable 
for qualitative disclosures in general, and linguistic choices in particular. It is shown 
that, at least in a high litigation environment, the inherent flexibility of the language 
provides firms with the opportunity to achieve a further reduction of information 
asymmetries, avoiding the costs of a tight regulation on disclosures. However, this 
evidence also stresses the importance of shareholder litigation as an external control 
mechanism in limiting managers’ opportunistic disclosure choices. (Rogers et al., 
2011) 
The research is structured as follows. The following paragraph reviews relevant 
literature and develop testable hypotheses. The third paragraph details research 
design, discussing sample data and describing measures used in the empirical 
analysis. The forth paragraph presents descriptive and regression results, while the 
fifth concludes with a discussion of the main implications, limitations of this study 
and avenues for future research. 
 
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses 
This study combines three different areas of research: environmental disclosure; 
impression management and corporate governance. This paragraph starts by 
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reviewing different theoretical perspectives on the use of discretionary disclosure 
strategies. Then, it introduces the thematic manipulation of disclosure through the 
use of language and formulate the first set of hypotheses. Finally, it discusses the 
influence of the board of directors’ attributes in addressing the informativeness of 
language in environmental reporting and posits the second set of hypotheses.  
 
2.1 Discretionary strategies in environmental disclosure 
Discretionary disclosure strategies can be explained in the light of two competing 
views: the incremental information vs. impression management arguments (Merkl-
Davies & Brennan, 2007). 
According to agency theory, disclosure mitigates information asymmetries and 
agency costs between insiders and outsiders (Verrecchia, 2001). Therefore, managers 
exploit discretion in corporate narratives to truthfully convey additional value-
relevant information in order to reduce the cost of capital and increase the market 
value of the firm (Healy & Palepu, 2001). This perspective is known in literature as 
the incremental information argument and assumes that managers have no economic 
incentives to engage in opportunistically biased reporting, since the market is able to 
assess bias, punishing the firm with low share price performance (Clarkson et al., 
2010).  
Nevertheless, another stream of literature suggests that managers may successfully 
engage in self-serving communication tactics to influence prices because the market 
is unable to assess reporting bias, at least in the short term (Impression management) 
(Clatworthy & Jones, 2001). The impression management view is grounded either in 
agency theory or in socio-political theories (e.g. legitimacy theory, stakeholder 
theory). Under agency theory, opportunistic managers might obfuscate failures and 
emphasize success to enhance their reputation and compensation, avoiding the 
negative consequences of poor performance. From a different point of view, socio-
political theories argue that managers use impression management strategies to alter 
the user’s perception of corporate achievements in an attempt to convince 
stakeholders to accept the management’s view of society (Hooghiemstra, 2000). 
Although impression management literature stems from different theoretical 
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frameworks, the main argument is that managers self-servingly use the discretion in 
corporate communication to manipulate public’ impression of the company, rather 
than conveying truthful information.  
Although there are a few studies that attempt to differentiate between incremental 
information and impression management arguments (Lang & Lundholm, 2000; 
Barton & Mercer, 2005; Bowen et al., 2005), research on environmental disclosure 
seems to ignore this duality, and, with few exceptions (Clarkson et al., 2008, 2010), 
often adopt an impression management perspective. For instance, analyzing a sample 
of 33 publicly traded Canadian companies from 1982 to 1991, Neu et al. (1998) 
claim that “the textually-mediated environmental disclosures contained in annual 
reports provide organizations with an effective method of managing public 
impression” (Neu et al., 1998: 279). Jones (2011) examines the selective inclusion of 
graphs and the distortion of graphs in social and environmental and finds that 
companies from high impact industries tend to be more selective, trying to present 
relatively more good news than bad news. Cho et al. (2012) find evidence of both 
enhancement and obfuscation in the graph displayed in corporate sustainability 
reports. These aforementioned studies interpret the use of discretionary disclosure 
strategies in environmental reporting as opportunistic managerial behavior, aiming at 
self-servingly biasing information through decisions on the amount of information, 
the range of topics, and the rhetorical devices to be included in such disclosure.   
Nevertheless, this interpretation may be premature unless one can first assess 
whether discretionary strategies in corporate narratives provide truthful information 
about future firm performance or are an impression management tool. To discern 
between these two alternative views, the focus is on the verbal tone in environmental 
reporting, investigating its association with measures of future environmental 
performance. 
 
2.2 Disclosure tone: incremental information or impression management? 
Managers can adopt different discretionary strategies in corporate narratives: 
disclosure choices on quantity, thematic content and attribution of organizational 
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outcomes, choices on presentation and diffusion of information (Merkl-Davies & 
Brennan, 2007).  
Previous studies on environmental disclosure mainly focus on the amount and the 
characteristics (Neu et al., 1998; Hughes et al., 2001), the thematic content (Cho & 
Patten, 2007) as well as visual and structural presentation of disclosure (Cho et al., 
2012). However, the wide diffusion and the increase in the length of environmental 
disclosures (KPMG, 2011) shed light on another key dimension of corporate 
communication: the use of language and verbal tone (Cho et al., 2010).  
Disclosure tone (i.e. the use of optimistic versus pessimistic language) is a 
characteristic of the narrative disclosure that is captured through the use of nouns, 
adjectives, or verbs that express different sentiments (Sydserff & Weetman, 1999). 
According to Davis et al. (2012) language use and verbal tone is an important 
element of the information package of the firm. It provides a unifying framework for 
disclosures, that affect how market participants process the information but also how 
they perceive and understand it (Morris et al., 2005). However, this aspect of 
disclosure is by nature largely unregulated, thus leaving managers an inherent 
flexibility that can be used either to signal their expectations about future 
performance or to opportunistically manage the impression of market participants 
about the firm. Prior work on the information content of disclosure tone reports 
mixed results, some supporting the incremental information argument, while others 
the impression management view. 
Research arguing that tone is incrementally informative for market participants 
(Incremental information school) shows that it is significantly associated with both 
current and future firm performance. Demers & Vega (2010) find that language in 
management quarterly earnings press releases is incrementally informative over the 
contemporaneously available “hard” information. Davis & Tama-Sweet (2012) find 
that a higher level of pessimistic language is associated with lower future firm 
performance. Davis et al. (2012) find a significant association between “optimism” 
in earnings press releases and future firm performance, and conclude that the 
language has information content beyond the quantitative disclosures. They also 
document that investors respond to this incremental information. 
WHY ARE MANAGERS OPTIMISTIC? AN INVESTIGATION OF CORPORATE 
ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE TONE 
 
 143 
Nevertheless, as disclosure tone is relatively costless and difficult to detect, it 
provides managers with the opportunity to engage in opportunistic behavior aiming 
at influencing market’s perception about future firm performance. Therefore, another 
stream of literature points out that the language may serve as an impression 
management strategy to alter and/or manipulate users perception of corporate 
achievements (Impression management school). According to Merkel-Davis & 
Brennan (2007) the bias towards reporting good news vs. bad news represents a type 
of thematic manipulation that is known as “concealment” behavior, through which 
managers may obfuscate failures (obfuscation) and emphasize success (image 
enhancement). Consistently, Land & Lundholm (2000) find that managers use 
language to “hype” their stock before seasoned equity offerings. Cho et al. (2010) 
document that the worst environmental performers use more “optimism” (image 
enhancement) and less “certainty” (obfuscation) in their environmental disclosure 
than better performing peers. 
Given this conflicting evidence, this study empirically investigates whether the 
“optimism” in environmental disclosure is a discretionary strategy to provide 
incremental information rather than being an impression management tool, by 
formulating two alternative hypotheses on its association with future environmental 
performance.  
In line with the incremental information school, it is argued that if managers use the 
language of environmental disclosure to communicate truthful, value-relevant 
information, they will bias the tone of corporate narratives to align investors’ 
expectation about future performance to their own assessment (Ajinkya & Gift, 
1984). Therefore, managers anticipating positive environmental performance will use 
more optimistic language to convey their future expectation to shareholders. Thus, 
the following hypothesis is formulated (Incremental information hypothesis). 
HP1a Ceteris paribus, the “optimism” in corporate environmental disclosure is 
positively associated with future environmental performance 
Conversely, from an impression management perspective, managers may self-
servingly bias environmental disclosure to pursue their own benefits at the expense 
of the informativeness of such disclosure and/or to face threats of legitimacy. In such 
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a setting, the more the firm performance differs from a desired benchmark, the more 
the management is motivated to adopt opportunistic language choices to alter 
stakeholders’ impression of corporate achievements (Cho et al., 2010). Therefore, 
managers, anticipating poor environmental performance, are expected to use more 
“optimistic” language in environmental disclosure. Then, the following alternative 
hypothesis is formulated (Opportunistic impression management hypothesis).  
HP1b Ceteris paribus, the “optimism” in corporate environmental disclosure is 
negatively associated with future environmental performance 
 
2.3 The influence of board monitoring and stakeholder orientation 
Environmental disclosure is, however, part of the overall disclosure strategy that is 
determined by a cost-benefit assessment (Cormier & Magnam, 1999). Therefore, 
whether firms use tone as an informative strategy rather than an impression 
management tool should depend on the incentives that managers have when deciding 
to disclose truthfully rather than opportunistically. As disclosure emanates from the 
board (Haniffa & Cooke 2005; Cheng & Courtenay 2006; Cerbioni & Parbonetti 
2007; Michelon & Parbonetti 2010), the focus is on that part of incentives stemming 
from the board of directors’ characteristics.  
Traditionally, studies on the influence of board of directors on corporate 
transparency emphasize the monitoring or control role of the board of directors 
(Johnson et al., 1996; Zahra & Pearce 1989). This literature, rooted in agency theory, 
claims that the primary role of the board is to monitor mangers ensuring that they 
behave in the shareholders’ interests. Because disclosure is selective and self-
interested managers may exploit reporting discretion to conceal or distort 
information, the monitoring of the board is essential in ensuring high level of firm 
transparency (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Within the agency framework, a well 
developed strand of literature examines whether board of directors’ attributes, such 
as board size and structure or the board-CEO relationship mitigate opportunistic 
management behavior in the context of quantitative mandatory information (Beasley, 
1996; Peasnell et al., 2005). 
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However, studies on the influence of board of directors on discretionary disclosure 
strategies are much more limited. Abrahamson & Park (1994) document that outside 
directors, large institutional investors, and accountants constrain the concealment of 
negative organizational outcomes in the president letters. Mather & Ramsay (2007) 
find that board independence limits the selective inclusion of graphs in financial 
reports and the distortion of the graphs’ construction. Analyzing a broader set of 
impression management measures, García Osma & Guillamón-Saorín (2011) find 
that the strength of corporate governance (proxied by characteristics of structure and 
functioning of the board of directors) constrains managerial incentives to bias the 
presentation and the diffusion of information in ARPR, thus reducing the extent of 
impression management.  
This study bases its prediction on this literature, but going one step further, it 
recognizes that discretionary strategies in corporate narratives may also fulfill an 
informative rather than an opportunistic role. Therefore, it is predicted that strong 
board-based monitoring reduces the managers incentives to opportunistically exploit 
reporting discretion in order to manipulate outsider’s impressions, but increases the 
likelihood that they will engage in informative discretionary strategies to boost the 
corporate communication. In other words, it is anticipated that board monitoring 
intensity will push manager to language choices in environmental reporting that 
convey truthful value-relevant information about future environmental performance. 
This, in turn, lead to the following hypothesis: 
HP2 Ceteris paribus, board monitoring intensity is positively associated with the 
informativeness of the tone in environmental disclosure. 
Nevertheless, according to the resource dependence theory, the board is assigned 
another important function: the service role (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003)110. Within this 
framework directors, because of their prestige in the profession and community, are 
able to extract resources vital to the corporation (e.g. information, ties, legitimacy), 
reducing the transaction costs associated with the environmental uncertainty (Pfeffer, 
1972). Therefore, the importance of the board of directors is strictly related to its 
                                                
110 A third role assigned to the board of directors is the strategic role. As the examination of the 
strategic role of directors is outside the scope of this analysis, see Pugliese et al. (2009) for a complete 
review. 
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ability to establish linkages with external environment, through which it may 
represent the firm in the community, thus enhancing organizational legitimacy and 
reputation (Daily & Dalton, 1994; Hambrick & D’Abeni, 1992)111. Mallin et al. 
(2012) point out that the service role of the board with respect to stakeholders gives 
rise to a further dimension of the board activity, which becomes particularly 
important in the context of environmental reporting: the “stakeholder orientation”.  
This dimension captures the ability of the board of directors to fulfill its fiduciary 
duties not only towards the owners, but also towards all the firm’s stakeholders, by 
responding to their various and diverse expectations. For instance, a board composed 
of directors who are highly reputed in the community, or with a greater variation 
among its members may increase the degree to which stakeholders enforce their 
claims because they are likely to be proposed by relevant stakeholders and their 
interests are more closely aligned with the external community (Kassinis & Vafeas, 
2002). This, in turn, fosters the corporate social responsibility (Sacconi, 2006) and 
enhances the organizational legitimacy (Ullmann, 1985; Zattoni, 2011). Michelon & 
Parbonetti (2010) argue that the stakeholders-legitimacy perspective of directors’ 
role can be considered complementary to the agency-based view of the board, and 
help explain the influence of board of directors on social and environmental 
disclosure. Haniffa & Cooke (2005) find that non-executive directors can put 
pressure on companies to engage in social and environmental disclosure to ensure the 
congruence between organizational actions and societal values or organizational 
legitimacy. In the analysis of the corporate governance path leading to social and 
environmental disclosure, Mallin et al. (2012), find that stakeholder-oriented 
governance mechanisms lead to higher environmental performance, and eventually 
to more transparent environmental disclosure112.  
Therefore, the stakeholder orientation of the board is expected to play a role also in 
shaping managerial language choices in environmental disclosure. Specifically, it is 
                                                
111 Also from a legalistic perspective the service role of the board involves enhancing company 
reputation, establishing contact with the external environment, giving counsel and advice to 
executives (Carpenter, 1988; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
112 Mallin et al. (2012) examine the determinants of the social and environmental disclosure taking 
into account dimensions of the corporate governance that go beyond the role of the board of directors, 
such as the nature and the concentration of the ownership. However, as this study is interested only in 
the effect of the board of directors, the characteristics of the board will be only considered.  
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anticipated that stakeholder-oriented boards push managers to bias disclosure tone in 
order to convey additional truthful environmental information addressing various 
social, environmental and ethical expectations, thus improving the informativeness 
of this type of communication for the broader community of stakeholders. Moreover, 
their role goes beyond  improving the information flow between managers and 
outsiders. Minority representative directors, directors’ community prestige and 
connections may themselves enhance the firm’s status in the business community 
(Unerman & Bennett, 2004). This will prevent future legitimacy threats, which, in 
turn, reduces the need to engage in impression management strategies aiming at 
facing firm’s legitimacy gap. Thus, the following hypothesis is posited: 
HP3 Ceteris paribus, the board stakeholder orientation is positively associated with 
the informativeness of the tone in environmental disclosure. 
 
3. Research Method 
3.1 Sample and data collection 
A sample of firms listed in the US Stock Market in the 2009 and 2010 belonging to 
the Oil & Gas industry is selected. The focus is on the Oil & Gas industry since it is 
one of most controversial environmentally sensitive industries, at the heart of the 
public debate around companies’ environmental violations and abuses. Therefore, for 
these companies environmental disclosure plays a very significant role for gaining a 
broader social acceptance, ensure the continuous flow of resources and contribute to 
their long-term prosperity (De Roeck & Delobbe, 2012). The choice of the sample is 
also driven by recent studies documenting a large diffusion among Oil & Gas 
companies of several communication tactics to boost the effectiveness of CSR-
related information (Du & Vieira, 2012). 
This initial sample comprises all companies from Compustat Global dataset. Next,  
US companies operating in the Oil & Gas industry are selected by using the two-digit 
SIC code classification. Then, companies that are not listed in KLD’s SOCRATES 
database are eliminated. Finally, companies for which it it not possible to collect 10-
K filings and other required documents are eliminated,  as well as companies with 
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missing data for the financial and governance variables. The total number of the 
firm-years observation is equal 226, corresponding to 113 unique firms. (Table 1). 
Table 1. Sample distribution 
        
 Year  
SIC-code 2009 2010 Total  
    
1311 64 64 128 
1381 8 8 16 
1382 3 3 6 
1389 8 8 16 
2911 11 11 22 
4922 2 2 4 
4923 7 7 14 
4924 10 10 20 
    
Total 113 113 226 
Table 1 reports the sample distribution. The full sample comprises 226 firm-year observations 
corresponding to 113 unique US firms belonging to the Oil&Gas industry in 2009-2010.  
 
3.2 Measure of environmental performance 
To test the hypotheses it is required a measure of future environmental performance 
as dependent variable. To this aim, the analysis relies on KLD’s SOCRATES 
database, which is a comprehensive research database measuring the social and 
environmental performance of corporations, widely used in the recent environmental 
accounting research (Cho et al., 2006; Cho & Patten, 2007; Cho et al., 2010). The 
database provides independent rates of hundreds of companies traded on the US 
Stock Exchanges measuring their social performance across a range of dimensions 
such as Community, Corporate Governance, Environment, Employee Relations. For 
each area, KLD analysts assign “strengths” and “concerns” on a 5-point scale. 
Among the multi-dimensional concepts of corporate social performance provided by 
the KLD’s database, the scores are selected for the environmental performance of 
one fiscal year ahead (2010-2011) the year of analysis for environmental disclosure 
(2009-2010). Specifically, according to Cho et al., (2010) this study refers to the 
environmental concern ratings that are assigned to companies referring to the 
following seven items (i) Hazardous Waste, (ii) Regulatory Problems, (iii) Ozone 
Depleting Chemicals, (iv) Substantial Emissions, (v) Agricultural Chemicals, (vi) 
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Climate Change, (vii) Other Concern. Thus, firms with higher environmental 
concern scores have worse environmental performance. However, as more than 52% 
of the sample firms have environmental ratings equal to 0 (n= 119), this analysis is 
conducted by focusing on sample firms that have at least one concern. Therefore, the 
dependent variables (EPt+1) is a dummy variable equal to one if sample firms exhibit 
environmental concerns greater or equal to 1, 0 otherwise. 
 
3.3 Measure of discretionary disclosure strategies 
The extent of discretionary disclosure strategies in environmental reporting is 
measured using the bias in disclosure tone. In doing so, this research follows the 
suggestion of Cho et al. (2010) arguing that “the language and verbal tone used in 
environmental disclosures (...) must be considered when investigating the 
relationship between corporate disclosure and performance”. According to Cho et 
al. (2010), the tone of environmental disclosure in the 10-K filings is captured, by 
performing a computer-aided content analysis of the information provided in Section 
1 (Description of the Business)113. It has been chosen to analyze the tone of narrative 
information in 10-K mandatory filings, as they are among the potentially most 
effective means to manage impressions given the closeness of the narrative section 
and the more credible and verifiable audited information (Neu et al., 1998). 
However, as additional analysis, disclosure tone in voluntary corporate documents 
(environmental press releases) is also examined to check whether the nature of the 
information provided (mandatory vs. voluntary) affect the informative value of 
communication strategies. 
DICTION 5.0 is used to measure disclosure. It is a widely used software for 
linguistic analysis. Relying on a set of dictionaries developed according to the 
linguistic theory (Bligh et al., 2004), this software perform a word frequency counts 
on the input text, providing as output five master variables (“optimism”, “activity”, 
“realism”, “commonality”) that allow users to perform a lexical analysis. The use of 
                                                
113 Other sections that potentially could contain environmental information are Section 3 (Legal 
Proceedings) and Section 7 (Management’s Discussion and Analysis). However, following the 
suggestion of Cho et al. (2010) both Sections are excluded to minimize concern of a confounding 
analysis.  
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DICTION has several advantages. First, it computes an optimism score, which is a 
continuous variable rather than a categorical variable. Second, the score is 
normalized by the word number, increasing the comparability of results between 
disclosures of different lengths. Finally, it ensures greater objectivity of the results 
and allows substantial time saving relative to other manual coding procedures. 
Nevertheless, it is not without limitations. Unlike manual procedures, DICTION 
does not consider the context in which the words have been used, thus introducing 
noise into the computed score. However, the trade-off between DICTION’s strength 
and weaknesses is arguably in favor of the use of this software. Thus, the “optimism” 
score is employed as the measure of the tone bias (OPT)114.  
 
3.4 Measures of board monitoring and stakeholder orientation 
The influence of reporting incentives over the informativeness of disclosure tone is 
captured by focusing on two roles of the board of directors: the board monitoring and 
the board stakeholder orientation. Each of the two dimensions emphasizes different 
directors’ responsibility and is captured by different attributes of the board. From an 
agency perspective the quality of the board as a monitor is a function of several 
attributes such as the directors independence, the degree to which they are dependent 
from the CEO and the presence of the audit committee (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
Thus, the board monitoring intensity is measured with five different measures: (i) 
board size, (ii) CEO-duality, (iii) proportion of independent directors, (iv) expertise 
of the audit committee members. 
A board comprised of many directors may experiment coordination costs and free-
riding problems that prevent the effective monitoring on the financial reporting 
practices (Lipton & Lorsh, 1992). However, it may also offer a better advice to the 
CEO due to the broader expertise of its member (Dalton et al., 1999). The board size 
(B_SIZE) is measured as the total number of directors sitting on the board.  
                                                
114 Optimism is defined as “Language endorsing some person, group, concept or event or highlighting 
their positive entailments”. It is computed through the following formula [Praise + Satisfaction + 
Inspiration] -[Blame + Hardship + Denial]  (DICTION 5.0 Manual - Hart, 2000). Following Ober, 
Zhao, Davis & Alexander (1999) and Cho et al., (2010) the “optimism” master variable is reported 
without adjustment. 
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Board consisting primarily of insiders is considered to be less effective at 
monitoring. Conversely, independent directors are less susceptible to the CEO 
(Weisbach, 1988), thus they help aligning the board activities with the interest of 
stakeholders (Brammer & Pavelin, 2006), providing managers with incentives to 
convey truthful information (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). This study captures the 
independence of the board (IND) by considering the proportion of independent 
directors. 
CEO duality refers to the combination of the CEO and Chairman’s role. Agency-
centered theories and codes of best practice of corporate governance recommend the 
separation of these roles to ensure the board has greater independence from 
management (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Therefore, the independence of the board 
members from the CEO is measured with a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if 
CEO is also the Chairman of the board (CEO_DUAL).  
Among the various sub-committees that the board of directors may nominate, the 
audit committee is arguably the most important, having the ultimate responsibility to 
oversee corporate disclosure policies. To proxy for its monitoring ability it is 
employed the audit committee’s financial expertise (DeFond et al., 2005). This 
measure captures the presence of audit committee members with specific knowledge 
in finance and accounting areas. To this aim, each board member biography is read 
and directors are classified as an accounting/financial expert if she/he has experience 
as public accountant, chief accounting officer, auditor, CFO, controller or former 
CEO of a for-profit organization. Then, the final proxy of audit committee financial 
expertise is a dummy variable equal to one if the number of financial expert in the 
audit committee is equal or above the sample median (AC_FE).  
This study also considers the stakeholder-orientation of the board. It relies on the 
characteristics of the board of directors that, according to the resource dependence 
theory, proxy for its ability to perform a service role towards firms stakeholders. 
They are: (i) directors connections, (ii) presence of directors who are “community 
influential”, (iii) board diversity, (iv) presence of a specific CSR/ethic/sustainability 
committee.  
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The first attribute encapsulates the network of ties to other firms created through the 
presence of the same director on the board of different organizations, a situation that 
is often referred in the literature as interlocking directorship (Haunschild, 1993). 
Directors connections not only provide a network of ties with other organizations, 
that are pivotal for the company’s success and survival but also professional 
competence and prestige, necessary to legitimizing the firm service (Zahra & Pearce, 
1989). For instance, Bazerman & Schoorman (1983: 211) claim that an 
“organization’s reputation can be affected by who serves on the board of directors 
and to whom the organization is seen to be linked” (Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1992). 
The directors connection is measured as the logarithm of the total number of 
directorships held by each director (B_EXT).  
This study also considers the presence of community influential members, i.e. retired 
politicians, academics, members of social organizations, that due to their experience 
bring connections to community groups and provide non-business perspectives on 
the firm’s actions and strategies (Hillman et al., 2000). Their network of ties aids the 
company in understanding and responding to its environment. They often directly 
represent the interests of external stakeholders (Kassinis & Vafeas, 2002), and put 
pressure on executives for more informative disclosure in order to promote the firm’s 
legitimacy. The presence of “community influential” is measured by a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 if the number of “community influential” is equal or 
above the sample median (B_CI). This proxy was chosen in order to better isolate 
firms that, having a number of “community influential” particularly high, distinguish 
themselves relative to their peers. According to Hillman et al. (2000) and Michelon 
& Parbonetti (2010) community influential is defined as academicians, politicians 
(including retired politicians), military officers (including retired military officers) 
and members or directors of social/non profit organizations (including members of 
clergy and religious leaders). This information was hand collected using the same 
procedure adopted to identify financial and accounting experts in the audit 
committee. 
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Board diversity refers to the variation among its members as proxied by the gender 
diversity (i.e. the presence of female on board)115. Several studies show that having 
more women on boards enhances firms’ reputation (Bernardi et al., 2006; Brammer 
et al., 2009). Finally, women on board are more likely than man to be community 
influential (Hillman et al., 2002), being able to sensitize boards towards CRS 
activities, including environmental disclosure (Bear et al. 2010). Therefore, the board 
diversity is measured with the logarithm of the number of female directors (B_FEM). 
The last measure of stakeholder orientation is the presence of a specific 
CSR/ethic/sustainability committee (D_SHE). It oversees the company’s policies on 
social, environmental, and other matters of significance to the firm’s reputation as a 
global corporate citizen. Among its responsibilities and activities there is the 
monitoring of practices relating to the company’s global social and environmental 
accountability and the oversight of the publication of CSR Report (if present). As it 
provides stakeholders with the assurance that the firm involvement in CSR activities 
is real it is expected that it will force the board of directors to provide a more reliable 
environmental disclosure. 
 
3.5 Control variables 
As the use of impression management tactics in environmental reporting is a part of a 
broader communication strategy that includes financial accounting information, the  
first control variable is the level of earnings management. Several recent studies 
document the presence of a close relationship between the manipulation of 
quantitative accounting data (earnings management) and manipulation of more 
qualitative narrative information (impression management) (Godfrey et al., 2003; 
Guillamón-Saorín & García Osma, 2010; Aerts & Chen, 2011; García Osma & 
Guillamón-Saorín, 2011). As consequence it is anticipated that the extent of earnings 
management may play a role in addressing the manager decision to bias the tone as 
an opportunistic device to maintain organizational legitimacy and garner support 
from stakeholders whose interests are damaged by EM practices. 
                                                
115 Board diversity is recognized as a broader concept, including not only gender diversity, but also 
race, age and possible disabilities. However, given the difficulties in proxying for such multiple 
aspects, following Mallin et al. (2012) and Coffey & Fryxell (1991) the focus is on gender diversity. 
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To measure the extent of earnings management, this study uses the cross-sectional 
modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1995) by pooling firms for year to estimate 
coefficients in equation (1):  
TAi,t/Assetsi,t = a1*(1/Assetsi,t) + a2*(∆SALESi,t/Assetsi,t) + a3*(PPEi,t/Assetsi,t) + εi,t 
(1)                                                                                                                                              
where: 
Assets: Total Assets for the period t; 
TAi,t = EBEIi,t - CFOi,t; 
EBEIi,t= Earnings before extraordinary items for the period t; 
CFOi,t = Operating Cash Flow for the period t; 
∆SALESi,t = Change in sales from period t-1 to period t;  
PPEi,t = Gross level of property, plant and equipment; 
Then, the estimated parameters from the Equation (1) is used in the following model 
(2) to calculate non discretionary accruals (NDAi,t):  
NDAi,t = â1*(1/Assetsi,t) + â2*[(∆SALESi,t-∆ARi,t )/Assetsi,t] +  â3*(PPEi,t/Assetsi,t) + 
εi,t                                                                                                                                                                                                (2) 
where:  
∆SALESi,t = change in sales from period t-1 to period t;  
∆ARi,t = change in accounts receivable from period t-1 to period t; 
PPEi,t = gross level of property, plant and equipment. 
Then, discretionary accruals (DAi,t) are computed as follows. 
DAi,t = (TAi,t/Assetsi,t) - NDAi,t  
The final measure of earnings management is the absolute value of the computed 
discretionary accruals (DA_ABS), as it is not of interest the direction of the 
manipulation, but rather the level of manipulation, 
Then, this study considers variables that may drive discretionary disclosure strategies 
and also affect the informativeness of the tone, including variables that might 
influence future environmental performance. It is measured the presence of growth 
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opportunities with the Market-to-Book ratio (MTB) and the level of capital intensity 
with the level of property, plant and equipment divided by the total asset (TANG). 
Firm size is controlled with the logarithm of total asset. Finally, economic 
performance is controlled with the Return on Equity (ROE) and the financial 
structure is controlled with an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the company 
total debt is increased by more than 10% in the current period, 0 otherwise 
(D_ISSUE). Archival data on board of directors are hand-collected from proxy 
statement or gathered from Corporate Library Database, while financial variables are 
collected from COMPUSTAT Database116.  
Table 2 provides a detailed explanation of the variables definition and sources. 
Table 2. Variables definition 
 
Variable 
Name 
Variable 
Label Definition Source 
Panel A: Environmental performance  
EPt+1 
Environmental 
performance 
one year ahead 
Dummy variable equal to one if firm has at least 
one environmental concern in the year t+1 
KLD's 
SOCRATES 
database 
    
Panel B: Discretionary disclosure strategies 
OPT 
Optimism in 
environmental 
10-K 
disclosure 
DICTION's “optimism” score computed by 
analyzing Section 1 of 10-K filings 
Companies 10-
K filings 
OPT_PR 
Optimism in 
environmental 
press releases 
DICTION's “optimism” score computed by 
analyzing environmental press releases 
Companies 
Press Releases  
    
Panel C: Board monitoring  
B_SIZE Board Size Total number of directors sitting on company board 
Corporate 
Library 
IND Board Independence 
Proportion of independent directors sitting on 
company board 
Corporate 
Library 
CEO_DUAL CEO_Duality Dummy variable =1 if CEO is also Chairman of the board; 0 otherwise 
Corporate 
Library 
AC_FE 
Audit 
committee  
financial 
expertise 
Dummy variable= 1 if the number of audit 
committee members with financial expertise is 
equal or above the sample median; 0 otherwise  
Hand-collected 
from 10-K 
filings 
                                                
116 To control for outliers some financial variables are winsorized at 10%. 
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Panel D: Stakeholder orientation 
B_EXT Directors connections 
Natural logarithm of the total number of 
directorships held by each director 
Corporate 
Library 
B_FEM Female representation 
Natural logarithm of the number of female 
directors  
Corporate 
Library 
B_CI Community Influentials 
Dummy variable= 1 if the number of 
“community influential” (Hillman et al., 2000) is 
equal or above the sample median; 0 otherwise  
Hand-collected 
from 10-K 
filings 
D_SHE 
CSR/Ethic/Sus
tainability 
committee 
Dummy variable =1 if company board has a 
formal CSR/ethic/sustainability committee;  0 
otherwise. 
Hand-collected 
from 10-K 
filings 
Panel E: Control variables 
DA_ABS Dicretionary accuarls 
Absolute value of discretionary accruals from the 
Modified-Jones Model 
COMPUSTAT 
GLOBAL 
TANG Tangibility End of the year property, plant and equipment divided by the end of the year total asset  
COMPUSTAT 
GLOBAL 
ROE Return on Equity 
Net Income divided by the end of the year book 
value of equity 
COMPUSTAT 
GLOBAL 
SIZE Firm Size Natural Logarithm of the end of the year Total Asset 
COMPUSTAT 
GLOBAL 
D_ISSUE Debt issue 
Dummy variable=1 if company total debt is 
increased by more than  10% in the current 
period; 0 otherwise 
COMPUSTAT 
GLOBAL 
Panel F: Earnings management variables 
TA Total Accrual EBI-CFO 
COMPUSTAT 
GLOBAL 
EBI 
Earnings 
before 
extraordinary 
items 
Earnings before extraordinary items for the 
period t 
COMPUSTAT 
GLOBAL 
CFO 
Operating 
Cash Flow Operating Cash Flow for the period t 
COMPUSTAT 
GLOBAL 
∆SALES 
Change in Net 
Sales 
Net Sales for the period t minus net Sales for the 
period t-1 
COMPUSTAT 
GLOBAL 
PPE 
Property, plant 
and equipment 
Gross level of property, plant and equipment for 
the period t 
COMPUSTAT 
GLOBAL 
ASSETS Total Asset Total Asset for the period t 
COMPUSTAT 
GLOBAL 
∆AR 
Change in 
Accounts 
Receivables 
Net Account Receivables for the period t minus 
Account Receivables for the period t-1  
COMPUSTAT 
GLOBAL 
Table 2 reports label of variables used in the empirical analysis, their definition and the sources of the 
data. The full sample comprises 226 firm-year observations corresponding to 113 unique US firms 
belonging to the Oil&Gas industry in 2009-2010. 
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4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables used 
in the empirical analysis. 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
         
  N   mean   min  p25 p50 p75   max sd 
Panel A: Environmental performance and disclosure tone 
EPt+1 226 0.473 0 0 0 1 1 0.501 
OPT 226 47.011 44.24 45.64 47.215 48.41 49.18 1.633 
         
Panel B: Board monitoring  
B_SIZE 226 9.606 5 8 10 11 17 2.321 
CEO_DUAL 226 0.575 0 0 1 1 1 0.495 
IND 226 0.644 0 0.555 0.666 0.75 0.888 0.156 
AC_FE 226 0.513 0 0 1 1 1 0.500 
         
Panel C: Board stakeholder orientation  
B_FEM 226 0.431 0 0 0 0.693 1.386 0.473 
B_EXT 226 2.643 0.693 2.565 2.706 2.706 3.663 0.313 
B_CI 226 0.495 0 0 0 1 1 0.501 
D_SHE 226 0.143 0 0 0 0 1 0.349 
         
Panel D: Control variables 
DA_ABS 226 0.106 0.001 0.027 0.059 0.109 2.309 0.211 
MTB 226 2.211 -23.322 1.383 1.937 2.491 33.460 3.676 
TANG 226 1.317 0.177 0.893 1.113 1.444 7.165 0.808 
SIZE 226 7.734 3.616 6.620 7.766 8.702 12.252 1.775 
D_ISSUE 226 0.518 0 0 1 1 1 0.501 
ROE 226 -0.066 -3.601 -0.084 0.051 0.125 1.095 0.496 
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for variables of analysis. Panel A provides results for 
environmental performance and disclosure tone. Panel B provides results board monitoring proxies. 
Panel C provides results for stakeholder orientation proxies, while Panel D provides descriptives for 
control variables. The full sample comprises 226 firm-year observations corresponding to 113 unique 
US firms belonging to the Oil&Gas industry in 2009-2010. See Table 2 for variables definitions. 
As expected more than a half of the sample firms have positive environmental 
performance (EPt+1=0), confirming that companies from high environmental 
sensitive industry (Oil & Gas) are under greater pressure for their environmental 
outcomes. The optimism score takes values between 44.24 and 49.18, with the 
average company having a score of 47.01. Concerning the characteristics of the 
board of directors the mean (median) value of directors sitting on a board is about 10, 
with the minimum of 5 to the maximum of 17. 
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The proportion of independent directors has a mean of (median) 64% (66%), while 
the average audit committee is composed of at least two financial experts. These 
results suggests that the board of directors of the average sample company behaves 
as an effective monitor, which seems in line with the strict enforcement and 
regulatory regime existing in the US post Sarbanes-Oxley era. Looking at the board’s 
stakeholder orientation attributes, a tendency towards a low degree of board diversity 
can be observed, with the mean (median) number of female sitting on the board 
equal to 0. The average directors connections with external community is quite high, 
since a half of the sample firms has at least one community influential, with the mean 
(median) number of directors connections about 13. Very surprisingly, only 14% of 
the board has a formal CRS/ethics/Sustainability committee. Finally, concerning the 
financial structure the average sample firm tends to be a growing firm with high level 
of capital intensity, strong financial needs and a negative economic performance. 
Table 4 provides the Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients between the 
variables employed in the empirical analysis. Environmental concerns are negatively 
correlated with the optimism score, and positively with some of the board of 
directors’ characteristics. Board of directors attributes are positively correlated to 
each other. The only exception is the audit committee’s financial expertise that is 
positively correlated with other monitoring proxies, and negatively correlated with 
stakeholder orientation’s variables.  
 
4.2 Factor analysis of board monitoring and stakeholder orientation measures 
Previous literature suggests that monitoring and stakeholder orientation refers to two 
roles of the board of directors that are theoretically distinct, but may be performed 
together (Hillman et al., 2000). Therefore, to examine the effects of these two 
dimensions on the informativeness of the tone both separately and simultaneously a 
matrix format is built as follows. To capture the extent of monitoring intensity and 
stakeholder orientation of the board, the board of directors’ measures are combined 
in two binary factors through a principal component analysis. The first factor 
(MONITORING) proxies for the board monitoring intensity and include the agency-
based board attributes (board size; CEO duality; proportion of independent directors; 
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size and financial expertise of the audit committee). The second factor 
(STAKEHOLDER_ORIENTATION) captures the stakeholder orientation of the 
board and includes measures that, according to the resource dependence role, are 
indicative of an orientation towards the stakeholders (directors connections; female 
representation; community influential; presence of a CSR/ethical/sustainability 
committee).  
Table 5. Factor analysis 
          
Panel A: Monitoring factor      
     
Variable   Eigenvectors kmo 
B_SIZE   0.610 0.525 
CEO_DUAL   0.415 0.590 
IND   0.587 0.520 
AC_FE   0.334 0.504 
     
     
Number of obs:   226   
Eigenvalue:  1.395   
Variation explained: 0.349   
Overall kmo:  0.5293   
     
Panel B: Stakeholder orientation factor  
     
Variable   Eigenvectors kmo 
B_FEM   0.544 0.678 
B_EXT   0.517 0.714 
B_CI   0.482 0.677 
D_SHE   0.452 0.694 
     
     
Number of obs:  226   
Eigenvalue:  1.951   
Variation explained: 0.488   
Overall kmo:   0.690   
Table 5 reports results of the principal component analysis. Panel A provides eigenvectors and the 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (kmo) for the monitoring factor, while Panel B 
provides these measures for the stakeholder orientation factor. In both cases we retain the first factor 
which is the only one having an eigenvalue greater than 1. The full sample comprises 226 firm-year 
observations corresponding to 113 unique US firms belonging to the Oil&Gas industry in 2009-2010. 
See Table 2 for variables definitions. 
Table 5, Panel A provides eigenvectors and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of 
sampling adequacy for the monitoring factor, while Panel B provides these measures 
for the stakeholder orientation factor.  
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Next, the sample firms are partitioned by creating two binary variables according to 
the sample median of both factors. Specifically, a firm is classified as having high 
monitoring (MON=1) if it has the firm-specific value of monitoring factor above the 
sample median. Similarly, a firm is classified as having high stakeholder orientation 
(STK=1) if it has the firm-specific value of board stakeholder orientation factor 
above the sample median. By developing these two separate dimensions of board 
structure, MON and STK, it is possible to analyze the effects of board on the 
information content of the tone in four distinct circumstances. Figure 1 illustrates the 
four possible combinations of board types using MON and STK in a matrix format. 
Figure 1. Board types matrix 
  STAKEHOLDER ORIENTATION 
  HIGH LOW 
HIGH 
Effective monitored stakeholder 
oriented 
(MON_STK) 
Effective monitored not 
stakeholder oriented 
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Ineffective monitored stakeholder 
oriented 
(STK) 
Ineffective monitored not 
stakeholder oriented 
(NO_MON_STK) 
 
Figure 1 displays the matrix obtained by combining the MONITORING and STAKEHOLDER 
ORIENTATION factors, according to the sample median. Firms from the upper left quadrant exhibit 
the firm-specific value of both MONITORING and STAKEHOLDER ORIENTATION factors above 
the sample median (n=80). Firms from the upper right quadrant exhibit the firm specific value of 
MONITORING factor above the sample median while the value of STAKEHOLDER 
ORIENTATION factor equal or below the sample median (n=33). Firms from the lower left quadrant 
exhibit the firm specific value of MONITORING factor equal or below the sample median while the 
value of STAKEHOLDER ORIENTATION factor above the sample median (n=34). Firms from the 
lower right quadrant exhibit the firm-specific value of both MONITORING and STAKEHOLDER 
ORIENTATION factors equal or below the sample median (n=79). The full sample comprises 226 
firm-year observations corresponding to 113 unique US firms belonging to the Oil&Gas industry in 
2009-2010. See Table 2 for variables definitions. 
In the upper left quadrant, the effectively monitored stakeholder oriented board (high 
MON and high STK) tends to exhibit large board size, greater independence from the 
CEO with an audit committee large and competent in financial and accounting 
issues. Moreover, it has a strong network of ties with other organizations and the 
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firm’s external environment, due to the presence of directors with experience 
linkages relevant to the firm’s community. Finally, it tends to exhibit a broader 
representation of minorities and appears more actively involved in CSR practices. 
Therefore, this type of board looks like an effective “watchdogs” for the company 
shareholders, being also able to satisfy the interests of all the other firm’s 
stakeholders, as indicated by the high reputation and legitimacy in the community. 
Moving to the upper right quadrant, the effectively monitored not stakeholder 
oriented board (high MON and low STK) tend to be characterized by separation of 
CEO and chair roles, a high proportion of independent directors, larger board size 
and higher expertise of the audit committee members. However, it lacks strong 
network connections with other organization. Directors would also have low 
reputation and legitimacy in the community, due to their scarce influence over 
important non-business organizations. Finally, it is characterized by very low 
adherence to CSR standards (such as the presence of CSR committee). Thus, 
directors concerns are more about the maximization of shareholder wealth, 
controlling opportunistic managerial choices, rather than protecting the interest of the 
firm’s broader community of stakeholders.  
In the lower left quadrant the ineffectively monitored stakeholder oriented board (low 
MON and high STK), tends to exhibit CEO duality, low proportion of independent 
directors, smaller board and less experienced audit committee. Thus, it is less able to 
protect the interests of shareholders, being more “a pawns of powerful managers” 
(Mace, 1971). At the same time, this type of board of directors exhibits a high 
number of links to external community and greater board diversity. These 
characteristics suggest that the board of directors of these firms would perform a 
“social role”, ensuring that the company behaves within the bounds of the society, 
enhancing stakeholder engagement and organizational legitimacy. 
Finally, in the lower right quadrant, the ineffectively monitored not stakeholder 
oriented board (low MON and low STK) can be considered the opposite of the upper 
left quadrant board type. It looks like a small managerial board, whose directors lack 
of experience in controlling manager disclosure choices. Moreover, they also lack of 
independence from the CEO as well as prestige and reputation in the external 
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environment. Therefore, this type of board appears not really aligned with the 
interests of either shareholders or other firm’s stakeholders, being unable to fulfill 
both the monitoring and the service role. 
This matrix format offers the opportunity to perform a univariate comparison of 
firms characteristics across the four different quadrants. To this aim, first are 
computed the variables’ means for each quadrant and, then, are performed a battery 
of tests to contrast the variables means across quadrants. The results of this 
comparison are shown in Table 6.  
Table 6. Comparison of variables means across board types  
              
Variable 
MON_STK 
vs. MON 
MON_STK 
vs. STK 
MON_STK vs. 
NO_MON_STK 
MON vs. 
STK 
MON vs. 
NO_MON_STK 
STK vs. 
NO_MON_STK 
       
OPT 0.347 -0.157 -0.199 -0.505* -0.547* -0.041 
B_SIZE -2.454* -2.134* -3.689* 0.319 -1.235* -1.555* 
CEO_DUAL 0.098 -0.514* -0.320* -0.613* -0.418* 0.195* 
IND -0.028 -0.199* -0.183* -0.171* -0.155* 0.015 
AC_FE 0.138* -0.385* -0.283* -0.523* -0.421* 0.102 
B_FEM -0.664* -0.343* -0.601* 0.321* 0.063 -0.257* 
B_EXT -0.288* -0.107* -0.363* 0.181* -0.076 -0.257* 
B_CI -0.627* -0.135* -0.811* 0.492*  -0.184* -0.676* 
D_SHE -0.325* -0.148 -0.325* 0.176* 0 -0.176* 
DA_ABS 0.006 0.082* 0.088* 0.076* 0.082* 0.006 
MTB -0.912 0.734 1.305* 1.646 2.218* 0.572 
TANG 0.331 0.043 0.063 -0.288* -0.268 0.020 
SIZE -1.197* -1.540* -2.419* -0.343 -1.222* -0.879* 
D_ISSUE 0.075 0 0.019 -0.076 -0.057 0.018 
ROE -0.226* -0.164* -0.148* 0.062 0.078 0.015 
Table 6 reports the results comparison of variables means across quadrants corresponding to the four 
boards types. MON_STK denotes firms from the upper left quadrant of Figure 1 (effective monitored 
stakeholder oriented). MON denotes firms from the upper right quadrant of Figure 1 (effective 
monitored not stakeholder oriented). STK denotes firms from the lower left quadrant of Figure 1 
(ineffective monitored stakeholder oriented). NO_MON_STK denotes firms from the lower right 
quadrant of Figure 1 (ineffective monitored not stakeholder oriented). * denotes significance at 10% 
level (two-tailed). The p-values of the tests of differences in means for continuous variables are based 
on t-test. The p-values of the tests of differences in means for binary variables are based on test of 
proportions. The full sample comprises 226 firm-year observations corresponding to 113 unique US 
firms belonging to the Oil&Gas industry in 2009-2010. See Table 2 for variables definitions. 
Firms belonging to the upper two and the lower two quadrants are quite similar in 
term of optimisms scores. However, effectively monitored not stakeholder oriented 
firms tend to be significantly more optimistic than ineffectively monitored 
stakeholder oriented and ineffectively monitored not stakeholder oriented ones. As 
expected, the four groups are statistically different with regard to the board of 
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directors characteristics. Effectively monitored stakeholders oriented firms exhibit 
highest level of almost all board monitoring proxies, followed by effectively 
monitored not stakeholder oriented firms. Firms from the lower left quadrant 
(ineffectively monitored stakeholder oriented) show higher stakeholder orientation 
measures than effectively monitored not stakeholder oriented firms. Firms in the 
lower right quadrant (ineffectively monitored not stakeholder oriented) have the 
lowest value of both monitoring and stakeholder orientation variables. Finally, 
moving from the upper left to the lower right quadrant firms tend to exhibit 
increasing value of discretionary accruals and growth opportunities, while decreasing 
value of size, tangibility and profitability. The difference among economic 
characteristics that are part of the controls are, however, not always significant across 
the quadrants. 
The results of this univariate analysis, however, tell little about the informativeness 
of the language in environmental press releases. Therefore, attention is turned  to the 
analysis of the relationship between language and future environmental performance. 
 
4.3 Regression analysis  
4.3.1. Analysis of the tone’s informativeness  
Empirical analysis starts by examining whether the language choices serve as 
incremental information strategy or impression management tool. It is hypothesized 
that if tone bias is a discretionary strategy to communicate truthful information, then 
“optimism” in environmental disclosure should predict positive future environmental 
performance (Incremental information hypothesis). Conversely, if mangers use tone 
to opportunistically bias environmental reporting, they are expected to be more 
optimistic to conceal negative environmental performance (Impression management 
hypothesis). Empirically, for the incremental information hypothesis to hold, a 
positive association between “optimism” in environmental disclosure in the year t 
and the likelihood of having positive environmental performance in the year t+1 
should be found. On the contrary, if a negative relationship between “optimism” in 
the year t and environmental disclosure in the year t+1 is observed, this will give 
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support to the opportunistic impression management hypothesis. Figure 2 illustrates 
this hypotheses. 
Figure 2. Empirical predictions 
    
+ OPTt  - EPt+1 
        
Hp1b: Impression 
management 
 
    
+ OPTt  + EPt+1 
        
Hp1a: Incremental 
information 
t t+1  
 
Figure 2 depicts empirical predictions for the analysis of the tone’s informativeness. Under the 
Incremental information hypothesis (Hp1a) a positive association between optimism in the year t and 
environmental performance in the year t+1 is expected. Under the Impression management hypothesis 
(Hp1b) a negative association between optimism in the year t and environmental performance in the 
year t+1 is expected. 
To identify the relation between tone and future environmental performance, a probit 
regression is used, since the dependent variable (EPt+1) is specified as a dummy 
variable. Furthermore, other factors are controlled potentially influencing the 
language choice117. Thus, the first model is stated as118: 
EPt+1= β 0 + β 1*OPT + β 2*DA_ABS + β 3*MTB + β 4*TANG + β 5*SIZE + 
β6*D_ISSUE + β7*ROE  + ε                                                                                                                              (1) 
Table 7 reports the results of the model testing Hp1a and Hp1b119. Optimism in the 
year t is negatively and significantly related with the likelihood of having at least one 
environmental concern in the year t+1 (β1=-0.133). This result gives support to the 
Incremental information hypothesis, suggesting that sample firms use optimistic 
language to convey additional value-relevant information on firms future 
environmental performance. This result is not really surprising for at least three 
reasons. First, US litigation environment imposes asymmetric loss function to the 
firms (i.e. firms are more likely to be sued when they have large negative surprises). 
This, in turn, encourages firms to be less optimistic in their forecast about future 
firms performance (Rogers & Stocken, 2005). Second, the Oil & Gas industry can be 
                                                
117 All regression models include year fixed effects and robust standard errors to control for 
heteroskedasticity.  
118 For ease of reading firms-years subscripts are suppressed. 
119 This study reports the estimated coefficients rather than the odds ratio since the interest is in 
evaluating the sign of the association.  
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considered one of the most important environmental sensitive sectors, and it faces 
greater societal pressure with regard to the environmental impact of companies’ 
activities. Third, in the US there is a form of semi-strong/strong market efficiency 
where investors, on average, are able to assess reporting bias. These factors push 
managers to use discretion in corporate narratives in order to overcome information 
asymmetries, avoiding unduly optimistic disclosures that would cause higher cost of 
capital, lower share price performance and increased likelihood to be sued (Rogers et 
al., 2011). 
Table 7. The informativeness of the tone  
      
  (1) 
Variable   EPt+1  
   
OPT  -0.133** 
  (-2.42) 
DA_ABS  0.232 
  (0.50) 
MTB  0.137*** 
  (2.89) 
TANG  0.365*** 
  (2.68) 
SIZE  0.506*** 
  (7.13) 
D_ISSUE  0.445** 
  (2.27) 
ROE  0.330 
  (1.29) 
   
Wald Chi2  68.10 
Obs.   226 
Intercept  Yes 
Year-dummies   Yes 
Table 7 reports results of the probit regression testing the informativeness of the tone in environmental 
10-K disclosure. The full sample comprises 226 firm-year observations corresponding to 113 unique 
US firms belonging to the Oil&Gas industry in 2009-2010. *, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 
5%, 1% levels (two-tailed). In parentheses are reported z test statistics based on robust standard errors. 
See Table 2 for variables definitions. 
As expected, the proxies for firms economic characteristics are significantly 
correlated with the likelihood of having at least one environmental concern in the 
year t+1, with the exception of ROE. This result indicates that large growing firms 
with high capital intensity and more financing needs are more likely to experiment 
negative environmental performance in the year t+1. The coefficient on DA_ABS is 
WHY ARE MANAGERS OPTIMISTIC? AN INVESTIGATION OF CORPORATE 
ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE TONE 
 
 
 
167 
positively, but not significantly related with negative environmental performance in 
t+1120. 
4.3.2. Analysis of the influence of board monitoring and stakeholder orientation 
So far, this study has examined the association between the disclosure tone and 
future environmental performance to disentangle whether managers use discretion in 
environmental reporting to truthfully convey additional information or to 
opportunistically conceal negative organizational outcomes. However, the role of 
board of directors maybe pivotal in addressing environmental disclosure 
transparency (Mallin et al., 2012). Therefore, it is investigated the influence of two 
dimensions of the board activity, monitoring and stakeholder orientation, on the 
informativeness of the tone using a matrix format (see Figure 1) as discussed in 
section 4.2. 
Under the agency theory, a more optimistic language is expected predicting positive 
environmental performance for firms in the upper two quadrants of the matrix 
(effectively monitored stakeholder oriented and effectively monitored not stakeholder 
oriented), due to the higher control and monitoring capabilities (Hp2). Directors 
sitting on the board of firms belonging to the lower two quadrants (ineffectively 
monitored stakeholder oriented and ineffectively monitored not stakeholder oriented) 
should, indeed, be unable to constrain managerial opportunistic disclosure choices, 
increasing the likelihood that tone bias reflect impression management strategies. 
From a different perspective, according to the resource dependence theory more 
informative tone is likely to occur in the upper and lower left quadrants of the matrix 
(effectively monitored stakeholder oriented and ineffectively monitored stakeholder 
oriented) because of the stakeholder orientation of the board. In both these quadrants, 
managers would bias language in environmental reporting to improve the 
communication with external stakeholders to enhance the firm reputation in the 
external community (Hp3). Conversely, firms from the upper and lower right 
                                                
120 As suggested by prior work, environmental disclosure tone may be affected by the level of 
environmental performance in the current year (Cho et al., 2010). Therefore, as additional test, 
regression analysis is performed using a dummy variable equal to one if sample firms exhibit 
environmental concerns greater or equal to 1 in the year t, 0 otherwise (EPt). The results remain 
unchanged. 
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quadrant should engage in less informative language choices. However, the effects of 
the board monitoring intensity are ignored in this scenario. 
To explore how the board monitoring and stakeholder orientation simultaneously 
affect the informativeness of the tone, the predictions of both theories are combined 
into one single matrix (Figure 3).  
Figure 3. Interaction between agency and resource dependence theory predictions 
  STAKEHOLDER ORIENTATION 
  HIGH LOW 
Effective monitored stakeholder 
oriented 
Effective monitored not 
stakeholder oriented HIGH 
Incremental information Incremental information vs. 
Impression management 
Ineffective monitored stakeholder 
oriented 
Ineffective monitored not 
stakeholder oriented M
O
N
IT
O
R
IN
G
 
LOW Incremental information 
vs. 
Impression management 
Impression management 
 
Figure 3 displays combined predictions for the influence of the board of directors on the 
informativeness of the tone based on both the agency and the resource-dependence theory. Firms from 
the upper left quadrant exhibit the firm-specific value of both MONITORING and STAKEHOLDER 
ORIENTATION factors above the sample median (n=80). Firms from the upper right quadrant exhibit 
the firm specific value of MONITORING factor above the sample median while the value of 
STAKEHOLDER ORIENTATION factor equal or below the sample median (n=33). Firms from the 
lower left quadrant exhibit the firm specific value of MONITORING factor equal or below the sample 
median while the value of STAKEHOLDER ORIENTATION factor above the sample median 
(n=34). Firms from the lower right quadrant exhibit the firm-specific value of both MONITORING 
and STAKEHOLDER ORIENTATION factors equal or below the sample median (n=79). The full 
sample comprises 226 firm-year observations corresponding to 113 unique US firms belonging to the 
Oil&Gas industry in 2009-2010. See Table 2 for variables definitions. 
By interacting these two dimensions, however, the informativeness of the tone 
becomes a-priori predictable only for the upper left and the lower right quadrants. 
Firms with effectively monitoring stakeholders oriented board are, indeed, expected 
to use optimistic language to convey managers’ private information on future 
environmental performance. The stronger monitoring and the higher stakeholder 
orientation would reinforce each other leading to highly informative language 
choices. On the opposite, firms with ineffectively monitoring not stakeholder 
oriented board are more likely to engage in biased language to manage the 
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stakeholder perception of corporate achievements, due to the lack of both monitoring 
and stakeholders orientation capabilities. Nevertheless, in the other two quadrants 
monitoring and stakeholder orientation will cause confounding outcomes, with a net 
effect on the informativeness of the tone depending on whether these two dimensions 
serve as complement or substitutes.  
To empirically investigate the information content of the tone in presence of different 
board types, this study performs a multivariate analysis. Still using a probit 
regression model, model 1 is augmented to include the dummy variables indicating 
respectively effectively monitorig stakeholder oriented board (MON_STK=1); 
effectively monitoring not stakeholder oriented board (MON=1); ineffectively 
monitoring stakeholder oriented board (STK=1); ineffectively monitoring not 
stakeholder oriented board (NO_MON_STK=1). The model is stated as follows: 
EPt+1= β 1*OPT + β 2*MON + β 3*STK + β 4*MON_STK + β 5*NO_MON_STK + 
β6*DA_ABS + β7*MTB + β8*TANG + β9*SIZE + β10*D_ISSUE + β11*ROE  + ε 
(2) 
Table 8 documents the regression results. Column 1 reports estimation results for the 
naïve model testing the effect of optimism, after introducing the indicator variables 
for different board types (model 2).  
The optimism score in the year t is found to be significantly and negatively related 
with the likelihood of having at least one environmental concern in the year t+1(β1=-
0.140). This result is in accord with the regression results presented for model 1. 
Similarly, the control variables behave in the expected way. Looking at the effect of 
the board types on environmental performance, the coefficient of MON, STK, 
MON_STK and NO_MON_STK are found to be positively related with the 
likelihood of having at least one environmental concern. However, as none of these 
coefficients is statistically significant, the conclusion is that having different board 
types does not affect per se the future environmental performance of the firm.  
Next, this study examines the informativeness of the tone for firms having different 
board types, by including the interaction effects between the four indicator variables 
and the optimism score. 
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Table 8. The influence of board monitoring and stakeholder orientation 
        
  (1) (2) 
Variable    EPt+1 EPt+1 
    
OPT  -0.140**  
  (-2.39)  
MON  1.124 10.58 
  (0.39) (1.02) 
STK  0.615 -0.232 
  (0.22) (-0.03) 
MON_STK  0.0342 -0.277 
  (0.01) (-0.07) 
NO_MON_STK  0.906 -1.440 
  (0.32) (-0.30) 
MON_OPT   -0.342 
   (-1.57) 
STK_OPT   -0.125 
   (-0.66) 
MON_STK_OPT   -0.137* 
   (-1.69) 
NO_MON_STK_OPT   -0.093 
   (-0.94) 
DA_ABS  0.321 0.305 
  (0.68) (0.64) 
MTB  0.149*** 0.150*** 
  (3.02) (2.98) 
TANG  0.385*** 0.396*** 
  (2.93) (3.05) 
SIZE  0.648*** 0.666*** 
  (7.53) (7.60 ) 
D_ISSUE  0.389* 0.408** 
  (1.93) (2.01) 
ROE  0.454 0.449 
  (1.64) (1.60) 
    
Wald Chi2  79.91 77.79 
Obs.   226 226 
Intercept  No No 
Year-dummies   Yes Yes 
Table 8 reports results of the probit regressions testing the influence of board types on the 
informativeness of the tone in environmental 10-K disclosure. MON is a dummy variable equal to one 
if firms belong to the upper right quadrant of Figure 1 (effective monitored not stakeholder oriented); 
otherwise it is zero. STK is a dummy variable equal to one if firms belong to the lower left quadrant 
of Figure 1 (ineffective monitored stakeholder oriented); otherwise it is zero. MON_STK is a dummy 
variable equal to one if firms belong to the upper left quadrant of Figure 1 (effective monitored 
stakeholder oriented); otherwise it is zero. NO_MON_STK is a dummy variable equal to one if firms 
belong to the lower right quadrant of Figure 1 (ineffective monitored not stakeholder oriented); 
otherwise it is zero. MON_OPT is the interaction term indicating the optimism score for effective 
monitored not stakeholder oriented firms (MON=1). STK_OPT is the interaction term indicating the 
optimism score for ineffective monitored stakeholder oriented firms (STK=1). MON_STK_OPT is the 
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interaction term indicating the optimism score for effective monitored stakeholder oriented firms 
(MON_STK=1). NO_MON_STK_OPT is the interaction term indicating the optimism score for 
ineffective monitored not stakeholder oriented firms (NO_MON_STK=1). The full sample comprises 
226 firm-year observations corresponding to 113 unique US firms belonging to the Oil&Gas industry 
in 2009-2010. *, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels (two-tailed). In parentheses are 
reported z test statistics based on robust standard errors. See Table 2 for other variables definitions. 
Model 3 is stated as follows121: 
EPt+1= β1*MON + β2*STK + β3*MON_STK + β4*NO_MON_STK + β5*MON_OPT 
+ β6*STK_OPT + β7*MON_STK_OPT + β8*NO_MON_STK_OPT + β9*DA_ABS 
+ β10*MTB + β11*TANG + β12*SIZE + β13*D_ISSUE + β14*ROE  + ε                            (3) 
Table 8 Column 2 reports estimation results for the full model (model 3). With the 
only exception of MON, the indicator variables for board types now exhibit negative 
but not significant coefficients.  More interestingly, the coefficient on the interaction 
term between MON_STK and OPT is negative and statistically significant (β7=-
0.137). This suggests that the optimism of environmental disclosure of time t is a 
significant predictor of the likelihood of being good environmental performers in the 
year t+1 only for firms with effectively monitoring stakeholder oriented boards. As 
predicted, in this case strong board monitoring interacted with successful stakeholder 
orientation, pushes managers to be more optimistic in environmental reporting in 
order to align the stakeholders’ expectation about future environmental performance 
with their own assessment and manage their external scrutiny. 
Contrary to the expectations, firms from the lower right quadrant (ineffectively 
monitored not stakeholder oriented) also exhibit a negative relationship between 
optimism and the measure of environmental performance, although not this 
association is not statistically significant. An alternative explanation for this 
counterintuitive result is that the litigation environment of the sample can behave as 
an additional external mechanism that compensates the internal governance 
inefficiency, thus limiting managers’ opportunistic disclosure choice. Similarly, 
firms from the remaining two quadrants have a negative relationship between OPT 
and EPt+1, suggesting that for the sample firms the two dimensions of the board 
activity, monitoring and stakeholder orientation would potentially substitute each 
                                                
121 For ease of interpretation the intercept of the model is suppressed, but  the indicator variables are 
included for all the four groups. Accordingly, OPT is included only interacted with the MON, STK, 
MON_STK, NO_MON_STK. 
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other. However, as the regression coefficients are not statistically significant it is not 
possible to draw further conclusion on the informativess of tone for these latter cases. 
4.3.3 Additional analysis: disclosure tone in environmental press releases 
As discussed earlier, firms with effective monitored and stakeholder oriented board 
tend to use tone in environmental reporting to overcome information asymmetries, 
by revealing managers’ expectation about future environmental performance, 
regardless of the board types. This evidence has been interpreted in the light of the 
litigation threat affecting US Oil & Gas companies in the post Sarbanes-Oxley’s era. 
Nevertheless, another factor potentially explaining these results is the measurement 
of environmental disclosure tone through information provided in mandatory section 
of 10-K filings (Section 1). Thus, the high scrutiny concern and the risk of detection 
characterizing mandatory disclosures could further dampen managerial incentives to 
engage in self-serving disclosure choice. 
Therefore, to check whether managers strategically choose the language to convey 
environmental information in mandatory filings vs. other voluntary disclosure 
channels, an additional analysis is performed on the tone of environmental press 
releases. According to Guillamon-Saorin et al. (2012), press releases are a more 
tactically oriented disclosure vehicle used to fulfill different disclosure strategies. 
Moreover, they are largely unregulated and unaudited being also subject to a limited 
external scrutiny. These features, in turn, may lower litigation risk increasing the 
potential for impression management strategies.  
To perform this additional test, all the press releases issued by sample companies 
during the fiscal year 2009-2010 are reviewed. Then, the ones providing information 
with regard to environmental issues are selected122. Once environmental press 
releases are identified, the optimism for each single press release with DICTION is 
separately quantified, as described in the paragraph 3. Similar to previous work 
(Kothari et al., 2009), the final optimism score is computed as a firm-specific 
                                                
122 This study includes press releases concerning (among others) energy efficiency programs; 
environmental incidents; Oil spill; LEED certification; environmental permits and licences; EISs; 
EPAs; climate change; reduction of greenhouse gas; waste reduction; compliance to environmental 
regulations; research with environmental impact; environmental projects (e.g. Enhanced Oil 
Recovery); other environmentally sensitive policies.  
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average of the DICTION’s optimisms scores for press releases issued by a company 
during each fiscal year (OPT_PR). 
The univariate analysis starts comparing environmental disclosure, governance and 
economic characteristics between firms issuing and not issuing environmental press 
releases. Table 9 provides descriptive statistics for the two sub-groups. 
Table 9. Descriptives for firms issuing/not issuing environmental press-releases 
                    
                    
   N   mean   min  p25 p50 p75   max sd 
Panel A: Environmental performance and disclosure tone   
EPt+1          
 D_PR=1 119 0.571* 0 0 1 1 1 0.497 
 D_PR=0 107 0.364 0 0 0 1 1 0.483 
OPT          
 D_PR=1 119 46.883 44.24  45.04 47.1 48.41 49.18 1.768 
 D_PR=0 107 47.152 44.24  46.31 47.33 48.41 49.18 1.464 
OPT_PR          
 D_PR=1 119 49.093 46.76  48.29  49.04 50.297 51.06 1.379 
 D_PR=0 107 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Panel B: Board monitoring    
B_SIZE          
 D_PR=1 119 9.798 6 8 10 12 17 2.499 
 D_PR=0 107 9.392 5 8 9 11 14 2.096 
CEO_DUAL          
 D_PR=1 119 0.622 0 0 1 1 1 0.487 
 D_PR=0 107 0.523 0 0 1 1 1 0.502 
IND          
 D_PR=1 119 0.676* 0.308 0.571 0.7 0.778 0.875 0.131 
 D_PR=0 107 0.609 0 .5  0.625 0.75 0.889 0.174 
AC_FE          
 D_PR=1 119 0.487 0.502 0 0 1 1 0.502 
 D_PR=0 107 0.542 0 0 1 1  0.500 
          
Panel C: Board stakeholder orientation   
B_FEM          
 D_PR=1 119 0.494* 0 0 0.693 1.099 1.386 0.505 
 D_PR=0 107 0.362 0 0 0 0.693 1.386 0.426 
B_EXT          
 D_PR=1 119 2.672 1.946 2.565 2.706 2.706 3.663 0.287 
 D_PR=0 107 2.612 0.693 2.565 2.706 2.706 3.526 0.339 
B_CI          
 D_PR=1 119 0.538 0 0 1 1 1 0.500 
 D_PR=0 107 0.467 0 0 0 1 1 0.501 
D_SHE          
 D_PR=1 119 0.185* 0 0 0 0 1 0.390 
 D_PR=0 107 0.093 0 0 0 1 1 0.292 
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Panel D: Control variables   
DA_ABS          
 D_PR=1 119 0.099 0.001 0.027 0.060 0.116 2.309 0.220 
 D_PR=0 107 0.114 0.001 0.025 0.056 0.109 1.352 0.203 
MTB          
 D_PR=1 119 2.478 0.616 1.455 1.984 2.473 33.460 3.180 
 D_PR=0 107 1.933 -23.322 1.194 1.902 2.625 14.151 4.156 
TANG          
 D_PR=1 119 1.210* 0.177 0.870 1.087 1.334 6.138 0.685 
 D_PR=0 107 1.436 0.219 0.897 1.156 1.666 7.165 0.915 
SIZE          
 D_PR=1 119 8.077* 3.616 7.170 8.186 9.075 12.252 1.880 
 D_PR=0 107 7.351 3.616 6.253 7.474 8.144 10.867 1.573 
D_ISSUE          
 D_PR=1 119 0.546 0 0 1 1 1 0.500 
 D_PR=0 107 0.486 0 0 0 1 1 0.502 
ROE          
 D_PR=1 119 -0.033 -3.610 -0.052 0.064 0.132 0.530 0.425 
  D_PR=0 107 -0.102 0.564 -0.114 0.021 0.115 1.095 -3.610 
Table 9 reports the descriptive statistics for the analysis of the informativeness of the tone in 
environmental press releases. Panel A provides results for environmental performance and disclosure 
tone. Panel B provides results board monitoring proxies. Panel C provides results for stakeholder 
orientation proxies, while Panel D provides descriptives for control variables. The full sample is 
divided in two sub-groups of firms: issuing firms (D_PR=1) and not issuing firms (D_PR=0). * 
denotes significance at 10% level (two tailed). The p-values of the tests of differences in means for 
continuous variables are based on t-test. The p-values of the tests of differences in means for binary 
variables are based on test of proportions. The full sample comprises 226 firm-year observations 
corresponding to 113 unique US firms belonging to the Oil&Gas industry in 2009-2010. See Table 2 
for variables definitions.  
What is notable is that the two groups are different across many of the characteristics 
of the boards of directors. Concerning the board monitoring proxies, firms issuing 
press releases (n=119) have significantly worse environmental performance (EPt+1) 
and more independent directors (IND). Similarly, they also have significantly higher 
value of stakeholder orientation measures, such as minority representation (B_FEM) 
and the provision of a CSR Committee (D_SHE). Finally, they are larger and less 
capital intensive relative to the non-issuing firms (n=107). 
The results of the univariate analysis suggest that firms issuing environmental press 
releases are statistically different from the others, since they tend to exhibit stronger 
board monitoring and stakeholder orientation. In addition, it should be considered 
that firms choose to issue a press releases and this choice may be itself an impression 
management strategy (Guillamon-Saorin et al., 2012). As a consequence, a key 
problem of this analysis is that a simple OLS regression would suffer from self-
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selection (Heckman, 1978). In response to this problem the following two sets of 
equations are estimated: 
D_PR= β0 + β1*B_SIZE + β2*CEO_DUAL + β3*IND + β4*AC_FE + β5*B_FEM + 
β6*B_EXT + β 7*B_CI + β 8*B_SHE + β 9*DA_ABS + β 10*MTB + β 11*TANG + 
β12*SIZE + β13*D_ISSUE + β14*ROE  + ε                                                                                             (4a) 
EPt+1= β0 + β1*OPT_PR + β2*D_ISSUE + β3*ROE + β4*SIZE + β5*INV_MILLS + ε 
                                                                                                                                                                                         (4b) 
The first equation (4a) models the likelihood that firms issue environmental press 
releases, conditional on their governance and economic characteristics, through a 
probit regression. In model (4b), this study still uses a probit regression and estimates 
the likelihood that firms will have at least one environmental concern in the year t+1 
as a function of the optimism in environmental press releases in the year t (OPT_PR) 
and other variables potentially affecting environmental performance. If optimism in 
environmental press releases predicts future environmental performance, a negative 
coefficient β1 is expected to be observed in the model (4b). 
Table 10, Panel A reports the regression result of the model (4a), while Panel B 
provides the results of the model (4b). Results from Panel A document that the 
likelihood of issuing environmental press releases is increasing with board 
independence, firm size and growth opportunities. Conversely, it decreases with 
board size and capital intensity. This result seems in line with the evidence that 
strong board monitoring force firms to be more forthcoming with regard to 
information on environmental issues. However, contrary to previous evidence, no 
support is found to the hypothesis that firms with lower quality of accounting 
numbers prefer not to issue an (environmental) press releases, since the coefficient 
β10 is positive and not statistically significant (Guillamon-Saorin et al., 2012). 
Moving to the regression results of Panel B, the inverse mills ratio’s significance 
confirms the concern for self-selection bias. Finally, looking at the coefficient of 
interest, a negative and significant relationship is found between OPT_PR and EPt+1 
(β1=-0.184), documenting that managers use more optimistic language in 
environmental press releases to predict future environmental performance. This 
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result suggests that the sample firms do not strategically use language in 10-K 
fillings vs. voluntary press releases. Furthermore, this evidence indicates that the 
main conclusion on the informativeness of the tone is not driven by the mandatory 
nature of the disclosure vehicle under analysis. 
Table 10. Disclosure tone in environmental press releases 
      
Panel A: Stage 1  
  (1) 
Variable    D_PR 
   
Board monitoring   
B_SIZE  -0.109* 
  (-1.71) 
CEO_DUAL  0.154 
  (0.83) 
IND  1.793*** 
  (2.84) 
AC_FE  -0.169 
  (-0.93) 
Board stakeholder orientation   
B_FEM  0.201 
  (0.81) 
B_EXT  0.282 
  (0.83) 
D_CI  0.001 
  (-0.00) 
D_SHE  0.056 
  (-0.19) 
Controls  
DA_ABS  0.212 
  (0.44) 
MTB  0.055** 
  (2.00) 
TANG  -0.274** 
  (-2.18) 
SIZE  0.164** 
  (2.29) 
D_ISSUE  -0.018 
  (-0.10) 
ROE  0.248 
  (1.29) 
   
Wald Chi2  33.65 
Obs.   226 
Intercept  Yes 
Year-dummies   Yes 
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Panel B: Stage 2 
   (1) 
Variable  EPt+1 
    
OPT_PR  -0.184* 
  (-1.93) 
D_ISSUE  0.525* 
  (1.86) 
ROE  -0.381 
  (-1.31) 
SIZE  0.636*** 
  (5.04) 
INV_MILLS  1.547* 
  (1.86) 
   
Wald Chi2  34.12 
Obs.   119 
Intercept  Yes 
Year-dummies   Yes 
Table 10 reports results of the probit regressions testing the informativeness of the tone in 
environmental press releases. The full sample comprises 226 firm-year observations corresponding to 
113 unique US firms belonging to the Oil&Gas industry in 2009-2010. *, **, *** denotes significance 
at 10%, 5%, 1% levels (two-tailed). In parentheses are reported z test statistics based on robust 
standard errors. See Table 2 for variables definitions. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This research studies the extent of discretionary strategies in narrative disclosures 
with the goal of identifying whether they are informative about future environmental 
performance (incremental information hypothesis) or they are impression 
management tools to manipulate the users perception of corporate achievements 
(impression management hypothesis). 
To this aim, the focus is on the tone of environmental disclosure issued by a sample 
of US Oil & Gas companies in 2009 and 2010 analyzing its relationship with future 
environmental performance. The results support the incremental information 
hypothesis: the optimistic tone of environmental disclosures does not reflect purely 
managerial opportunistic reasons, but rather predicts future positive environmental 
performance (Demers & Vega, 2010; Davis et al., 2012; Baginski et al., 2012). 
This study contributes with several findings to the existing literature. First, it shows 
that in a context of high litigation risk the bias toward positive language in 
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environmental narratives is informative about future environmental performance. 
This result is in line with previous studies indicating that environmental disclosure is 
used as a signal to reveal superior performance because of the greater societal 
pressure with regard to environmental issues (Cormier & Magnan, 1999; Al-Tuwaijri 
et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 2008). The evidence is also consistent with the literature 
suggesting that shareholder litigation can be viewed as an important mechanism 
limiting managerial opportunistic disclosure choices (Rogers et al., 2011). 
Second, firm-specific incentives are identified that can lead to cross-sectional 
differences in the informativeness of the tone. Specifically, focusing on two 
dimensions of the board of directors (monitoring and stakeholder orientation), it is 
examined how they interact with each other, ultimately affecting the informativeness 
of the tone. In this way, prior work is extended confirming that although board 
monitoring and stakeholder orientation are theoretically distinct, they should be 
considered simultaneously when examining the influence of the board of directors on 
environmental disclosure (Mallin et al., 2012). However, this study does not support 
the view that board monitoring has a negative effect on firm’s commitment towards 
CSR, including disclosure of environmental information (Surroca & Tribò, 2008). 
The results rather suggest that both monitoring and stakeholder orientation have a 
positive effect on the informativeness of disclosure tone in environmental narratives. 
When these two dimensions are simultaneously present, they can reinforce each 
other, enhancing the board’s ability to fulfill its fiduciary duties toward a community 
of stakeholders broader than only investors. 
Third, the analysis on disclosure tone in environmental press releases also extends 
the literature on the informativeness of the tone, by providing evidence in a voluntary 
disclosure setting. Conditioning the issuance of environmental press releases on the 
firm’s governance and economic characteristics, managers are still found to use 
optimistic tone in environmental press releases to predict future environmental 
performance, rather than to self-servingly bias disclosures. 
This research acknowledges its limitations. First of all, the analysis is based on a 
single country-industry, it does not allow to isolate the effect of external incentives 
that may limit managerial use of self-serving reporting strategies (e.g. litigation risk). 
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Therefore, a natural extension of this research could be investigating the same 
research question in different settings with lower litigation risk (such as other non-
environmental sensitive industry and/other non-US countries). Second, 
characteristics of environmental disclosure other than the tone (width, depth, 
coverage, readability, reliability) may also affect the future environmental 
performance. As this research design does not capture these aspects, it is not possible 
to assess whether the informative value of the tone is incremental relative to other 
features of environmental disclosure. Moreover, although the evidence indicates that 
the tone is informative about future environmental performance, it is not known if 
the market responds to this information. Therefore, future research effort could be 
directed in addressing these limitations. Finally, this study is not aimed at showing 
whether managers intentionally disclose overly optimistic disclosures to convey 
information, rather than to mislead stakeholders. The results only indicate that 
optimism in environmental press releases is associated with higher likelihood of 
being good environmental performers in the next year.  
Subject to these caveats, this study claims that its findings could have interesting 
implications for both investors and policy-makers. Investors should be aware of the 
use of language as a signal over future firm performance and rely on it to take better 
investment decisions. From a regulators perspective, the results could contribute to 
the longstanding debate on the costs and benefits of a regulation for qualitative 
disclosures, suggesting that in the absence of a tight regulation it is possible to force 
managers to be forthcoming by increasing the level of shareholder litigation, which 
may act as a constraint for opportunistic disclosure choices. Finally, in line with 
recent research (Rodrigue et al., 2012) they shed light on some additional 
mechanisms (CRS committee, the presence of “community influentiancials” on the 
board) that, being substantive rather than symbolic governance practices, could be 
prescripted by the law in order to improve the accountability of the firm towards a 
broader community of stakeholders. 
 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This thesis deals with the role of corporate governance and disclosure in the capital 
market. Although these topics have been largely investigated by the existing 
literature, the business environment’s complexity, the shortcomings of financial 
reporting model together with recent reforms and regulation have produced 
substantial changes in the institutional and information environment, shedding new 
light on some underinvestigated reporting issues.  
This thesis proposes a framework for the analysis of corporate governance and 
disclosure in the capital market and provides newly empirical evidence helping the 
development of the knowledge within the research field. 
In the first section theoretical and empirical contributions from accounting, finance 
and corporate governance literature have been reviewed. A framework for the 
analysis of the relationship between corporate governance, accounting and other 
disclosure policies has also been developed. Within this framework some research 
questions not completely addressed by the literature have been pointed out, such as 
the interrelationship between both internal and external governance mechanisms, and 
their influence on firm transparency, the interplay between different sources of 
corporate information, the informativeness and the credibility of soft disclosures. 
Moving from these research gaps, the second section has presented two empirical 
analyses sharing a similar setting and examining interrelated research questions. 
The first study has explored the nature of the interaction between firms’ voluntary 
and mandatory risk disclosure to empirically investigate whether they serve as 
complements or substitutes. In addition, it has analyzed the influence of firm- and 
country-level incentives on the decision to disclose risk information not mandated by 
the law. The analysis of a sample of European Oil&Gas companies has pointed out 
the existence of a non-monotonic relationship between mandatory and voluntary risk 
disclosure, suggesting that firms, on average, use voluntary disclosure to complement 
the information in mandatory filings. However, when the level of mandatory 
disclosure goes beyond a threshold, the positive relationship starts reversing, since 
the costs of disclosing proprietary risk information overcome its benefits. 
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Furthermore, consistent with the prediction of the agency theory, it has also been 
found that firm-level monitoring provided by the board of directors increases the 
firm’s provision of voluntary information. Conversely, weak evidence supports the 
substitution hypothesis between external monitoring by the institutions and internal 
board-based monitoring on voluntary disclosure.  
Departing from the increasing importance of narrative and descriptive disclosures 
inside the reporting package of the firm, the second study focused on the use of 
discretionary disclosure strategies in corporate narratives to mislead stakeholders 
rather than providing additional value-relevant information. To this aim, it has been 
examined the relation between disclosure tone in environmental reporting and future 
environmental performance to disentangle whether managers’ use of optimistic 
language represents opportunistic discretionary strategy (i.e. impression 
management), or incremental information tool. Furthermore, using two different 
theories to explain the board of directors’ influence on disclosure strategies, it has 
been explored whether and to what extent the informativeness of tone varies 
according to the board of directors’ monitoring intensity and stakeholder orientation. 
The evidence from a sample of US firms belonging to the Oil&Gas industry, 
suggests that the bias toward positive language in environmental narratives does not 
reflect purely managerial opportunistic reasons, but rather predicts future 
environmental performance. This result seems consistent with the high litigation 
environment constraining managers’ unduly optimistic disclosures. In addition, the 
results have shown that the board of directors significantly affects the 
informativeness of the language only when it simultaneously provides effective 
monitoring and successful stakeholder engagement.  
The joint contribution of these analyses to the proposed framework is manifold. 
Firstly, they answer to the recent call in the accounting literature for considering the 
interdependencies between various factors that shape the corporate information 
environment, documenting the existence of a direct link between mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure strategies (Beyer et al., 2010).  
Secondly, they add to the debate on whether discretionary strategies in corporate 
narratives play an informative rather than an opportunistic role (Merkl-Davies & 
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Brennan, 2007), showing that managers use environmental disclosure tone as an 
incremental information tool. Moreover, it has been found that the informativeness of 
the tone does not vary across alternative disclosure media.  
Thirdly, these studies contribute to the still germinal field of governance research in 
accounting that examines the interaction between internal and external corporate 
governance mechanisms (Armstrong et al., 2010; Carcello et al., 2011), partially 
supporting the substitution hypothesis between board of directors’ and external 
institutions’ monitoring over corporate transparency. 
This thesis is also subject to some limitations that suggest a number of other venues 
for future research. The most important challenge of this research is the endogeneity 
issue. The results of empirical studies should, indeed, be interpreted with caution, as 
they do not completely address the endogenous nature of voluntary disclosure, 
mandatory reporting choices and the characteristics of internal and external 
governance mechanisms. Therefore, one important extension would be performing 
additional statistical tests to take into account the endogenous nature of corporate 
governance and disclosure. 
A second limitation of this thesis is the generalizability of the empirical evidence 
based on the Oil&Gas sector. Although this industry has been worth studying due to 
the uncertainty and the turbulence of the inherent environment and the high 
stakeholders’ demand for supplementary information (e.g. risk information, social 
and environmental disclosure), this choice has not allowed to isolate the effect of 
external incentives that may limit managerial use of self-serving reporting strategies 
(e.g. litigation risk). Thus, a natural improvement of this work would be to check for 
the robustness of results across different settings.  
Thirdly, although this thesis has focused on the effect of the corporate governance 
characteristics on disclosure policies, a large body of literature supports the concept 
that the characteristics of corporate governance system have some effects on the 
market, by influencing, among others, the firm’s performance, its cost of equity and 
debt financing (for a complete review, see Brown et al., 2011). Further research is 
needed to explore if the characteristics of the corporate governance system have a 
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direct or indirect effect on the market, and whether or not accounting quality and/or 
other disclosures mediate these effects. 
Finally, this thesis analyzes the relationship among different information sources, by 
focusing on some disclosure venues (mandatory and voluntary annual report 
disclosure and press releases). However, it should be noted that firms may mitigate 
information asymmetries through several other channels such as management 
forecasts, conference calls. In addition, third party information (i.e. information 
diffused by external analysts) may play a significative role. Therefore, future 
research on the relationship between governance and disclosure in the capital market 
should consider the interactions among these information channels, too. 
Subject to these caveats, this thesis’ evidence have interesting practical implications. 
Its findings could help investors to interpret managers’ disclosure choices and could 
provide regulators and policy-makers with useful knowledge in order to design future 
regulations in light of their influence on the firm’s disclosure strategies.  
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Appendix A 
Panel A: Coding Rules 
(1) The focus is on sections with at least one of the following headings: Operating 
and Financial Review, Financial Review, Business Review, Business and Financial 
Review, Operating Review, Board of Directors’ Report, Director’s Report, 
Management Report, Report of the Board of Management, Audit Committee Report, 
Notes to the (Consolidated/Group) Financial Statements, Risks, Risk Management, 
Risk Factors, Risk Analysis. All other sections of the annual report are excluded 
from the analysis. 
(2) Information is referred to as coding unit. To identify risk information’s the 
following definition of risk is used  
“if the reader is informed of any opportunity or prospect or of any hazard, 
danger, harm, threat or exposure that has already impacted upon the 
company  or may impact upon the company in the future or of the 
management of any such opportunity, prospect, hazard, harm, threat or 
exposure” (Linsley and Shrives, 2006). 
(3) The risk disclosure is classified as mandatory if it provides information on 
financial risk is in accordance to the IFRS 7 and shall be classified according to 
Appendix A - Panel C. 
(4) The risk disclosure is classified as voluntary if refers to disclosure on non-
financial risk factors and shall be classified according to Appendix A - Panel B. 
(5) If the information has more than one possible classification, it will be classified 
into the category that is most emphasized.  
(6) Risk information provided in tables (quantitative and qualitative) should be 
interpreted as if they were non-tabulated information and classified accordingly. 
(7) If a company provides a broader discussion that includes more than one sub-
category the value is assigned for each sub-category identified in the table that are 
related to them.  
(8) Disclosure that is repeated shall be recorded as a risk disclosure one time only. 
(9) If a company discloses risk information that does not fall into the identified sub-
categories, the value is assigned to the category that is more closely related to it. 
(10) If a disclosure is too vague in its reference to risk, then it shall not be recorded 
as risk disclosure. 
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Panel B: Categories and types of risk for non-financial risk disclosure 
Category Type of risk Definition 
ETHICAL MISCONDUCT 
Intentional misstatement of financial statements or 
other management fraud that may adversely affect 
external stakeholders’ decisions 
REGULATORY Regulations impact competitive position, capacity to conduct business and efficiency of operations. 
LITIGATION RISK 
The possibility that legal action will be taken 
because of an individual's or corporation's actions, 
inactions, products, services or other events. 
LEGAL 
Laws impact capacity to complete transactions, 
enforce contractual agreements and implement 
specific strategies and activities. 
C
O
M
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N
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R
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K
 
TAX 
Accumulation and consideration of relevant tax 
information will affect  compliance with tax 
regulations or the avoidance of avoidable tax costs. 
INDUSTRY 
The attractiveness of an entire industry is affected 
by demographic, social and ecological factors 
impacting the customer base and work force, new 
technologies, new uses of existing technologies, 
advances in IT and changes in market demand. 
STAKEHOLDER 
ENGAGEMENT 
Engaging with stakeholders, canvassing 
their views and understanding their needs, 
is importat in order to act as a responsible business, 
well placed to achieve its goals. 
REPUTATION 
Damanaged or enhanced reputation will impact 
customer loyalty, profits and the ability to compete 
in all markets. 
BRAND NAME EROSION 
Erosion of trademark or brand name over time 
threatens the demand for products or services, 
whilst their maintenance builds demand. 
THIRD PARTIES 
DEPENDENCE 
Increased dependence on key customers/suppliers 
could have direct consequences on company’s 
financial development. 
PRICING 
Relevant and reliable information is needed to 
support pricing decisions and avoid prices that 
customers will not pay or that do not cover costs 
and risks 
COMPETITION 
Action of competitors, new entrants and 
withdrawals from the market impact the ability to 
compete, survive and thrive. 
POLITICAL 
Political attitudes and actions in a country with 
significant investment, volume of business or 
counterparties impact resources and future cash 
flows 
ST
R
A
T
E
G
IC
 R
IS
K
 
GEOGRAPHICAL 
Operating in regions where kidnapping, piracy and 
community unrest are commonplace; direct action 
by host communities that results in disruptions.  
APPENDIX  
 
 221 
CAPITAL AVAILABILITY Access to capital impacts capacity to grow, execute strategies and generate returns. 
MANAGEMENT OF 
GROWTH 
Management of restructuring and or growth. 
Ensuring the design and operation of controls is 
appropriate for its scale and size. 
RESERVES REPLACEMENT 
Inability to progress upstream resources in a timely 
manner could adversely affect the long-term 
replacement of reserves and negatively impact the 
business. 
 
CATASTOPHIC LOSS 
Major disasters threaten ability to sustain 
operations, provide products and services or 
recover operating costs. 
PRODUCT QUALITY 
Failure to meet product quality standards could 
lead to harm to people and the environment and 
loss of customers 
HUMAN RESOURCES 
Competition and availability affect the recruitment 
of skilled labour, including management, with 
necessary knowledge, skills, experience and 
authority to ensure that critical objectives are 
achieved 
PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT 
Successful product development underpins a 
company’s ability to meet or exceed customers’ 
needs and wants consistently over the long-term 
EFFICIENCY 
Efficiency of operations determines ability to 
produce goods or services at or below cost levels 
of competitors or world class companies. 
CAPACITY 
Insufficient capacity threatens ability to meet 
customer demands whilst excess capacity threatens 
ability to generate competitive margins. 
PERFORMANCE GAP 
Ability to perform at world class level in term of 
quality as well as cost and time, through operating 
best practices drives demand for products and 
services. 
SOURCING 
Access to sources of energy, metals, commodities 
and raw materials is crucial to meeting quality, cost 
and time targets. 
OBSOLESCENCE, 
SHRINKAGE 
Inventory obsolescence or shrinkage may lead to 
significant financial losses whilst not purchasing 
and producing the right goods at the right time 
leads to reduced cash flows. 
BUSINESS INTERRUPTION 
Interrupted supply of raw materials, information 
technologies, skilled labour or other resources 
threatens continued operations. 
O
PE
R
A
T
IO
N
A
L
 R
IS
K
 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
Hardware, networks, software, people and 
processes comprising the IT infrastructure need to 
support the current and future needs of the business 
in an efficient, cost-effective and well controlled 
fashion. 
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PRODUCT/SERVICE 
FAILURE 
Prevalence of faulty or non performing products or 
services will impact costs of customer complaints, 
warranty claims, field repairs, returns, product 
liability claims and litigation, and loss of revenues 
market share and business 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
Climate change and carbon pricing policies could 
result in higher costs and reduction in future 
revenue and strategic growth opportunities. 
HEALTH & SAFETY 
Safety of working environment for employees will 
affect compensation liabilities, business reputation 
and other costs 
E
N
V
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L
 
H
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H
 &
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ENVIRONMENTAL 
Effects of activities on the environment will drive 
liabilities for bodily injury, property damage, 
removal costs and punitive damages 
Source: Adapted from Arthur Andersen Business Risk Model. 
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Panel C: Categories and types of risks for financial risk disclosure 
IFRS 7- BASIC REQUIREMENTS 
Nature and extent of risks arising from financial instruments 
31) An entity shall disclose information that enables users of its financial statements to evaluate the 
nature and extent of risks arising from financial instruments to which the entity is exposed at the end 
of the reporting period. 
32) The disclosures required by paragraphs 33–42 focus on the risks that arise from financial 
instruments and how they have been managed. These risks typically include, but are not limited to, 
credit risk, liquidity risk and market risk. 
Qualitative disclosures 
33) For each type of risk arising from financial instruments, an entity shall disclose: 
(a) the exposures to risk and how they arise; 
(b) its objectives, policies and processes for managing the risk and the methods used to measure the 
risk;  
(c) any changes in (a) or (b) from the previous period. 
Quantitative disclosures 
34) For each type of risk arising from financial instruments, an entity shall disclose: 
(a) summary quantitative data about its exposure to that risk at the end of the reporting period. This 
disclosure shall be based on the information provided internally to key management personnel of the 
entity (as defined in IAS 24 Related Party Disclosures), for example the entity’s board of directors or 
chief executive officer. 
(b) the disclosures required by paragraphs 36–42, to the extent not provided in (a), unless the risk is 
not material (see paragraphs 29–31 of IAS 1 for a discussion of materiality). 
(c) concentrations of risk if not apparent from (a) and (b). 
35) If the quantitative data disclosed as at the end of the reporting period are unrepresentative of an 
entity’s exposure to risk during the period, an entity shall provide further information that is 
representative. 
  
Credit risk 
36) An entity shall disclose by class of financial instrument: 
(a) the amount that best represents its maximum exposure to credit risk at the end of the reporting 
period without taking account of any collateral held or other credit enhancements (eg netting 
agreements that do not qualify for offset in accordance with IAS 32); 
(b) in respect of the amount disclosed in (a), a description of collateral held as security and other 
credit enhancements; 
(c) information about the credit quality of financial assets that are neither past due nor impaired; and 
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(d) the carrying amount of financial assets that would otherwise be past due or impaired whose terms 
have been renegotiated. 
Financial assets that are either past due or impaired 
37) An entity shall disclose by class of financial asset: 
(a) an analysis of the age of financial assets that are past due as at the end of the reporting period but 
not impaired; 
(b) an analysis of financial assets that are individually determined to be impaired as at the end of the 
reporting period, including the factors the entity considered in determining that they are impaired; 
and 
(c) for the amounts disclosed in (a) and (b), a description of collateral held by the entity as security 
and other credit enhancements and, unless impracticable, an estimate of their fair value. 
Collateral and other credit enhancements obtained 
38) When an entity obtains financial or non-financial assets during the period by taking possession of 
collateral it holds as security or calling on other credit enhancements (eg guarantees), and such assets 
meet the recognition criteria in other IFRSs, an entity shall disclose: 
(a) the nature and carrying amount of the assets obtained; and 
(b) when the assets are not readily convertible into cash, its policies for disposing of such assets or 
for using them in its operations. 
  
Liquidity risk 
39 An entity shall disclose: 
(a) a maturity analysis for non-derivative financial liabilities (including issued financial guarantee 
contracts) that shows the remaining contractual maturities. 
(b) a maturity analysis for derivative financial liabilities. The maturity analysis shall include the 
remaining contractual maturities for those derivative financial liabilities for which contractual 
maturities are essential for an understanding of the timing of the cash flows (see paragraph B11B). 
(c) a description of how it manages the liquidity risk inherent in (a) and (b). 
  
Market risk 
Sensitivity analysis 
40) Unless an entity complies with paragraph 41, it shall disclose: 
(a) a sensitivity analysis for each type of market risk to which the entity is exposed at the end of the 
reporting period, showing how profit or loss and equity would have been affected by changes in the 
relevant risk variable that were reasonably possible at that date; 
(b) the methods and assumptions used in preparing the sensitivity analysis; and 
(c) changes from the previous period in the methods and assumptions used, and the reasons 
for such changes. 
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41) If an entity prepares a sensitivity analysis, such as value-at-risk, that reflects interdependencies 
between risk variables (eg interest rates and exchange rates) and uses it to manage financial risks, it 
may use that sensitivity analysis in place of the analysis specified in paragraph 40. The entity shall 
also disclose: 
(a) an explanation of the method used in preparing such a sensitivity analysis, and of the main 
parameters and assumptions underlying the data provided; and 
(b) an explanation of the objective of the method used and of limitations that may result in the 
information not fully reflecting the fair value of the assets and liabilities involved. 
Other market risk disclosures 
42) When the sensitivity analyses disclosed in accordance with paragraph 40 or 41 are 
unrepresentative of a risk inherent in a financial instrument (for example because the year-end 
exposure does not reflect the exposure during the year), the entity shall disclose that fact and the 
reason it believes the sensitivity analyses are unrepresentative 
Source: IFRS7(2009). 
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Appendix B 
Panel A: Example of coding for non-financial risk disclosure 
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 (Afren, 2010) 
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(Non Financial Risk, Afren, 2010) 
Ethical misconduct 0
Regulatory 0
Litigation 0
Legal 3
Tax 3
SUB-TOT CC 6
MAX CC 15
Industry 0
Stakeholder 
engagement 0
Reputation 0
Brand name erosion 0
Third parties 
dependence 0
Pricing 3
Competition 0
Political 3
Geographical 3
Capital availability 0
Management of 
growth 3
Reserves replacement 0
Catastophic loss 0
SUB-TOT STR 12
MAX STR 39
Product Quality 0
Human Resources 3
Product Development 0
Efficiency 3
Capacity 0
Performance gap 0
Sourcing 3
Obsolescence, 
shrinkage 0
Business interruption 0
Infrastructure 0
Product/service 
failure 0
SUB-TOT OPR 9
MAX OPR 33
Climate change 0
Health&Safety 3
Environmental 3
SUB-TOT EHS 6
MAX EHS 9
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Panel B: Example of coding for financial risk disclosure 
Credit risk 
The refining sector represents the Group’s reference market and it is principally made up of 
multinational companies operating in the oil sector. Transactions executed are generally settled very 
quickly and are often guaranteed by primary credit institutions. Sales in the retail and wholesale 
markets are small on an individual basis; nontheless, also these sales are usually guaranteed or 
insured (Risk Analysis, pg. 96)  
 
(Saras Group, 2010) 
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(Credit Risk, Saras Group, 2010) 
 
 
IFRS 7
Qualitative disclosures 
33.a the exposures to risk and how they arise; 1
33.b
its objectives, policies and processes for managing the risk and
methods used to measure the risk 1
33.c any changes in (a) or (b) from the previous period 1
Quantitative disclosures (by class of financial instrument)
36.a
the amount that best represents its maximum exposure to credit risk at 
the end of the reporting period without taking account of any
collateral held or other credit enhancements 1
36.b
in respect of the amount disclosed in (a), a description of collateral
held as security and other credit enhancements 1
36.c
information about the credit quality of financial assets that are neither
past due nor impaired 0
36.d
the carrying amount of financial assets that would otherwise be past
due or impaired whose terms have been renegotiated 0
Financial assets that are either past due or impaired (by class of
financial asset)
37.a
an analysis of the age of financial assets that are past due as at the end 
of the reporting period but not impaired 1
37.b
an analysis of financial assets that are individually determined to be
impaired as at the end of the reporting period, including the factors
the entity considered in determining that they are impaired 1
37.c
for the amounts disclosed in (a) and (b), a description of collateral
held by the entity as security and other credit enhancements and,
unless impracticable, an estimate of their fair value 0
Collateral and other credit enhancements obtained (when an
entity obtains financial or non-financial assets during the period
by taking possession of collateral it holds as security or calling on
other credit enhancements, and such assets meet the recognition
criteria in other IFRSs)
38.a the nature and carrying amount of the assets obtained 1
38.b
when the assets are not readily convertible into cash, its policies for
disposing of such assets or for using them in its operations 0
34.c Concentrations of risk (if not previously discosed)
B8.a a description of how management determines concentrations
B8.b
a description of the shared characteristic that identifies each
concentration (eg counterparty, geographical area, currency or
market)
B8.c
the amount of the risk exposure associated with all financial
instruments sharing that characteristic
35
If the quantitative data disclosed as at the end of the reporting
period are unrepresentative of an entity’s exposure to risk during
the period, an entity shall provide further information that is
representative 0
CREDIT RISK
DESCRIPTION
